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Abstract
Enhanced knowledge of the nature and causes of mental disorder and the 
neurogenetic basis of many conditions of youth and old age have led 
increasingly to a need for the recruitment of ‘cognitively vulnerable’ participants 
in biomedical research. These include adults with mental disorder or mental 
retardation and healthy adolescents whose decisional competence often falls in 
the ‘grey area’ between obvious competence and obvious incompetence. As a 
result, they may not be recognised as having the legal capacity to make such 
decisions themselves. At the core of the debate surrounding the ethics of 
participation of cognitively vulnerable participants in research is when, if at all, 
we should judge them decisionally competent to consent to or refuse research 
participation on their own behalf and when they should be judged incompetent 
in this respect.
In this thesis, I develop a theoretical framework for making judgments about 
decisional competence to consent to biomedical research on behalf of five 
discrete groups of cognitively vulnerable individuals. I call this a framework a 
theory of precautionary task or decisional competence judgment (PTDCJ). It 
derives from precautionary moral reasoning informed by Alan Gewirth’s 
Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) and is supported by empirical studies in 
psychiatry. Using this framework, I argue that we can make morally defensible 
judgments about the competence or incompetence of a potential participant to 
give contemporaneous consent to research by having regard to whether a 
judgment of competence would be more harmful to the generic rights of the 
potential participant (and any other agents concerned) than a judgment of 
incompetence. I also use this argument to justify an account of supported 
decision-making in research. I end the thesis by applying this framework to 
evaluate the extent to which this approach is evident in existing legal provisions 
and ethical guidelines in England and Wales and the United States.
vü
Main abbreviations
FPCLC First-person contemporaneous legal capacity / legal 
competence
GCAb Generic Capacities of Action behaviour
GCAbrpvp Generic Capacities of Action behaviour consistent with rpvp
PGC Principle of Generic Consistency
PTDCJ precautionary task or decisional competence judgment
RM Reason and Morality
rpvp relation: proactively valuing purposes
vili
Note on the text
The analysis of ethical guidelines and legal provisions derives from research 
conducted principally between 2002 and 2003 and updated in 2006. Where 
discussed, I have stated the regulatory position correct as of 1 October 2006.
In the interests of textual fluency, where the gendered pronoun ‘he’ or ‘she’ 
would be used to denote a hypothetical human agent, the agent is always 
referred to as ‘she’. I sometimes refer to an agent as ‘it’, not to dehumanize 
agents, but to emphasize that there is nothing inherent the concept of an agent 
that suggests that the agent must be gendered or sexed, or even human.
1Introduction
One might be forgiven for thinking that decisional competence is not a central 
concern of biomedical research ethics. Many bioethicists working in this area, 
for example, have focused on human rights abuses in the history of medical 
research with human participants1, the arguments in support of the principle of 
free and informed consent to research participation2 and the ethics of 
biomedical research in developing countries3. More recently, the emerging field 
of ‘neuroethics’ has directed interest towards enhancement technologies and 
the social implications of neuroscience4. However, the ethical basis for making 
judgments of decisional competence to consent to biomedical research on 
behalf of individuals with some form of cognitive vulnerability raises issues 
which touch on all of the above. It is quite surprising, therefore, that the issue 
has not been more widely discussed5.
There have been a number of attempts to address the concept of competence 
per se. However, these attempts have tended to adopt a narrower discipline- 
specific approach, not usually venturing beyond philosophy or psychiatry and
1 See Moreno (2001); Jonsen, (1998), Chapter Five; Lederer (1997); Advisory Committee on 
Human Radiation Experiments (1996); Annas and Grodin (eds.) (1995); McNeil (1993),
Chapters 1 and 2; Lifton, (1988); Katz (1972); Pappworth, (1967), especially Part 1; Beecher 
(1966); Mitscherlich and Mielke (1962) and Fox (1959).
* See Katz (2002); Berg etal. (2001) Chapter 12 and 13; Foster (2001), Chapter 8, esp. pp. 
113-128; Doyal and Tobias (eds.) (2000); Fischman (2000); Wellman (1999:133-136); King et 
at. (1999); Smith (1999), Chapter Four; Bloche (1998); Brody (1998, esp. pp. 43-48); Meisel and 
Kuczewski (1996); Katz (1993); Veatch (1987); Sumner (1987:182-194); Freund (1972). I use 
‘participant’ in preference to the more conventional ‘subject’ as I wish to avoid the connotation of 
passivity and subordination associated with being a subject.
* See, especially, Macklin (2004), Resnik (2004) and Benatar (2001).
4 The essays collected in llles (2006) and Marcus (2002) offer an excellent overview of this field.
5 Much of the literature relevant to this research question has appeared over the last decade. 
These include: Saks and Jeste (2006); Bielby (2005b); British Medical Association and The Law 
Society (2004, Chapter 13); Howe etal. (2003); Jeste etal. (2003); Toner and Schwartz (2003); 
Wendler and Shah (2003); Appelbaum (2002); Roberts (2002); Maio (2002); Poythress (2002); 
Holm (2001); Appelbaum and Grisso (2001); Berg and Appelbaum (1999); Appelbaum etal. 
(1999); Capron (1999); Appelbaum (1998); Elliott (1998); Bonnie (1997); DeRenzo (1997); 
Dresser (1997); Elliot (1997); Berg (1996). Older discussions can be found in Cutter and Shelp 
(1991); Kopelman (1990); Morreim (1983) and Keith-Spiegel (1983).
2engaging with an academic audience drawn from those disciplines6. They have 
also tended to cluster around a number of established topics. Where 
commentators have attempted to develop a multi-disciplinary theory of 
competence to consent to medical interventions, these have tended to proceed 
with regard to the separate question of consent to treatment and not research7. 
Other attempts to theorize competence have considered it in relation to 
particular social behaviours and practices, including competence to consent to 
sexual intercourse, competence to initiate divorce proceedings and competence 
to stand trial8.
In the context of biomedical research, a presumption or judgment of decisional 
competence serves to adduce specific cognitive and conative skills to an 
individual, which affirms their capability to decide whether to participate on their 
own behalf9. Knowledge of decisional competence is significant for three 
reasons. First, it occupies a ‘gate-keeping’ 10 function to identify the 
circumstances in which it is possible to seek contemporaneous consent from 
the person who the decision will affect11 and in which seeking such consent is 
ethically justified. Where there is doubt, assessing competence fulfils a 
determinative function concerning whether a particular person is able or unable 
to consent on her own behalf.
6 For example, Shanteau etal. (2004); Goldstein and Hogarth (1997); Sternberg and Kolligian Jr
(1990) . Spaak (1994, 2003), writing from a jurisprudential perspective, represents an exception 
to this trend.
7 Northoff (2006); Benaroyo and Widdershoven (2004); Breden and Vollmann (2004); Silver 
(2002); Welle and Welie (2001); Vaswani (2000); Gunn etal (1999); Grisso and Appelbaum 
(1998); Wear (1998), Chapter Seven; White (1994); Devereux (1993); Cutter and Shelp (eds.)
(1991) ; Faden et al. (1986), Chapter Eight, esp. pp. 287-294; Culver and Gert (1982: 42-63); 
Tancredi (1982); Freedman (1981); Abernethy and Lundin (1980); Baumgarten (1980); Roth, et 
al. (1977). Zaubler et al. (1996) provide a useful annotated bibliography of research published in 
this area between 1977 and 1995.
8 See Wertheimer (2003), Chapter Ten; Grisso (2002); Stefan (1993); Roesch (1981).
9 This should not negate the important role of emotion in decision-making. Emotion is implicated 
in practical reasoning in so far as it constitutes an expression of cognition and evaluation rather 
than entailing a separation from it. See Damasio (1994) and Nussbaum (2001) for lucid 
accounts of the cognitive and evaluative dimensions of emotion respectively and Charland 
(1998a) for an application of these ideas to decisional competence to consent. For a more 
sceptical view of the relationship between emotion and decisional competence, see Appelbaum
first used in Faden etal. (1986: 274). “[CJompetence judgments function to distinguish 
persons from whom consent should be solicited from those from whom consent need not or 
should not be solicited”, (ibid: 288).
11 As opposed to proxy consent or a prospective consent provided through an advanced 
directive.
(1998).
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3Second, the rationale for making judgments about decisional competence to 
consent to biomedical research and the extent to which decisional competence 
informs ascriptions of first person contemporaneous legal competence (FPCLC) 
depends upon the type of ethical theory which grounds judgments of 
competence. As Benjamin Freedman put it in a seminal article over twenty-five 
years ago, the ethical dimension of competence judgments mediate between 
their ascriptive and normative status:
“Competence is not pure description . . .  nor pure evaluation; but, 
perhaps, an evaluation that stems from certain described facts coupled 
with a moral theory that tells us what those facts mean, how we ought to 
respond to those facts. A middle step between description and action is 
always needed, i.e., a moral theory that interprets experience and guides 
action.”12
Knowledge of who is judged decisionally competent to consent and who is not 
makes clear whether consent from the person who is to participate in the 
research is sufficient for the purposes of authorising research participation or 
whether further authorisation (e.g. from a proxy) is required. It also reveals how 
values such as autonomy and paternalism, beneficence and social justice are 
understood and reconciled when addressing issues of competence. A few years 
before Freedman’s article, Jeffrie Murphy presciently identified the ethical 
question this raises:
“T]he vast majority of cases that confront us will be borderline -  cases 
in that greyish area between full competence and obvious 
incompetence. The real problem that will face us, then, is what to do 
in the borderline cases. When in doubt, which way should we err -  on 
the side of safety or the side of liberty? It is vital that we do not adopt 
analyses of “incompetence” or patterns of argument that obscure the 
obviously moral nature of this question.”13
My aim in this thesis is to provide an answer to this ethical question. I intend to 
demonstrate how moral reasoning applied in the context of empirical studies in 
psychiatry provides a justificatory framework for making judgments of decisional 
competence to offer a contemporaneous consent to biomedical research on 
behalf of individuals whose decisional competence may be questionable. By 
‘questionable’, I mean that there is enough doubt surrounding it as to suggest
12 Freedman (1981: 55).
13 Murphy (1979: 174).
4an assessment of competence, but not so much that their decisional 
competence is likely to be widely fluctuating or at the point of atrophy. My focus 
is therefore on individuals who could plausibly consent on their own behalf, 
without the need for a surrogate decision-maker or advance directive. I consider 
five discrete groups -  older children and adolescents, adults with mental 
retardation, adults with depression, adults with schizophrenia and adults with 
dementia, including Alzheimer’s disease. I refer to these groups collectively as 
‘cognitively vulnerable’ participants14. The argument draws upon ideas from 
moral philosophy, bioethics, psychiatry and legal theory and seeks to integrate 
the insights that each discipline offers15. In doing so, I develop a novel theory of 
decisional competence to consent to biomedical research.
In Chapter One, I explain and distinguish the five constitutive meanings of 
competence - agency, societal, task, decisional and legal competence - in order 
to understand its multi-faceted character and to achieve conceptual clarity. 
From this, we can arrive at an analytical understanding of what we are invoking 
when we discuss competence and in what context. The definitions of 
competence we will arrive at are separate from the normative question of when 
to judge the presence of or to support the development of decisional 
competence to research in relation to cognitively vulnerable individuals, a 
question that a definition of competence alone cannot answer.
In Chapter Two, I discuss the nature of competence to consent16 and why 
research is used in preference to experimentation in this thesis. This leads into 
an analysis of human (or agent) vulnerability along with its significance to 
biomedical research with participants whose decisional competence to consent 
may be questionable. I argue that adolescents and adults with mental disorder
14 Freedman (1981) refers to them as ‘marginally competent’ individuals. I do not use this term 
as it begs the question of where the margins of decisional competence lie.
15 In taking such an approach, this thesis will align itself with a perspective set out in an earlier 
work on the theory of consent: “The special commitments of medicine, law, psychiatry, 
philosophy, psychology, and other professions have led to competing perspectives on 
competence that are in many instances incompatible. Some have claimed that there is not and 
likely will never be a consensus definition of competence. This view is short sighted”. Faden et 
al (1986: 288). This thesis goes further, however, as it seeks to prove that there can be a 
consensus theory of competence, insofar as I attempt to reach a rapprochement between the 
‘special commitments’ of relevant disciplines. As Vanderpool (1991: 209) observes, the 
‘competence of definitions of competence' depends upon a completeness that is dependent 
upon different disciplinary perspectives informing and partially transforming one another.
1® Although this understanding of competence could be coherently applied to other scenarios 
that involve sophisticated decision-making abilities.
5or mental retardation embody in varying ways a notion of heightened intrinsic 
vulnerability that I call cognitive vulnerability. This is comprised of factors 
internal to the individual that may affect decisional competence, such as 
cognitive immaturity or underdevelopment, misperception of reality or declining 
memory retention. These are sufficient for such individuals to have their 
decisional competence brought into doubt but may not be sufficient to lead to a 
judgment of decisional incompetence. The nature and purpose of the ‘new’ 
brain sciences and other advances in biomedical research17 often depends 
upon the participation of such individuals whose decisional competence may be 
prima facie questionable.
Defining decisional competence - which I take to be more coherent in its 
‘decision-relative’ than ‘risk-relative’ form - provides a basis upon which we can 
undertake normative and empirical analysis of making judgments of 
competence to consent to biomedical research. In Chapter Three, the moral 
theory used in this analysis is introduced, a morally objectivistic, dialectically 
necessary approach developed by the North American philosopher, Alan 
Gewirth, known as the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC)18. For the 
purposes of the thesis, I will take Gewirth to be essentially correct in his theory 
and will not seek to defend it from counter-arguments19. On a meta-ethical level, 
the PGC commits all agents to accepting that they have moral rights for no 
other reason than that they are agents20.
After clearly setting out the stages of the argument, I explore the value that the 
PGC attaches to consent and explain why the PGC supports a positive rights 
claim to assistance in decision-making. When applied to the context of medical 
research, the PGC endorses recognition of the decision-making competence of 
research participants and support for its development where possible. I 
conclude the chapter by illustrating the epistemological superiority of the PGC
17 For an overview of developments in the area of neuroscience, see Ackerman (2006) and 
Rees and Rose (eds.) (2004). On impact of neuroscientific and genetic knowledge on medical 
research with adolescents and adults with mental disorder or mental retardation, see 
respectively: Jellinger et al (eds.) (2000); Williams et al. (eds.) (1999); Hall (1996); Hàfner and 
Wolpert (1996).
18 Gewirth was born in 1912 and died in 2004. His most discussed work is Reason and Morality 
(Gewirth, 1978) hereinafter abbreviated to RM.
9 Beyleveld (1991) has already done this extensively, to which I refer the interested reader.
20 These moral rights are subsumed under the broad categories of freedom and well-being.
6as an account of moral obligation through a comparison with the contractarian 
moral theories of John Rawls and David Gauthier. I have chosen Rawls and 
Gauthier as comparators because, like Gewirth, they both detail the steps of 
their arguments carefully and seek to provide an explicit foundation for morality.
Setting out one’s moral theory, however, is not enough to identify the scope of 
the moral community it presupposes. In Chapter Four, I explain how the PGC is 
used to identify members of the moral community by applying the PGC under 
conditions of metaphysical uncertainty, which Beyleveld and Pattinson have 
termed ‘precautionary reasoning’. I consider how we ultimately cannot know 
with certainty that there are other agents apart from oneself, but that this should 
not lead us act on the premise that there are no other agents than ourselves. 
Precautionary reasoning requires us to treat any entity (human or otherwise) as 
an agent where the available evidence suggests that the entity has agentive 
capacities. Even when it appears not to have these capacities, we still cannot 
assume that the entity in question is not an agent, although it will affect how 
paternalistically we treat that entity. Thus, the recipients of our moral obligations 
need not merely be those who can apparently exercise rights and duties 
themselves. In doing so, this chapter lays the groundwork for the more specific 
application of precautionary judgments and gives shape to the meaning of 
precaution which I employ in this thesis. Whilst there has been discussion of the 
role of the ‘precautionary principle’ in bioethics, there have been no previous 
attempts to apply ‘precautionary’ moral judgments in bioethics (grounded in the 
PGC or otherwise) to judgments of decisional competence21. In this sense, the 
meaning of ‘precaution’ within the argument differs from previous usages.
In Chapter Five, I apply precautionary reasoning to the agentive, task and 
decisional capabilities of members to the five cognitively vulnerable groups 
under consideration in this thesis. I draw upon psychological research, 
psychiatric nosologies and debates about personal identity in the philosophy of 
mind as a basis for making ascriptions of agency and reflect upon the likelihood 
of each group being able to develop task and decisional competences. This 
generates a theory which I call a precautionary task or decisional competence
21 For an overview of the role of precautionary principle in bioethics, see Kopelman et al. (2004) 
and Hayry (2005). For a criticism, see Harris and Holm (2002).
7judgment (PTDCJ). PTDCJ specifies that the correct judgment to make about 
the task or decisional abilities of an agent is the one that has the least harmful 
consequences for the generic rights of the agent and those of any other agents 
whose generic rights may be affected compared with the effects of any other 
judgment that may be open in the situation.
In the context of making judgments of competence, PTDCJ requires that where 
the available evidence suggests that an agent can exercise a particular task or 
decisional competence, the agent should be presumed able to do this. Similarly, 
where the evidence suggests that the agent can develop this competence with 
appropriate support, PTDCJ requires that the agent should be presumed able to 
do this, and as far as possible be given this support. In both cases, the 
judgment cannot be made if the consequences of permitting the agent to 
exercise or develop this competence are worse (as measured under the PGC) 
than not permitting the agent to exercise or develop this competence.
Chapter Six presents a critical survey of the empirical studies currently available 
on decisional competence to consent in medical and related forms of research 
with the five cognitively vulnerable groups under consideration in this thesis. 
Evidence derived from studies and assessments of competence to consent to 
medical research substantiates the claim that a considerable number of 
members of these groups are likely to have at least a developable decisional 
competence to make participation decisions on their own behalf which may be 
realised once offered appropriate support. When making a judgment of 
decisional competence under PTDCJ, the empirical evidence for decisional 
competence can be broadly categorized into three groups: compelling: 
uncompelling and inconclusive. The factors that place cognitively vulnerable 
individuals within these three categories include psychological maturity, ability 
to generate preferences in relation to specific decisional contexts, level of 
minimally adequate cognitive functioning (including emotional integrity) and the 
liability of decisional competence to fluctuate over time. However, the limitations 
of the existing research attenuate the force of the conclusions we can draw.
Chapters Seven and Eight extend the theoretical and empirical analysis to 
examine decisional competence to consent to biomedical research in policy
8proposals, ethical guidance and medical law in England and Wales and the 
United States. This serves to establish to what extent decisional competence 
informs ascriptions of FPCLC to consent and whether support in making 
decisions is being offered to older children and adults with mental disorder and 
mental retardation and, indeed, whether the issue is even being addressed at 
all. We will gain a sense of the meaning and importance attached to decisional 
competence to consent as a practical principle and identify the similarities and 
differences with the position supported by PTDCJ.
In conclusion, by applying Gewirthian moral reasoning under precaution22, we 
can make morally defensible judgments about the decisional competence or 
incompetence of a potential cognitively vulnerable participant to consent on 
their own behalf. We can reach these by having regard to whether, given the 
available evidence, a judgment of decisional competence would be more 
harmful to the individual’s agency rights than a judgment of decisional 
incompetence. This empirically-informed normative approach minimizes the 
possibility of reaching conclusions that are unethical, implausible, or 
inconsistent with other findings. It is not my aim to provide practical 
recommendations to guide the development of law and ethical codes in respect 
of competence to consent to biomedical research. Instead, I intend to make the 
case for a theoretical framework to which any future development should have 
regard.
At this stage, I should acknowledge that there are those who are sceptical that 
we actually can have recourse to a clear set of ethical principles with which to 
resolve dilemmas in bioethics and medical ethics23. In anticipation of sceptics of 
moral foundationalism (and to avoid becoming a hostage to fortune), it is 
possible that the ethical argument may proceed merely from an acceptance of 
the existence of human rights and need not necessarily rest upon acceptance of 
the dialectical necessity of the PGC for its force24. Moreover, alternative 
egalitarian rights-based moral theories exist which would imply, if not entail 
similar conclusions25. Yet this is, I believe, unlikely to be enough to convince
22 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998, 2000), Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001).
23 Baum (1990: 7).
24 Beyleveld (1996).
25 Such as Rawls (1971; 1993) or Dworkin (1978, 2000).
gthe hard-line sceptic precisely why rights are indispensable independently of 
their enshrinement in a system of positive law.
As audacious as this may seem to some, I believe that the Principle of Generic 
Consistency is the most compelling answer yet offered in response to the 
‘authoritative question’ of moral philosophy, namely, ‘why should I be moral?’ 
This does not foreclose continuing debate in moral philosophy by any means, 
but instead provides a robust touchstone against which we should measure the 
cogency of future contributions. A foundationalist, dialectically necessary 
account of morality has the advantage of not leading to question-begging 
conclusions derived from premises which ultimately cannot be proven. 
Answering the authoritative question is a fundamental requirement in seeking to 
repudiate our hard-line sceptic and for considering what grounds we have for 
making moral judgments at all, not just the grounds on which we should make 
judgments about decisional competence for research participation from 
cognitively vulnerable participants. It is in the belief that this question is 
answerable -  and that Gewirth has persuasively answered it - that I have 
written this thesis26 *.
26 Other commentators who have espoused or applied Gewirth’s ideas include Phillips (1986),
Beyleveld and Brownsword (1986; 2001), Beyleveld (1991), Toddington (1993), Brown (1998), 
Harris (2002), Pattinson (2002) and Clucas (2004).
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Chapter One
Five concepts of competence
That commentators use ‘competence’ frequently within moral philosophy, 
psychiatry and legal theory is reason enough not to doubt its multi-disciplinary 
credentials27. It would be mistaken, though, to suppose that the insights of each 
discipline are either uncontested or incontestable. Moral philosophy, psychiatry 
and legal theory operate according to different discourses and utilise esoteric 
bodies of knowledge. For the uninitiated, these can often be highly abstruse. 
They typically rest upon disparate theoretical and empirical premises and reach 
different conclusions, sometimes from different perspectives within the same 
discipline. In particular, the way in which competence has been conceptualised 
previously has lead to insights from some disciplines to be given more 
prominence than others, and for others to be neglected. A fusion of these 
insights into an integrated theory of decision competence to consent to 
biomedical research is no easy task. We must begin, therefore, by drawing 
distinctions.
Although there has been much debate about how to test competence, relatively 
little effort has been made to define it28. Competence (or ‘competency’29) is an 
ethical quality, cognitive-psychological trait and legal property of human beings 
and takes several forms. For the sake of clarity, I arrange these into a lexical 
ordering:
1. Agency competence
2. Societal competence
3. Task competence
4. Decisional competence
l  See e0(ri t 904n55a)ble examples’ Landpy <19" )  and Pepper-Smith et at. (1996).
29 As it is often known in North America.
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5. Legal competence (also known as ‘legal capacity’)
These elements are constitutive of the broader meaning of competence in so far 
as to negate one element would be to impoverish our explanation of another.
Agency competence
Common to each form of competence is a measure of successful generic or 
specific human function or capability. Beauchamp describes this as:
“a single, basic, skeletal meaning that underlies various criteria of 
competence: ‘X is competent to do V always means 'X has the ability to 
perform task Y ‘Competence’ thus means ‘the ability to perform a task’.
This is the term’s simple definition (and its logically necessary and sufficient 
condition)."30
Beauchamp’s description expresses competence as an ability. This is true of all 
human competences, as its logical presupposition is that the individual 
concerned possesses the appropriate qualities to perform or participate in X. 
However, competence at its definitional level does not entail that X  should be a 
task. Task competence is a type of competence which presupposes the 
existence of antecedent capabilities. These antecedent capabilities are 
necessary for human action at all, namely consciousness, perception, 
ratiocination and volition. They are qualities common to all conatively functional 
human beings who we may consider competent in the most basic sense. I will 
call this type of competence agency competence. Agency competence is the 
necessary and sufficient condition of the development or possession of any 
other competence. Without this basic competence, individuals lack the qualities 
necessary for minimally independent human life.
Agency competence entails an ability to categorically instrumentally value and 
pursue the necessary means to those purposes (irrespective of what those 
purposes might be). This encompasses one’s freedom and well-being, by which 
I refer both to the ability to deliberate and make choices that are expressive of 
one’s intentions and to the possession of fundamental goods that are
30 Beauchamp, (1991: 50).
Five concepts of competence 12
presupposed by and needed to sustain this, such as life, sustenance and basic 
knowledge31. This current or prospective ability for action is a necessary and 
sufficient condition of being an agent32.
I use ‘agency’ in preference to ‘personhood’, for two reasons. Agency is the 
least restrictive criterion to denote the purposiveness ascribed to persons, as it 
denotes the capacity for freely chosen action construed as broadly as possible. 
On this account, all the agent is committed to valuing are its purposes and the 
means to attain those purposes, whatever those may be. By comparison, 
Harris, for example, connects personhood with the capacity to value existence 
rather than the capacity to value particular purposes33. Although Harris makes 
clear that his conception of personhood does allow a person to cease valuing 
their life34, agency tied to ends stands less in need of such qualification, as an 
purpose could conceivably refer to an intention to die in a context where 
existence is, or never has been, of value to the agent.
Second, the use of agency (at least in its Gewirthian sense) avoids semantic 
correspondence with being human. Correspondence usage occurs where 
personhood is conceived as a ‘subclass’ of human agency35 or where agency is 
understood as partially constitutive of human personhood. Rom Harre employs 
this later usage, defining personhood (or ‘personal being’) as comprising 
consciousness, agency and autobiography (personal identity)36. Insofar as 
human agents (the subject of this thesis) are conscious and capable of forming 
an identity, they fulfil Harre’s definition of personhood. Despite this, one could 
infer from such an account that human beings exhaust the range of agents that 
exist. Such an inference would overlook the wider reach of agency. An agent 
theoretically could be any entity that acts for freely chosen purposes, which 
includes (potentially) forms of artificial intelligence and higher-order non-human 
animals. Agents thus comprise a very expansive natural kind. This does not 
mean that it is impossible to define a person in similarly broad terms, as Harris
31 Gewirth (1978 30-47); see also Beyleveld (1991:18-21).
32 Gewirth (1978: 46 and 119-127).
33 Harris (1985); Harris (1999).
34 Harris (2005: 388-389).
35 See Taylor (1985a and 1985b) and Heinimaa (2000).
36 Harré (1984). Erde (1999) offers a lucid distillation of Harré’s conception of personhood.
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does37. However, the meaning of agency is less ambiguous, as it lacks the 
ordinary language use associated with personhood. This ordinary language use 
of personhood is synonymous with being human38. Agency is, in this sense at 
least, not bound up with being human in the way that personhood is.
Agency competence is not equivalent to, and nor does it require the level of 
competence required for the exercise of advanced abilities, such as academic 
or emotional intelligence, abstract reasoning or practical knowledge. The 
possession of these specialised abilities may affect the scope of the agent’s 
task and decision specific competences, but not the competence of the agent 
qua agent. The threshold of agency competence is low, and as such, most 
human beings meet it. Human beings who lack agency competence include 
foetuses and neonates, those in a coma or persistent vegetative state and 
those in the most advanced stages of dementia39. Their lack of agency 
competence prevents any development of task competences, even though 
prospective development or return of agency competence, and thus the 
possibility of task competences, may be possible40. At this stage, however, I 
wish to emphasize that I do not see these apparent non-agents as being 
unentitled to moral consideration. I will justify this claim when I return to the 
issue in Chapter Four41.
Task competence
Task competence is a descriptive and evaluative measure that includes generic 
activities (such as speech or physical mobility) and highly specialised activities, 
(such as mountaineering or performing neurosurgery). At a minimum, a 
judgment of task competence serves to describe a level of ability shown by an 
individual in respect of a given task (i.e. A is competent at task 8 to degree C). 
As the judgment of competence is task specific, it can describe a person’s 
ability to perform or participate in an activity P or a range of activities Pn at the 
same time she is incompetent to perform or participate in other activity Q or
37 Harris (1985).
38 Ford (2005: 80-81).
39 See Chapter Five for a discussion.
40 In the case of foetuses and neonates who survive to reach more advanced developmental 
stages or human beings who recover from a coma.
41 The reason for my use of the qualifying term ‘apparent’ will, I hope, also become clear.
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range of activities Qn. For example, a person may be competent to cook a meal 
or to speak German fluently whilst at the same time she is incompetent to play 
the cello or to fly a plane.
The following example illustrates the distinction between task-competence and 
agency competence. Suppose I wish to drive from Colchester to Ipswich in 
order to vote in a general election when I arrive. The mere fact that I am 
evincing a purpose that I wish to pursue is enough proof of my agency 
competence. Beyond, this, I am dependent on an array of task competences to 
allow me to fulfil my purposes. First, I would need to have demonstrated the 
competence of driving a car safely and responsibly to the satisfaction of the 
relevant authority. Second, I would need to be of an age (eighteen years or 
older) where I am presumed in law competent to participate in the democratic 
process. Neither of these task competences has any bearing on my agency; 
with or without them, I am still an agent.
A judgment of task competence can be used in two ways. First, it can be used 
to evaluate the ability shown in terms of alternative levels of ability that the 
individual has previously shown at that task under different circumstances; or, 
second, to evaluate the ability shown in terms of the level of ability at that task 
that another individual or group of individuals shows or has shown relative to A. 
Thus, a judgment of competence can have a comparative dimension in respect 
of the same individual over a period of time (e.g. A is competent at task B to 
degree C which is greater/lesser than the degree to which A previously has 
been shown to be competent at task B in different circumstances S) or a 
comparative dimension in respect of different persons at the same time (e.g. A 
is competent at task B to degree C which is greater/lesser than the degree to 
which another individual D or other individuals Dn is competent at B)42.
Additionally, a judgment of task competence may function to evaluate the task 
competences possessed by an individual in terms of the probability of the 
individual possessing those task competences in different circumstances. That 
is to say, from the fact that A has task competences M and N in circumstances
42 It would also be possible for a judgment of competence to have a comparative dimension in 
respect of different persons at the different times.
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T it is possible to infer the probability of A having task competences M and N in 
different circumstances U). Alternatively, we can frame this in terms of the 
probable range of task competences that another individual or individuals 
possess relative to A (i.e. from the fact that A has task competences M and N in 
circumstances T it is possible to infer the probability of another individual D or 
other individuals Dn have task competences M and N).
White identifies capacities and knowledge as providing the basis of task 
competence:
“A person is competent to perform a task, the actions of which are 
specified, if he knows what actions are required, knows how to perform 
those actions, possesses the capacities necessary to perform those 
actions, and, given his position, can reasonably be expected to possess 
both that knowledge and those capacities”43
White’s definition is plausible insofar as she defines capacities as being 
physical and mental44 and knowledge as being specific as well as generic, thus 
not excluding any possible task competences from consideration45. However, 
the definition appears to leave aside the meaning and significance of one’s 
‘position’ on the types of competence that one may develop. If one’s ‘position’ is 
taken to denote one’s level of learning or professional responsibilities rather 
than one’s ontological position as an agent, this would negate the prior question 
of how the competence is developed and its relative importance for human 
action.
Tasks at which it is possible to demonstrate competence can be categorised 
according to their usefulness and importance for fundamental human action. In 
so doing, we can observe where the absence of a task competence may 
seriously impinge on a person’s everyday life and where it may not. For 
instance, the skills required for speech (e.g. co-ordination, pronunciation) and 
physical mobility (e.g. walking, bodily coordination) are required for most human
43 White (1994: 47).
44 Although the volitional component of competence means that the mental aspects are logically 
prior. This is reflected in the difference between saying “Peter is incompetent to run a marathon” 
where Peter attempts unsuccessfully to run a marathon of his own free will and saying “Peter is 
incapable of running a marathon", where Peter chooses not attempt to run the marathon due to 
insufficient physical stamina. See further, Culver and Gert (1982- 53-54)
45 White (1994: 45)
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activities for most of the time, thereby enhancing personal independence and 
autonomy46. It is empirically verifiable that the majority of adult human beings 
are capable of exercising the skills required for speech and mobility. Those who 
do not or who are no longer capable of exercising them are clearly in need of 
additional support or assistance commensurate with the debilitating impact on 
the lives of those concerned47.
By contrast, fewer individuals are (or ever will be) competent to go 
mountaineering and fewer still to perform neurosurgery. However, it is less 
important for the independence and well being of those concerned that such 
competences are developed. Because of their application to specialist fields of 
activity, to lack competence to perform or undertake either is not going to have 
a detrimental impact upon the everyday life of the person who is unable to 
develop the competence, apart perhaps from the thwarting of an ambition.
Acknowledging that more individuals are task competent in respect of speech 
than neurosurgery may seem trite, but it is important to explain. First, the 
degree of understanding and skill required by speech and physical mobility is 
lower than that required for mountaineering or neurosurgery. Given basic 
knowledge about typical levels of human intelligence and motivation, it is more 
probable that a larger number of people are capable of speech or mobility than 
performing neurosurgery. Second, a precondition of possessing a task or 
decisional competence is that an individual should have the developable 
potential for exercising that competence. To be competent to go mountaineering 
or perform neurosurgery requires higher-level cognitive abilities, such as critical 
thinking, developed later in life through a combination of prior learning and 
experience. Even then, they are not developed by everyone to a degree that 
would allow them to be deemed competent to undertake those activities 
supervised, unsupervised or at all. To become competent to go mountaineering 
or perform neurosurgery respectively requires a long and intensive process of 
education, training and practice. Conversely, an individual can acquire the
46 This is true even if independence and autonomy are conceived of separately from the more 
perfectionist notion of human flourishing.
47 This claim requires a normative argument, which I develop between Chapters Three and 
Five.
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abilities for speech or physical mobility without any formal education and with 
only basic levels of cognitive processing48.
The latency or developable quality of task competences captures a significant 
part of their possession. It is not difficult to think of examples to illustrate this. 
One could describe an individual as having a latent task-competence if he or 
she possessed a pitch-perfect singing voice without ever having had singing 
lessons, or could interpret historical events without having ever studied history. 
In most cases, latent task competences need development and assessment 
against predefined criteria before they become formally recognised, but in some 
cases, an informal recognition is all that is required to identify a latent 
competence, such as the recognition of one’s singing proficiency by an amateur 
dramatics society.
To fully flourish, developable task competences require formal or systematic 
training which enhances the embryonic competence. So, in the last example, 
the informal recognition of latent competence could incline one to develop one’s 
competence so as to have it assessed and formally recognised, such as by 
taking singing lessons followed by assessment. The presence of variables that 
suggest a possibility, if not a certainty, that one could become competent in a 
certain respect indicate developable competences. For instance, not all 
individuals will have the competence to perform neurosurgery, but some will 
have a developable competence in learning science at school of such a 
standard that would allow them to progress to study medicine if they wished, 
equipping them to learn about how to perform neurosurgery if they 
demonstrated sufficient competence at medicine. Likewise, we can ascribe 
developable competences to mundane activities such as cooking. Many 
individuals who cannot cook have the developable potential to be able to cook 
following appropriate instruction. This means that we cannot presently describe 
such individuals as having this task competence, but that they have the 
potential to develop it should they so wish.
The potential to develop specific task competences implies a possible 
prospective exercising of those competences although they may not be
48 See further Piaget (1950, reprinted 2001), Chapters 4 and 5.
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possessed currently. It also suggests that an individual could develop 
competence at a particular activity if reasonable modifications were made to the 
immediate environment. For example, a severely physically disabled person 
may have the cognitive abilities to learn how to cook but would not be able to 
develop the competence to cook in an unmodified kitchen environment. 
Similarly, a cognitively able person of abnormally low physical height would not 
be able to develop the competence to learn how to drive a car, unless the 
person has access to a modified vehicle49.
Let us return to the specialised examples of task competence given -  
mountaineering and neurosurgery -  where we can draw a further distinction. 
The way in which we conceive of the relationships and consequences involved 
in mountaineering compared with neurosurgery gives rise to separate moral 
implications. Mountaineering is an activity that has implications only for the 
individual who has chosen to engage in that activity. Irrespective of whether 
duties exist to interfere with the decision of an individual who is ostensibly 
incompetent to go mountaineering, achievement or failure at that activity or the 
risk of harm caused by the activity is directly borne only by the participant50. 
Neurosurgery, on the other hand, involves an action performed on another 
human being, the possible outcomes of which range from the preservation or 
restoration of the patient’s life, serious brain damage or death. They therefore 
impinge upon important interests that the patient has in her psychological and 
bodily integrity and, indeed, life. Notwithstanding a free and informed consent of 
the patient to the operation, it is at least grossly negligent and at worst morally 
opprobrious for an individual lacking task competence in neurosurgery to 
perform the intervention, irrespective of the outcome for the patient. In other 
words, the risk of harmful consequences generated by one individual 
performing an activity that has direct implications for the basic interests of other
49 Modifications to immediate environment in order to allow as many people as possible to 
develop task competences is a matter of social justice that rests upon the value placed upon 
equality of opportunity within any given society and the types of activities that justify the 
provision of extra support and from which the disabled person can benefit (e.g. the provision of 
teaching and learning aids for dyslexic students by a local education authority).
50 Of course it might be possible to argue that direct harm could be caused to the family or 
friends or an injured or killed mountaineer or that society is harmed through the burden placed 
upon health care resources if the mountaineer was to become injured, although these indirect 
harms are more difficult to quantify and do not seem an adequate basis for restricting human 
action in this way. For a discussion of the rationale of prohibiting self-inflicted harm, see 
Feinberg (1986).
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individual provides prima facie grounds for ensuring that individuals 
incompetent at that activity be prevented from performing or participating in it51. 
A higher threshold of competence and clear prior demonstration of proficiency is 
thus presupposed for activities that are (i) more complex and (ii) have a risk of 
direct harm to others attached.
Societal competence
Societal competence describes the possession of a sufficient range of task 
competences for an individual to be considered competent to interact 
successfully within that society or community on her own behalf. By interaction, 
we can understand the array of knowledge, communication and inter-personal 
skills that living as part of a society presupposes. Conversely, societal 
incompetence occurs where: a) an individual possesses an insufficient range of 
task competences to be competent to interact successfully within that society or 
community and b) the individual does not have the potential to develop these 
competences. Individuals who are societally incompetent are not globally 
incompetent and are usually capable of developing some task competences (in 
some cases, even specialised task competences, such as arithmetical or artistic 
skills)52. Societal incompetence in this sense is a descriptive measure of how an 
individual is unable to become task competent in respect of interacting 
successfully within a particular society and is thus a measurement contingent 
on the organisation of a particular society.
It must be emphasised that a judgment of societal competence or incompetence 
is not tantamount to an endorsement of the organisation of that society. Nor is it 
a value judgment about the individual concerned. We can make judgments of 
societal competence or incompetence in both substantively just and unjust 
societies and in many cases these judgments may be expected to differ 
between the two. Echoing Daniel Wikler, how inclusive our societal organisation 
is amounts to an issue of distributive justice53. It is perfectly possible that a 
judgment of societal incompetence could serve to indicate that the society is
51 This could also be taken to mean an individual not yet proven competent at that activity.
52 An example of a societal incompetent person is someone suffering from severe autism
53 Wikler (1979: 377)
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organised on substantively unjust grounds. This would occur where a judgment 
of societal incompetence indicates that the nature of the social organisation 
makes no allowances for people with physical or intellectual disabilities or that 
the society is run only in the interests of persons with exceptionally high 
intelligence. Therefore, one should not infer from the fact that because an 
individual is societally incompetent in one society the individual could not be 
societally competent in any society. Indeed, evidence of societal incompetence 
may be suggestive of a moral failing of that society.
Decisional competence
Decisional competence follows the same conceptual structure as task 
competence. However, it is possible to relate accounts of decisional 
competence to one of two theoretical perspectives:
(i) Risk-relative (asymmetrical) competence
Common to risk-relative theories of competence is that the degree of risk 
attached to the consequence of each choice for the decision-maker within a 
given decision-making situation determines the level of competence required for 
making a particular decision54. Risk-relative theories of competence have been 
formulated in relation patient decision-making, and as such, the nature of the 
risk discussed is one which is posed to the decision-maker only and not to 
others (i.e. the risks involved in deciding whether or not to have chemotherapy 
rather than those involved in deciding whether or not to drive fast down a busy 
city street)55.
54 Robertson’s interesting analogy reflects aspects of this approach: “Competency is a filter or 
screen that channels our thinking by limiting the alternatives and factors to be considered. Like 
a command function of a computer, it opens up new issues, although unlike a computer, it is not 
totally neutral about the decisions and questions that follow. The final question can be reached 
only after leaving the narrow domain of competency and confronting the value choices between 
a patient-centred or other-directed approach that are presented”. (1991:144).
85 It would be perfectly probable in theory, however, to accommodate within a risk-related theory 
of decisional competence risks posed to others as well as the decision-maker. However, it is 
less clear whether one should assume the decision-maker to be incompetent to make a choice 
if the risk it posed to others is disputable.
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In Deciding for Others, Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock claim, “just because a 
patient is competent to consent to a treatment, it does not follow that the patient 
is competent to refuse it and vice-versa”56. They illustrate this by observing that 
a “lumbar puncture for presumed meningitis” requires a “low or minimal level” of 
competence, whereas “refusing surgery for a simple appendectomy” requires a 
“high or maximal level”.57 In other words, the greater the risk posed to the 
decision-maker by the choice made, the higher the standard of decision-making 
competence should be.
For Buchanan and Brock, balancing self-determination and the welfare of the 
decision maker lies at the core of their own theory of competence58. It follows 
that the choice of a decision-maker may be legitimately overridden in 
circumstances where a relevant authority -  such as a physician or researcher - 
believes that the choice (i) impinges on the decision-maker’s well-being and (ii) 
the choice reached is one that the decision maker would be unlikely to make 
when fully mindful of her values, irrespective of whether the decision-maker 
actually believes her welfare to be most satisfactorily pursued by this decision. 
In a rejoinder to a critique of their theory, Brock restates this point succinctly:
“Persons have a self-determination interest in making significant decisions 
about their lives, including important medical treatment decisions, for to 
themselves and according to their own values. But they also have an 
interest in having their well-being protected from serious harms that would 
result from their choices when their decision-making is substantially 
impaired”.59
The validity of this claim rests upon agreement as to the sufficiency of 
decisional impairment such as to justify overriding the outcome of a decision or 
making a determination of decisional incompetence. If one frames substantially 
impaired decision-making to refer to persons who are almost certainly incapable 
of making their own decisions in relation to a particular matter, then there can 
be no disputing Brock’s claim. However, this does not capture the nature of the 
ethical issue at sake here. The ethical issue arises where the choice itself may 
precipitate a reappraisal of the person’s competence -  where competence is
56 Buchanan and Brock (1989: 51-52).
57 Buchanan and Brock (1989: 53).
58 Which they describe as a decision-relative theory in Deciding for Others. However, in a paper 
published shortly afterwards, Brock (1991) concedes its risk-related quality
”  Brock (1991:106).
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questionable rather than palpably absent. For the choice to trigger a 
competence reassessment, it must either run contrary to the person’s well­
being or be at odds with their established values. Under Buchanan and Brock’s 
account, substantially impaired decision-making amounts to a failure to account 
for these two variables by the decision-maker, rather than a complete inability to 
decide at all. The difficulty here is drawing a distinction between instances 
where the decision-maker’s ‘true’ values are ‘distorted’ and may be legitimately 
substituted by others and where the individual’s values have undergone a 
transformation in the recent past that might be erroneously attributed to the 
effects of the condition from which she is experiencing.
James Drane, another exponent of a risk-related approach, considers that a 
standard of decision-making competence should vary in accordance with the 
dangerousness and irrationality of the choice:
“[F]or those . . .decisions that are very dangerous, and run counter to both 
professional and public rationality . . .  competence . .  . requires an ability on 
the part of the decision maker to appreciate what he or she is doing. 
Appreciation requires the highest degree of understanding . . .  To be 
competent to make apparently irrational and very dangerous choices, the 
patient must appreciate the implications of the medical information for 
his/her own life”.60
Invoking a notion of ‘professional and public rationality’ is tendentious in the 
absence of what such rationality is and why it is to be preferred over other forms 
of rationality or modes of understanding61. It is unclear whether a contravention 
of this rationality would occur at any time when the relevant authority (in this 
case the doctor) has her view challenged or rejected by the decision-maker (the 
patient), regardless of how dangerousness the decision-maker perceived it to 
be. Following Drane’s risk-related theory of competence would allow a form of 
strong paternalism to enter the process of competence assessment, negating 
the decisional competence that the decision-maker may actually possess. The 
permissibility or otherwise of such strong paternalism can only be resolved by 
expressly grounding a theory of competence in moral theory.
60 Drane (1985: 20).
61 On the problems involved in positing reasonina for thp <snno.w»w ~
or rationality over another, see MacIntyre (1982). P ^ 0V6r ° ne the0|T morality
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More recently, Ian Wilks proposed a more extensive risk-related theory of 
competence, known as “asymmetrical competence”62. This shares affinities with 
Buchanan and Brock’s account but it employs a more clearly delineated scale of 
risk. Wilks suggests that an individual may be competent to choose one option 
but not another in a particular instance of decision-making. To illustrate, Wilks 
draws an analogy between asymmetrical competence and Pascal’s Wager63:
“Just as, according to the proponents of the risk standard, what you are 
competent to do/not to do can depend upon the risked consequences of 
doing it/not doing it, so, according to Pascal, what you ought to 
affirm/deny can depend upon the risked consequences of affirming 
denying it. Hence . . . competence is not independent of the 
consequences under risk, but rather must be determined in part 
according to those consequences”.64
Wilks’ theory rests upon two heavy assumptions. First, to what are we to have 
appeal in order to judge the value of risk to the decision-maker, when the 
decision-maker will - if competent - be better placed than anyone to make that 
decision herself? Take, as a well-known example, the choice of the mentally 
competent terminally ill person to refuse a proposed life-sustaining course of 
medical treatment. Desire for an end to life does not constitute irrationality on 
the part of the patient simply because of the magnitude and irreversibility of 
what would be lost if the patient refuses treatment. Of course, there may be 
good grounds for ensuring that the patient’s reasoning is sound, informed, 
internally consistent and not subject to external pressure65. However, if there 
are no grounds to question patient’s competence to decide, it is hard to see any 
persuasive grounds for declaring that the patient is decisionally incompetent for
62 Wilks (1997 and 1999).
63 An argument proposed by the seventeenth-century French philosopher Blaise Pascal (1670) 
which suggests belief in God is rational, in the absence of any contrary evidence. Pascal argues 
given the anticipated benefit of belief in God is considerably greater than disbelief, if one 
believes and this transpires to be correct, then one enjoys eternity in Heaven. Accordingly, if 
one believes and this belief is ultimately disproved, one has lost comparatively little, other than 
the pleasure that may have resulted from living a hedonistic life. However, if one disbelieves 
and this disbelief is false, eternal damnation awaits. Therefore, if we are to value our purposes 
and fate, rationality dictates that we ought to subscribe to belief in God.
64 Wilks (1997: 423).
65 Beauchamp and Childress argue that there are circumstances where is it permissible to 
pressure patients or research participants to “change their beliefs or process information 
differently” (2001: 91). Such pressure amounts to persuasion rather than coercion, however, 
and does not necessarily mean that patients or research participants should be judged 
incompetent if they refuse to change their beliefs or process information differently. It also does 
not mean that we should deny decisional competence if a patient decides one way rather than 
another.
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the reason that the choice they reached is not the least or less risky option 
available.
Second, Wilks uses the analogy with Pascal’s Wager somewhat loosely. Wilks’s 
theory of asymmetrical competence presupposes that individuals are competent 
at a particular decision if they choose in some ways but not in others. Pascal’s 
exhortation is supposedly a reason for individuals of their own free will to 
believe in God and not a licence for someone else to deem one incapable of 
making a decision about atheism or agnosticism if one chooses not to believe in 
God. In Wilks’s theory, a judgment of competence to decide is made by 
someone else other than the individual. Thus, someone else’s standards of 
rationality are being imputed upon the decision-maker. In Pascal’s Wager, the 
competence of an individual to decide is not an issue. In suggesting that belief 
in God is more rational than disbelief, Pascal was not suggesting that disbelief 
disqualifies one from making the decision at all. Therefore, the analogy Wilks 
draws is erroneous.
An external standard of rationality is imputed upon the decision-maker in risk- 
relative and asymmetrical theories of competence through the standard of the 
‘reasonable decision-maker’. The relevant authority is likely to deem the 
decision-maker incompetent to decide if she fails to satisfy this standard66. Two 
consequences follow from this. First, such a standard entrenches power 
relationships between the decision-maker and assessor, with the freedom of 
the decision-maker to choose being to some extent subject to control by the 
assessor. Such control may indeed be warranted if the patient is incapable of 
reaching any choice in respect of that decision, but it is far more difficult to 
justify where it could lead to an individual being considered perfectly capable of 
making a choice if deciding one way, but incapable of making the choice if 
deciding the other.
This gives rise to the second consequence. Risk-relative theories of 
competence contend that the consequences of one option of a single decision
66 Roth et al. similarly argue, “The patient who fails to make a decision that is roughly congruent 
with the decision that a ‘reasonable’ person in like circumstances would make is viewed as 
incompetent. This test is probably used more often than might be admitted by both physicians 
and courts". (1977: 281).
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may be graver or more severe than another option, which fits well with intuitive 
knowledge about the array of options that any given decision scenario can 
pose. Nevertheless, it is not clear why this risk should attach to the 
consequence of a particular choice resulting from a decision and not be 
inherent to the nature of the decision-making scenario itself. Using an example 
of consent to treatment, Wilks argues that to be competent to say yes but be 
incompetent to say no is “as if someone says, ‘You can either say yes or no. If 
you say yes we will immediately comply. If you say no we will have to discuss 
the matter further, and we may comply or we may not’”67.
Here lies the problem. Not to comply with an individual’s choice (particularly 
where that person’s choice only has consequences for herself) implies that the 
individual is not sufficiently informed or informable to deliberate between 
options and reach a choice. However, the presence of options is necessary if 
we are to conceive of the situation as a involving a decision at all68. For a 
theory of decision-making competence to argue that an individual is competent 
to say yes, but incompetent to say no in respect of a single decision incurs a 
contradiction in that strikes at the very heart of what the decision-making 
process involves69. It suggests that the individual cannot weigh the benefits and 
burdens of possible outcomes necessary even for a competent ‘yes’ response. 
The ‘yes’ issued in the absence of such evaluative mental processes is mere 
acquiescence and not the product of choice. Such an individual is therefore 
/ncompetent to make this decision at all, rather than competent to decide one 
way but not the other. Asymmetrical decision-making competence thus 
commits the same error of “confusing compliance with competence” that Wilks 
levels at unjustified paternalism70.
67 Wilks (1999:158)
68 The Oxford Dictionary of Psychology defines a decision as, “The act or process of choosing a 
preferred option or course of action from a set of alternatives [emphasis added]. It precedes and 
underpins almost all deliberate or voluntary behaviour." (2001:187).
69 This is particularly problematic for asymmetrical competence theory if we recall Buchanan 
and Brock’s argument that “an adequate standard of competence will focus not on the content 
of the patient’s decision but on the process of the reasoning that leads up to that decision” 
(1989: 50) an argument which Wilks cites approvingly (1997: 414).
0 Wilks, (1997:414). Cale’s response to Wilks is broadly sympathetic to the critique presented 
here: “While the risks related to a decision might be grounds for taking more care in assessing a 
person’s competence, they should not provide grounds for increasing the standards by which a 
person’s competence is assessed”. (1999:148).
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By way of illustration, consider the following hypothetical scenario. A young man 
with learning difficulties suffering from mild schizophrenia is admitted to hospital 
after a minor episode of self-harm. Whilst recovering, and in a mentally lucid 
state, he is approached by a clinical researcher, who informs him of a research 
project being currently undertaken in the hospital to determine genetic 
propensity of the illness. The researcher informs him that participation in the 
research project incorporates two stages, each of which requires consent. The 
first involves the taking of blood and saliva samples for subsequent analysis. 
The second involves CT scanning of the brain, which contains a minimal risk of 
an allergic reaction to the iodine-based contrast dye. After being presented with 
this information, the patient orally agrees to participation in both stages of the 
research and signs a consent form for the first stage with the assurance that a 
consent form in relation to the second stage will be offered to him shortly 
afterwards.
In the intervening period, the researcher consults the patient’s medical notes to 
understand more about the nature and extent of the patient’s learning 
difficulties. The researcher reflects upon this knowledge and reappraises her 
view of the decisional competence of the patient to consent. She accepts the 
consent of the patient to the first stage of the research project, but does not 
accept the consent of the patient to the second on the belief that whilst the 
patient may have the appropriate standard of decisional competence to refuse 
this research, he does not have the competence to consent to it. From the 
perspective of a risk-relative theory of competence, this is an entirely 
appropriate action to take. The researcher, mindful of the condition and recent 
behaviour of the patient, is inclined to view the patient as capable of consenting 
to research activity that poses no or negligible risk, but incapable of providing 
consent to research activity that involves a minimal level of risk. This is as a 
direct result, in the judgment of the researcher, of the patient not being fully able 
to comprehend the nature, purpose and effect of the brain scan.71
However, unanswered questions remain. Did the researcher take the lucidity of 
the patient satisfactorily into account? After all, the patient displayed ostensible
71 Adopting the criteria devised by Thorpe J in Re C (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1994]
1 All ER 819 at p. 824 to determine the decisional competence of a patient to consent to 
medical treatment.
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signs of comprehension of the proposed research. Should this have inclined the 
researcher to maintain her initial judgment of decisional competence in this 
case? In retracting her previous judgment, it would seem that that the 
researcher is doubting the patent’s ability to make a decision about the second 
stage of the research at all, rather than doubting his ability to consent to it. Now, 
it may well be that there is something particular to biomedical research, 
especially that which involves participants with mental illness or learning 
difficulties that generates wariness about supposing a threshold of decisional 
competence to consent that is no higher than for refusal within a single 
decisional scenario. However, such wariness derives from separate normative 
factors about a wish to ensure protection for vulnerable groups, rather than 
deriving from the logical structure of the decision itself.
(ii) Decision-relative competence
Decision-relative theories of decisional competence hinge upon the notion of 
‘decision-specificity’, which means that they are conceptually closer to task 
competence than risk-relative theories of decisional competence72. Common to 
decision-relative theories of decisional competence are two claims: (i) that an 
individual can be competent in respect of some decisions and not others, and
(ii) that if an individual is competent in respect of a particular decision, it follows 
that she must be competent in respect of any choice which that decision allows.
Mark Wicclair argues that an instance of decision-making requires a different 
level of skills and abilities from another unrelated instance:
“The relative skills and abilities vary according to the specific decision, and 
a standard of decision-making capacity therefore should be decision-or-task 
related. It is likely, for example, that there are significant differences 
between the cognitive skills and capacities that are required to make a 
reasoned decision concerning life-extending medical treatment, on the one
72 Culver and Gert explain this in the following way: “SDecific-ta«;WrnmnAt0nrQ¡e^ic* ^  ■ w ^
from risk-related theories of competence in so far as they co llectL ly d rfne  compttence í f  
measure of the internal abilities of a person. Decision-rAiaw . mpeience as a
task specific competence in the decision-making sphere The twn ,S a.?.app ication of
decision-relative competence to have emerged in the last fiftPAn most C0^P ell,n9 definitions of
foremost the abilities and capacities of a pe?son to b° th f mphasise
considered to be an attribute of personhood.” (1990:638) n‘ ^ ompetence> therefore, is
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hand, and the cognitive skills and capacities that are required to make 
sound financial investments, on the other hand.”73
To claim that significant differences exist between the skills and capacities 
required to make a decision about life-extending medical treatment and those 
required to make financial decisions is not to preclude a relationship between 
these skills and capacities but deny that decision-making competence in one 
entails decision-making competence in the other. It is perfectly possible that a 
person in possession of the requisite skills to make such a decision about life- 
sustaining treatment (either currently or prospectively) will not possess 
adequate numerical, predictive or economic skills to make decisions about 
financial investments. Although decision-making about life-sustaining treatment 
and financial investments both require informed rational deliberation, the first 
decision clearly involves something that is far more fundamental to one’s 
existence and basic interests than the second. Thus, the level of understanding 
and appreciation required in order to be competent to decide about life- 
sustaining treatment is commensurate with the specific demands of the decision 
- understanding the nature of the disease, appreciating the medical prognosis 
and weighing up the risks and benefits of having a burdensome course of 
medical treatment against the consequences of not having this treatment. We 
can express this in the following terms:
Individual A is competent to make decisions of type W but not of type Y due to 
some property in type W decisions that the individual can satisfy and some 
property in type Y decisions that the individual cannot satisfy.
Where the general properties of a decision to be made comprise:
a) the content of the available options;
b) the relative ease or complexity with which deliberative reasoning can 
lead to the selection of one particular option; and
c) the impact of the chosen option on oneself and/or others.
73 Wicclair (1993:11).
Five concepts of competence 29
Prefiguring the approach taken by Grisso and Appelbaum74, Wicclair classifies 
the requirements for decisional competence that underpin any decision fivefold. 
This comprises an ‘ideal-type’ definition of decisional competence75:
(i) the capacity of the person to understand;
(ii) the capacity of the person to reason and deliberate;
(iii) the ability of the person to communicate;
(iv) the capacity of the person to possess a set of values and goals;
(v) the ability of the person to recognise options, and to understand the 
significance and meaning of different options.
(i) and (v) differ as understanding in (i) refers to the nature of what is proposed 
(e.g. catheterisation, taking of a blood sample for research) whereas (v) refers 
to the options that follow from deciding in a certain way (e.g. consenting 
to/refusing the proposed intervention and recognising what may follow from 
selecting either one of those options). The third requirement, communication, is 
necessary in order to operationalize any theory of decisional competence. It is 
of course theoretically possible that an individual could be competent to decide 
in the absence of the ability to communicate, but in such circumstances, it 
would be impossible to ascertain her decisional competence. The provision of 
reliable evidence to support an ascription of decisional competence lies at the 
core of its moral and legal significance. Provided one construes communication 
as widely as possible, it has a legitimate place in a definition of decisional 
competence. Taken together, then, the ‘ideal-type’ concept of decisional 
competence has five constitutive requirements: understanding, reasoning, 
deliberation, communication and freedom of the will76.
74 Grisso and Appelbaum (1998: 31).
75 Wicclair (1991: 91). These are also similar in nature and scope to those of Beauchamp, who 
argues that competence requires: (i) understanding and communication of the relevant 
information; (ii) the weighing of risks and benefits; and (iii) to make a decision about 
competence or participation in the light of such knowledge and in light of his or her relatively 
stable values (1991: 58-59). One might be inclined to see the presence of similarities between 
Influential dentitions of decision-making competence as evidence of an emerging consensus 
towards a core of settled meaning for competence. However, such a conclusion could be a 
hasty one to reach given that it is not merely a case of specifying the requirements for 
competence but also specifying how we should be interpret those requirements.
76 Here I agree with the analysis offered by Welie and Welie (2001).
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Whether an individual is competent to make a particular decision depends upon 
the level of understanding required by that decision and the extent to which a 
person can reason and deliberate in order to reach a choice about that decision. 
This explains why some individuals are competent to make basic practical 
decisions (such as whether or not to see a doctor if one has a pain in one’s 
back) but not competent to make more abstract decisions (such as whether 
evolutionary psychology offers a plausible account of human nature). Although 
the requirement for values and goals, communication and ability to recognise 
options is common to both types of decision, they are expressed relative to the 
specific decision to be made. Unlike risk-relative theories, the substance of the 
entire decisional context determines whether the individual is competent to 
make any choice it allows, rather than the level of risk attaching to one or more 
particular choices. It follows that each decision scenario - rather than individual 
choices - require different levels of cognitive function, depending on how 
innately complex or demanding they are. We can express this in the following 
way:
The necessary and sufficient reason for being competent to make decisions of 
type W but not of type Y is the level of possession of abilities E. The extent to 
which abilities E are required is determined by the nature of decision W, but at 
the most basic level are those powers of understanding, reasoning, evaluation, 
communication and choice that constitute the basis of any competent decision­
making.
In both criteria, there is a separation of the notions “competence to” and 
“competence in”. Wicclair concentrates upon qualities inherent to the person 
when engaging in the process of decision-making, rather than invoking external 
variables relative to the environment in which the person reaches a decision, or 
the values of the relevant authority making a judgment of decisional 
competence. These environmental variables are relevant but only in the sense 
that the decision-maker can comprehend and appreciate them. If she cannot, 
then she is not competent to make the decision at all, rather than competent to 
make one or more choices offered by that decision but not others. This avoids 
conflating an external judgment of environmental risk (irrelevant to the existence 
of decisional competence) with lack of the appropriate decisional abilities
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(relevant to the existence of decisional competence). So for instance, in the 
earlier example of the schizophrenic patient, we cannot treat the probability of 
the CT scan giving rise to an allergic reaction to the contrast dye as integral to 
the competence of the patient to decide whether he wishes to participate in the 
research process. It is a risk external to the patient. In this example, it would be 
difficult to make changes to the procedure in order to minimize the risks 
involved, but it may be possible in other cases. Changes of this nature may alter 
the nature of the decision to be made, but will not affect the individual’s pre­
existing level of decisional competence. The risks involved in the research 
activity do not determine the patient's competence to consent to participation 
but instead constitute the nature of the decision to be made at which the patient 
may or may not be competent to decide.
A decision-maker may of course display aberrant incompetence in reaching a 
choice without warranting a judgment of decisional incompetence. Beauchamp 
observes that a person may happen to perform an act incompetently, even if 
she possesses the competence not to do so77. We can apply this to particular 
instances of decision-making. For example, a person may be competent to 
manage his financial affairs, yet on one particular occasion, invests a significant 
amount of money in stock in a company which he knows to be on the verge of 
collapse. Assuming that the investment decision was a ‘one-off and affected no 
one other than himself, then irrespective of his reasons for doing this (he may 
not, of course, have any reasons) we cannot say that on the basis of this act 
alone the person has ceased to remain competent to manage his financial 
affairs. In removing the element of risk from determining the competence of the 
person to decide, a decision-relative theory allows for mistakes and lapses of 
reasoning to be made. In short, it does not reach judgments of decision-making 
incompetence lightly.
From a decision-relative perspective, there is also an affinity between 
developable task competence and potential decisional competence. An 
individual could be currently unable to take a decision due to lack of information 
but may be perfectly competent to make the decision once the information has 
been supplied to her. For example, a person considering what subject to study
77 Beauchamp (1991: 57).
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at university may be incompetent to take the decision before having gleaned 
any information on the topic or reflected on her preferences, yet become 
competent when having considered what subjects are available at which 
institutions and what skills and abilities they require. The provision of 
information does not make a difference to the person’s reasoning skills but it 
gives these skills something with which to reason -  much the same way that an 
engine is incapable of powering a car in the absence of fuel. Just as the fuel 
serves to ignite the engine, so in the same way, the information ‘ignites' the 
competence. So, for example, in biomedical research a potential participant 
may possess sufficient powers of reasoning as to make a competent decision 
as to whether or not to participate, but is not able to make a decision about 
participation until such time as she is provided with the information needed to 
exercise those powers in respect of the decision to be made78.
Decisional competence may also exceed that required as a minimum to be 
judged competent to make that decision, expressed through a ‘benchmark’. 
Common to both task competence and decisional competence is that they can 
be possessed by degree. Just as there can be degrees of competence that fall 
short of the minimally acceptable standard, there can be degrees of 
competence that exceed this. Consider, for example, the assessment of an 
individual to be deemed legally competent to drive a car. This requires that, at 
the point of assessment, all candidates have reached the same benchmark 
standard in that particular task. However, within that group of individuals, large 
disparities of ability will exist. Some will have passed the test with fewer errors 
than others. Some may only be able to drive a car in the situations upon which 
they were examined, whereas others will have the competence to drive on a 
motorway, off-road or on a racing track. These factors are constitutive of the 
competence of the individual driver. Nonetheless, the fact that all have passed 
the assessment show that all have been judged to reach the sufficient and 
necessary standard of competence to be allowed to drive. This sufficient and 
necessary standard can be surpassed but it cannot be fallen short if the 
individual is to be found legally competent to drive.
78 Beauchamp refers to this as an instance of “a perfectly competent person who cannot 
competently decide in the circumstances". (1991:57).
Five concepts of competence 33
The same principle applies to decisional competence. Recruitment practices, for 
instance, commonly employ benchmark tests for decisional competence where 
candidates often will be given a series of tasks designed to assess decision­
making skills relevant to the position for which they are being considered. In 
these circumstances, there usually will be factors other than a demonstration of 
decisional competence that determine the candidate’s suitability for the job. 
Nonetheless, demonstrations of decisional competence are still operating a 
‘gate-keeping’ function here, if only to identify those candidates who would be 
competent to make decisions required by the post, if they were appointed. The 
difference here between the driving test and the decision-making assessment, 
however, is that the degree to which the candidate surpasses the minimal 
standard of competence required to meet the benchmark will usually be taken 
into account, especially if there are more candidates than positions available, 
whereas it is irrelevant to the passing the driving test79.
Therefore, we can say of all tasks and decisions that involve a single 
determination of competence that they employ a minimal criterion of 
competence. This operates as a benchmark at which level the necessary skills 
and abilities must at least be possessed. We can express benchmark measures 
of assessing decision-making competence in the following terms:
In order for person A to be deemed competent to make decisions of type X, 
abilities E must be possessed to a necessary and sufficient level. Abilities E will 
depend upon the nature of X, and may well be possessed to such a degree that 
exceeds the requirements for X. The relevance of the degree to which A may 
exceed the necessary and sufficient level required to be deemed competent to 
make decisions of type X  will depend upon the purpose of the test and may well 
be irrelevant to the judgment of competence.
Two observations can be made of the relationship between decisional 
competence and benchmarks tests. First, in describing how tests for decision- 
making operate as a benchmark, we do not need to concern ourselves with the 
correctness of the normative premises upon which those tests are based (e.g.
79 At least in the UK. However, for all drivers that pass, there will be a record of the number of 
faults that were observed during the test, although these make no material difference to passino 
the test -  one cannot pass by degree. a
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whether the benchmark of decisional competence for recruitment to a social 
work position is set at a high enough level)80. Second, the relationship between 
decisional competence and benchmarks tests questions the belief that a 
definition of competence and the grounds on which it is tested are distinct81. 
Indeed, we have seen that in defining decisional competence as a quality that 
may be displayed by degree, an individual could display decisional competence 
that exceeds any benchmark standard that a test designed to assess that 
competence may employ.
In summary, theories of decision-relative competence offer a more conceptually 
convincing account of decisional competence than do risk-relative/asymmetrical 
theories of decisional competence. In determining the level of competence 
required to make a decision by the outcome chosen, risk-relative theories of 
decisional competence confuse what is needed to be able to make the decision 
at all with what is necessary to be judged competent to decide one way or the 
other. In doing so, they offer a problematic view of decision-making that 
decision-relative theories of competence, with their emphasis upon abilities 
required to make a specific decision (and not to select one options over others), 
do not share.
Legal competence
Legal competence -  or legal capacity - is in its essential form the exercise of a 
legally recognised power82. Legal competence is permissive - it serves to 
empower a person to be legally authorised to perform or participate in a given
80 Beauchamp takes a different view: “[Competence] is inherently normative in the way it is used
to establish the abilities and level of abilities. . .  [t]hus it is a mistake to infer that empirical 
judgments of psychological competence are free of prior evaluative commitments The reverse 
is true: they are inescapably value-laden." (1991: 53). Beauchamp is right to observe that the 
basis of competence judgments is normative. However, the way in which a benchmark test 
operates to measure competence is factual insofar as it operates for the purpose to establish 
whether person A has reached benchmark H for decisional competence W independent of the 
normative premises upon which it is based. H
81 A belief endorsed by Becky Cox White: “A definition serves a theoretical function -  it tells us 
what we mean by competence The capacities that define competence specify the criteria for 
being a competent person. To be competent is to have the relevant capacities Tests serv* 
a practical function -  they are tools that identify the presence or absence of capacities and 
determine whether particular persons have the appropriate abilities ” (1994- L P| «  ’ d
"  Wilh e x c e p t io n  of Hohfeld's concept o f.  legal ¿ w a r e is n^vfdence of
° ' le9al COmpe,e" CB “ "01 # »  1940s. The earliest known such discussion
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activity. The premise of legal competence is either presumptive (such as 
reaching eighteen years of age in respect of being legally competent to vote In 
the UK) or demonstrable (such as driving a car unsupervised after having 
passed a test) that signifies the individual is capable at that activity or in making 
a specific decision. The possible types of legal competence are wide. They 
extend to include duties assumed by virtue of one’s occupation or 
responsibilities (e.g. doctor, teacher, parent, carer) or vested in an inanimate 
body, such as an institution (e.g. Parliament) or other body (e.g. a 
corporation)83.
The legal presumption of competence is heavily value laden. As Eastman 
observes, “the law most obviously defines models of man in relation to mental 
capacity and responsibility”84. In essence, legal competence upholds the value 
of individual self-determination such that to enshrine the power to express a 
choice is to protect the power to express a choice. This value is epitomised in 
contemporary rights-based liberal political and legal thought85. It follows that an 
individual must display a high degree of evidence for task or decisional 
incompetence to trigger a reassessment of competence. One example of this is 
where a legal rule requires a driver convicted of dangerous driving to take the 
driving test again. This is also true when one declares an individual incompetent 
to perform a task or to make a decision. An illustration of this is an adult’s loss 
of the right to make decisions about medical treatment of a certain type on her 
own behalf, where she fails to display decisional competence or displays it 
unsatisfactorily.
Conventional understanding views legal competence as a single concept, yet 
within this there are three distinct meanings that are qualitatively different. 
These manifestations do not alter the essence of legal competence as a legal 
power but distinguish what factors inform the power and who is the exerciser of 
that power. The first sense of legal competence defines competence in terms of 
a legal power vested in an individual by law to make decisions affecting herself 
in respect of a specific activity. We can express this as follows:
83 For a discussion, see Spaak (1994).
84 Eastman (1992:161).
85 Evidenced in the works of Berlin (1969), Rawls (1972), Nozick (1974) Dworkin (1978V 
Gewirth (1978); Raz(1986) and Nagel (1991). See Plant (1991) for an excellent discussion. For 
a specific discussion in relation to bioethical issues, see Charlesworth (1993), Chapter 2.
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First sense of legal competence:
Person A has legal competence In relation to activity B by virtue of having 
attained legal threshold C.
Here, being person A and having attained legal threshold C are together the 
necessary and sufficient condition for having legal competence in relation to B. 
The legal threshold could be presumptive or demonstrative. For example, in 
English law, one gains legal capacity to marry and to consent to sexual 
intercourse by virtue of reaching a threshold age, which is presumptive. These 
activities require legal competence to be held and exercised by the participating 
individuals involved, as opposed to a third party. In other words, if I wish to 
marry or consent to sexual intercourse (presuming the consent of the other 
party), I must (i) have legal capacity to do this (by being of or above the 
requisite age) and (ii) exercise this capacity myself at the time I wish to make 
the decision. I call this ‘first-person contemporaneous legal competence' 
(FPCLC). This presumption of legal competence is not absolute, however, and 
the presence of manifest decisional incompetence can rebut this.
There is no necessary conceptual connection between legal competence and 
decisional competence, however86. Standards of legal competence may reflect 
insights from definitions of decisional and task competence to provide grounds 
for FPCLC. However, legal competence can be held by individuals who are 
themselves decisionally incompetent to make the decision or perform the task 
at the time the decision needs to be made or the task performed, but who have 
previously delegated the decision-making authority to a third party. This third 
party therefore has the legal power to make decisions or perform tasks of a 
specified nature on their behalf. Legal competence therefore extends beyond
86 In the US, medical professionals commonly define mental capacity as an expression of 
decision-making competence while competence is a legal construct (Berg et al, 2001: 95-96; 
Schneider and Bramstedt, 2006). The reverse is true in England and Wales, where not only 
does the dualist terminology exist but also capacity is often used in an unqualified form, which 
leads to inconsistency and a lack of clarity over whether legal or mental capacity is being 
invoked. Alternatively, in parts of continental Europe, legal competence is distinguished from 
decisional competence. Elsewhere, I argue (Bielby, 2005a) that this terminological complexity 
has given rise to frequent occasions where academic commentators and judges have conflated 
legal capacity and decisional competence.
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denoting the decision-making abilities of an individual at the time the decision is 
to be made87. The effect of this is to draw a conceptual distinction at least in 
part between decisional/task competence and legal competence. Beauchamp 
notes:
“Legal competence, by contrast to psychological competence, has to do with legal 
capacity. . . as a category distinct from psychological capacity. Some persons, 
such as precocious minors, may have psychological ability, but not legal ‘capacity’.
Some persons may have legal capacity without psychological capacity. Despite the 
contrast, however, legal competence generally builds on psychological 
competence, and adds an explicit, new evaluative dimension different from the 
evaluation involved in selecting abilities or tests of psychological incompetence. To 
say that someone is legally competent is to say that no-one is justified in 
authorising interventions in . . . the persons’ affairs or in acting on the persons’ 
behalf.”88
Beauchamp is right to claim that legal competence can exist in the absence of 
decisional competence and the psychological presence of decisional 
competence is no guarantee that it will be recognised officially through an 
ascription of legal competence. This is different from saying that not all 
instances of legal competence depend upon a prior assessment of decisional 
competence - presumptive legal competence illustrates this. In all cases, legal 
competence serves an enabling function when the law allows person A to make 
decisions of type X  or participate in activities of type Y. It is not necessary, 
however, that the person for whom the legal authorisation is designed to benefit 
must always exercise legal competence herself. Legal competence or capacity 
can take the form of a delegable power exercised by a third party nominated by 
the beneficiary in the interests of the beneficiary after the loss of decisional 
competence. This comprises the second sense of legal competence.
The transferability of legal competence is possible provided the following 
conditions are satisfied:
a) The beneficiary can nominate a willing surrogate;
87 Legal decision-making competence could feasibly allow the waiver of decision-making 
responsibility in relation to a particular decision altogether. Subsequent decision-making of that 
type may instead be manifest through a “conscious decision not to be involved in making 
.implicit and deliberate decisions.” (Dekkers, 2001: 185) This is reflected in a patient’s 
exhortation to her doctor “I trust you to make any further decisions on this matter as you see fit 
without discussing them with me”. It is unlikely that in offering such a waiver, the doctor would 
question the patient’s decision-making competence, however.
Beauchamp (1991:68)
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b) The decision or task must be able to be made or performed by another 
under the authority of the beneficiary;
c) The decision to be taken or action to be to performed must be something 
that is still of relevance to the beneficiary after the onset of decisional or 
task incompetence;
d) The surrogate is competent to make any decisions or perform any tasks 
such as may be required.
Typically, this will require;
(i) a legal rule which permits a surrogate appointed by a person before 
the onset of her decisional incompetence can make decisions on behalf 
of the person after the onset of her decisional incompetence and 
specifies the spheres of activity in which surrogate decision-making is 
possible;
(ii) legal authorization made by a person before the onset of her 
decisional incompetence consenting to a particular individual assuming 
the role of surrogate in respect of these types of decision-making 
scenarios.
We can understand legal competence in this sense as a prospectively 
delegable legal power. Here, the person for whom the decision-making is to 
benefit does not exercise the legal competence to make decisions of the type 
specified by the legal rule, as any grounds for presuming or demonstrating 
decisional competence that could inform FPCLC dissipate after the onset of 
decisional incompetence. Instead, the legal competence to make these 
decisions is exercised on behalf of the person for whom the decision-making is 
to benefit by the surrogate, once the person concerned no longer has the 
decisional competence to make decisions of this type for herself.
Delegable legal competence has parallels with other forms of legal 
authorisation. For example, it would be perfectly possible to authorise a willing 
individual to drive one’s car on one’s behalf, provided that the surrogate driver 
was competent to drive cars in general and was insured to drive this particular 
car. Where legal competence to make a decision also involves a task, and the
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individual is still competent to make the decision and not perform the task, the 
decision may still be taken by the individual but the task may be vested in a 
proxy where the task is not connected to the decision, such as voting on 
someone else’s behalf. This is because the decision-making element only - not 
the task element - is the necessary and sufficient condition of the legal 
competence. This explains why a physically disabled person reaching the age 
of majority would still be competent to vote and individuals are not declared 
competent to vote as soon as they are old enough to be physically able to visit a 
voting booth.
We can draw a further distinction between an individual’s decision to appoint a 
surrogate before the onset of decisional incompetence, which requires FPCLC 
in order to authorise the prospective powers of the surrogate, and the 
surrogate’s decisions taken on behalf of the person after the onset of decisional 
incompetence, the legal validity of which derives from the delegated legal 
competence which becomes operative once the beneficiary ceases to be 
decisionally competent. The operation of the delegated legal competence 
means that the beneficiary has not lost legal competence altogether. Legal 
competence continues to reside in the individual who is decisionally 
incompetent at the time the decision must be made in respect of that task, 
except she no longer makes it contemporaneously in the first-person. This is 
because the surrogate is exercising legal competence on behalf of the 
beneficiary, and because the surrogate has been vested with this power as a 
result of a decision made by the person whilst they still had FPCLC to do so. 
We can express this as follows:
Second sense of legal competence:
Person A has legal competence in relation to activity B after the onset of /Vs 
decisional incompetence by virtue of having transferred legal competence to 
make decisions in relation to B to person R before the onset of As  decisional 
incompetence (where the transfer becomes effective as soon as possible after 
the onset of >A's decisional incompetence).
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Here, being person A, who has transferred legal competence to R In respect of 
B (where B is a matter over which A had previously had FPCLC and over which 
A is, in the event of decisional incompetence, legally entitled to delegate the 
legal competence to a surrogate), is the sufficient and necessary condition of 
legal competence.
It is important to note the crucial difference between ‘has legal competence' in 
the first sense of legal competence and ‘can exercise legal competence’ in the 
second sense of legal competence89. In the first case, legal competence is both 
possessed and exercised by and on behalf of the same person. In the second 
case, legal competence is possessed by the incompetent person but exercised 
through her nominated surrogate.
There is, of course, a time in our lives where we cannot yet exercise FPCLC but 
the state still vests us with legal rights. In these cases where the beneficiary is 
too young to be able to exercise legal competence on her own behalf, legal 
competence is also exercisable by individuals deemed in law to be an 
appropriate surrogate to exercise the power, such as the parents or legal carer 
of an infant or young child. I call this ‘fiduciary’ legal competence. We can 
express this form of legal competence in the following way:
Third sense of legal competence:
Person A has legal competence in relation to activity B due to it being exercised 
by R during the period of life before A becomes legally competent in the first 
sense (i.e. before A is ascribed FPCLC) in relation to B.
This form of legal competence is similar to the second sense insofar as it 
involves a surrogate exercising legal competence on behalf of the beneficiary. 
However, it differs in two ways. First, the beneficiary could not have previously 
expressed a wish that the surrogate decision maker have the power they do 
due to the beneficiary s immaturity. In this sense, it cannot emanate from 
FPCLC. Second, the purpose of the surrogate decision maker is to hold in trust
89 Spaak (1994; 2003) draws such a distinction but uses it in a different way to describe the 
hypothetical possibility of changing a legal relationship (having competence) and the actual 
performance of the act which changes the legal relationship (exercising competence)
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the legal competence for the child with a view to the child assuming FPCLC by 
such time when she is either presumed in law to have FPCLC (which occurs in 
the ascription of a specific FPCLC on a presumptive basis) or when she has 
demonstrated sufficient intelligence and maturity to make decisions in relation to 
such matters (which occurs in the ascription of a specific FPCLC on a 
demonstrable basis). Although surrogate decision-making for decisionally 
incompetent adults may serve a similar stewardship function (for example 
during a period of mental illness or coma), in most cases of this type, surrogate 
decision-making will persist throughout the beneficiary’s life due to the 
irrevocable origin of the decisional incompetence.
The adoption of a legal standard of competence itself gives rise to possible 
problems. White argues that a definition of legal competence cannot and should 
not proceed without the involvement of specialists in the field in which such 
definition is required:
“Suppose, however, that the law decided to construct a definition of 
competence to resolve future hard cases. Legal scholars would still quite 
likely consult the experts, that is, the health professionals. In fact, if the law 
failed to consult medicine, medicine would -  and should -  insist on being 
involved. Any attempt to construct a definition without information from the 
group who knows the most about it and will be largely responsible for its 
implementation would be ill advised.’’90
White concludes that law cannot provide such a definition because of concerns 
about the inflexibility and narrowness of a legal definition of competence91. It is 
true that the inherent multi-disciplinarity of competence means that any attempt 
to provide a legal definition of competence without appropriate consultation 
would be doomed to failure. However, as White appears to be referring to a 
legislative definition, the substance of her claim is less compelling. Judicial tests 
of competence are unlikely to be shaped by overt medical, psychological or 
philosophical correlates in the way that a legislative measure, with more time 
available for consultation of interested parties and expertise, is likely to be. It is 
also probable that a common law definition of competence would be subject to 
unpredictable modification or even repeal in subsequent case law. I am 
prepared to go so far as to concede White’s claim that a legislative definition
90 White (1994: 11)
91 White (1994:12)
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cannot systematise the intricate definitional elements of different types of 
competence or incompetence, but this does not imply that a legislative definition 
cannot endorse a skeletal task or decision-relative definition of competence. A 
legal definition of competence may be possible, but its ambitions should be to 
give regulatory shape to the concept rather than to define it exhaustively.
However, another problematic consequence attaches to legal definitions of 
competence. In order to maintain certainty and consistency, definitions of legal 
competence that apply to FPCLC usually require a threshold or ‘cut-off point’. 
This is often achieved through a presumptive standard determined by age. 
Individuals above this age are presumed legally competence to make decisions 
of type X on their own behalf92; individuals below this age are not, either on their 
own behalf or at all. Beauchamp and Childress argue that these pragmatic 
guidelines which determine legal competence are distinct from criteria for 
decisional competence:
“We also need to distinguish two senses of standard of competence. In one 
sense, criteria of competence are at stake - that is, the conditions under 
which a person is competent. In a second sense, standard of competence 
refers to the pragmatic guidelines we use to determine competence. For 
example, a mature teenager could be competent to decide about a kidney 
transplant (satisfying criteria of competence) but could also be legally 
incompetent by virtue of age (failing pragmatic guidelines).”93
In principle, it may appear fairer to suggest that where some individuals 
genuinely do develop the necessary decisional competence at an age below the 
legal threshold of presumptive competence for making decisions of that type, 
they should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The realism of this argument 
depends upon the nature of the decision to be assessed and the number of 
individuals who would be subject to assessment. For instance, it is more difficult 
to assess each mature and intelligent fifteen year-old to determine whether she 
should be given the vote before reaching eighteen, than it is to assess whether 
each of these fifteen year-olds has developed a sufficient understanding and 
intelligence as to know what is involved in her medical treatment94. This is 
because having the vote involves making decisions that have direct implications
92 Although this is usually a rebuttable presumption.
93 Beauchamp and Childress (2001:107, n. 37).
94 The test devised by Lord S carman in the English case of Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech 
Area Health Authority [1985] 3 All ER 402.
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for others in society whereas consent to medical treatment only has direct 
implications for the person consenting95. For this reason, assessing voting 
decisional competence would almost certainly require more time and effort than 
assessing medical treatment decisional competence.
To formulate a legal definition of competence that is framed in a sufficiently 
intelligible way for use in legal reasoning yet at the same time is also informed 
by criteria of competence that are capable of interpretation by competence 
assessors -  doctors, psychiatrists and psychologists -  requires semantic 
clarity96. However, the application of any kind of rule (legal or otherwise) risks 
giving rise to a substantive injustice if the values of certainty and consistency 
are pursued at expense of fairness97. To avoid the possibility of such injustice, a 
normative theory is required to explain the conditions under which we should 
make a judgment of decisional competence and incompetence, and the 
circumstances in which it is ethically justifiable to deny someone the legal power 
to make decisions of a specific type98. On this basis, an attempt to provide a 
legal standard of decisional competence is more likely to remain faithful to 
criteria for decisional competence relative to a particular decision-making 
context (such as biomedical research), whilst simultaneously recognising the 
need to retain some kind of threshold to avoid administrative unworkability99.
This should be not taken to underestimate the effect that medical decision-making by young 
people can have on those who love and care for them, particularly where the young person's 
health may be adversely affected if their decision to refuse important treatment was to be 
respected.
96 Beauchamp and Childress attempt to rninimize semantic confusion resulting from a standard 
of competence possessing two concurrent meanings by using the term “only to mean a criterion 
for determining competence . (2001:107, n. 37). Culver and Gert (1982: 55-56) similarly seek to 
distinguish between the two although they do so in relation to incompetence and leqal *  *
incompetence. They are a little optimistic, perhaps, in claiming that a judgment of leqal 
.ncompetence always depends upon a prior assessment of decisiona competence 
9 Which could otherwise be expressed as a tension betwPAn o
For a discussion see, Lyons (1993). ee"  substa" ' «  formai justice.
981 use the term ‘power’ in a Hohfeldian sense
"  £vsn ‘f decisional competence could in some cases be determined on a case-by-case basis.
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Chapter Two
Consent, vulnerability and 
research
Competence to give informed consent
Competence to give informed consent is a form of decisional competence. Not 
all decision-making involves consent but every instance of consent involves 
decision-making. It follows that in every instance of consent there has to be an 
exercise of decisional competence. Decisional competence is thus a 
prerequisite of informed consent100.
Faden ef a/, identify two meanings of informed consent101. The first, which they 
call ‘sensei’ is “an autonomous action by a subject or patient that authorizes a 
professional either to involve the subject in research or to initiate a medical plan 
for the patient (or both)” 102. An individual gives sensei informed consent 
provided that she has “substantial understanding”, is not subject to the control 
of others, has intentionality and gives her authorization to the health care 
professional concerned103. It is similar to definitions that other commentators 
have offered, in particular, White104. ‘Sense2’ informed consent is “legally or
100 McConnell (2000: 70).
101 Faden etal. (1986: 276). They claim that their definition is a purely logical one that sets out a
conceptual analysis of informed consent without introducing normative variables This is 
problematic, in that informed consent qua effective authorisation intrinsically upholds the 
normative value of individual autonomy. 1 K
102 Faden efa/(1986: 278).
103 Faden et al (1986:278).
104 White (1994: 50) defines competence to consent in the following terms- "A person is 
competent for the task of giving a free and informed consent if (1 ) he is generally informable 
and cognitively capable of performing the actions involved in making a decision (2) he knows 
that the decision-making requires these tasks, (3) he knows how to perform these tasks and
g ven h,s situation we can reasonably expect him to be able to mai < 9 ^ S S S , ^ b^ S ) 
of a criterion for the legal effectiveness of that consent. White's definition of competence to 
consent is similar o sense, competence offered by Fatten ef aI. However, W h S d e W  on 
appears not to distinguish decisional from task competence. It is true that the S a M e  cZ c e s  
,n a particular dec,s,on-makmg instance may require task competence at a particular a c h y ^ o t
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institutionally effective [original emphasis] . . . authorization from a patient or 
subject. . .  obtained through procedures that satisfy the rules and requirements 
defining a specific institutional practice in health care or in research”.105
Sensei and sense2 consent correlate respectively to non-legal prerequisites of 
informed consent and legal or institutional rules of recognition for informed 
consent to be legally valid106. Sense2 competence must be grounded in sensei 
competence criteria in order to be coherent107, especially if the function of 
sense2 competence is to confer legal or institutional status on a particular 
normative conception of consent. However, at a conceptual level, it is possible 
that a legal rule or principle of an ethical code can introduce normative 
standards of their own quite apart from those suggested by the normative 
standards of sensei autonomous authorisation. Such a disparity allows a 
dichotomy to emerge between the level (such as age) at which decisional 
competence may be presumed to exist (on theoretical and empirical grounds) 
and the threshold at which the law officially recognises this decisional 
competence.
For example, until 2003, the age at which consent to homosexual sexual 
intercourse in England was set was eighteen years of age - two years higher 
than that for heterosexual sexual intercourse. Given that there is no difference 
in the level of decisional competence required for consensual sexual 
intercourse irrespective of whether it is heterosexual or homosexual in 
nature108, then it is clear that there are additional normative values expressed 
by the different legal standard for consent to homosexual as opposed to 
heterosexual intercourse. This legal rule, which regulates consent, was not an 
expression of the decisional competence required in order to make that 
decision, but a reflection of normative assumptions (about the morality of
decisional competence to offer consent does not entail task competence at a particular activitv 
For example, I can be decisionali competent to choose whether it is preferable fa?metoS i  
from Sheffield to Hull by train or by car without having the task c o r n e e to dr£e X r a
!S? Faden“  a'l (1°986 SST "6 8 “ ra" passeX  or bV to i'
106 Faden et al (1986: 277-278).
107 Faden et al (1986: 294).
108 The decision whether or not to have sexual intercourse vuith a ____ _
the same level of decisional competence irrespective of w/hpthor th sen in9 Partner requires 
same or different gender. This is b e ra te  ttfe gender of one s Dartrfnf^XUa.Par ner 'S 
or morally - to the level of decisional competence required to make the decteto!Tant " factua"1'
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homosexual sexual intercourse in early adulthood) quite unrelated to the 
requirements of decision-making competence. If we analyse it in terms of Faden 
et ais definition, we see that this definition insufficiently explains how other 
values apart from decisional competence can influence the level at which a 
presumptive standard of decisional competence to consent is set in law.
Faden et afs two senses of informed consent also describe FPCLC. Since they 
are couched in terms of providing consent in the first person (i.e. the individual 
who is to be affected by the decision is the one who consents), their two senses 
do not describe the nature and context of proxy consent, which corresponds to 
the second and third senses of legal competence outlined in the last chapter. 
This should not imply, as Abrams argues, that proxy consent is a conceptually 
incoherent use of consent:
“ If one accepts that in order for consent to be meaningful it must be given 
by the individual in question rather than from a third party, indeed it is 
questionable, at least on a theoretical level, whether ‘proxy consent’ is 
actually consent at all.” 109
The confusion over whether proxy consent is informed consent derives from an 
inadequate understanding of what type of competence is grounding the 
consent. Abrams assumes that consent by definition must proceed from the first 
person. This is mistaken. A necessary condition of a legally valid consent is 
legal competence. But as we have seen, to be legally competent to consent 
does not require decisional competence to be exercised through FPCLC. A 
surrogate decision-maker -  the proxy - can be legally empowered to take the 
decisions on the decisionally incompetent person’s behalf provided it meets the 
criteria of transferable legal competence. In this circumstance, the decision­
making competence rests with the proxy.
McConnell is therefore right to conclude that if a patient or research participant 
is decisionally incompetent, she cannot decide on her own behalf and as a 
result cannot waive her right to informed consent110. However, that does not
109 (1977:123).
110" the waiver of that. . .  right [informed consent] is relevant only so long as the patient is 
competent. If the patient is not competent, he cannot decide: and giving him information about 
the risks and alternatives serves no purpose. So there is no sense in which an incompetent
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mean that the patient or research participant cannot exercise legal competence 
by virtue of having a nominated surrogate appointed to take decisions on her 
behalf. Thus, decisional incompetence does not entail legal incompetence. 
However, as consent is being exercised on behalf of someone else rather than 
by person A for person A, it cannot be waived.
In decision-making about medicine and healthcare, a failure to ascribe FPCLC 
has significant repercussions. To be denied control over one’s physical and 
mental health through having decisions taken for oneself in respect of these 
matters involves others exerting an enormous amount of influence over one’s 
life111. For the law to ascribe FPCLC in relation to healthcare decisions with 
those who display evidence of relevant decisional competences is to personally 
empower individuals capable of making such decisions, even if it is for them to 
subsequently ask their physician to make certain health care decisions for 
them112.
Robertson argues that individuals who are incompetent to consent are entitled 
to respect for their personhood but do not require respect for their choices113. 
Without first being clear about the circumstances in which we are morally 
permitted to withhold respect from choices, Robertson’s argument does not tell 
us where the ‘trigger point’ for this lies. Without this, we risk mistaking the ability 
to exercise choice due to genuine decisional competence for a simulacrum of 
decisional competence in someone who is almost certainly decisionally 
incompetent to make that decision114. Robertson’s approach also assumes that 
persons who are apparently incompetent to make a decision are nonetheless 
capable of evincing a choice or preference in respect of that decision. In order 
to be decisionally incompetent to make a particular decision, a person has to be
patient can be said intelligently to have waived his right to informed consent”. McConnell (2000:
1^1 White and Denise (1991) argue that an individual capable of understanding but acting upon 
deluded premises is equally in need of paternalistic protection as someone who is completely 
incapable of understanding their actions This is not a claim that I would contest, but we must be 
careful to specify first what we mean by deluded’.
1121 see nothing that would be inconsistent with the concept of legal competence in allowing 
decisionally competent individuals to ask a relevant authority (such as a physician) to make 
decisions that they are dec.sionally competent to make on their behalf p S e T a d e q u 4
,S30 'SSUe WhiCh ' Cann0teXp'° re in deta" here- however
114 For instance, where an individual suffering from advanced Abbsimor'c ^
& Z S Z ? " *  °p,hns’ bul when asked' ca""ot reca"why
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incapable of undertaking the reasoning and deliberation necessary in order to 
reach a choice. To suggest that someone might still be capable of choosing and 
expressing preferences is to raise evidence that they might not be incompetent 
to make that decision after all and should have their decisional competence 
reassessed, if possible. It also suggests that the original evidence that 
supported a determination of decisional incompetence is flawed or incomplete. 
Establishing a strategy for minimizing error - or at least the moral consequences 
of this error - in determining decision-making competence is, therefore, 
crucial115.
It is possible, alternatively, that Robertson is referring to legal competence, 
where it is factually possible for a person to be decisionally competent and to be 
legally incompetent simultaneously116. In these circumstances, the individual 
concerned does not have their choices and preferences in relation to that 
decision legally recognised (such as the preference of a fifteen year-old to vote 
for a specific political party who has the decisional competence to reach such a 
decision). However, the fact that one is decisionally competent to choose but 
legally incompetent to make that decision for oneself does not mean that we 
must believe that the grounds for not ascribing FPCLC are stronger than the 
grounds forjudging decisional competence.
Individual autonomy
At the heart of any judgment of decisional competence or FPCLC is a normative 
conception of individual autonomy. This normative understanding of autonomy 
has analogues in other areas where a legal recognition of decisional 
competencies is made, such as freedom of conscience or freedom of contract.
Culver and Gert clearly express the rationale of this: “the primary point of determinino 
competence is not to prevent others overruling patients whose decisions should not be 
overruled but to allow them to overrule parents whose decisions should be overruled " (2004 ' 
262) '
116 This problem of ambiguity arises because it is not known clearly in what sense Robertson is 
using the term competence: Competent people get to decide for themselves Persons fallino 
on the incompetency side of the line still deserve respect as oersons hf.t r lV n ^ 'V  T  ff  9
statement could be read as referring both to FPCLC and to d e a s la S p 'e t f n L  fn a later
stage of the discussion in relation to medical treatment Robertson 7  3 ater
capacity for choice (ibid: 140), but that does not convince me that heìs w!ththis way throughout. convince me that he is using competence in
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In order for consent not to collapse into coercion, consent must involve the 
absence of external control and a minimal level of autonomy consistent with its 
permissive function. An analytical concept of autonomy117 as self-determination 
thus gives consent its basic conceptual meaning and logical coherence. A 
normative concept of autonomy enhances this analytical definition, insofar as it 
explains why consent should be valued apart from its logical coherence. A 
normative concept of autonomy thus emphasises the moral significance of 
consent.
At its simplest, the normative significance of consent amounts to a belief that 
those individuals who are at the centre of a decision that affects either only 
them or another consenting party get to make their own choices as far as 
possible, rather than have the choices of others imposed upon them118. In the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals' 19, Kant argues for the value of 
individual autonomy as proceeding from the will of a rational being. For Kant, 
autonomy is a necessary criterion for rational action, but simply because human 
beings possess the capacity for rational action does not presuppose that they 
will employ it in all circumstances of deliberation. Various impulses and desires 
exist that blind the will from what is rational. These impulses lie outside the 
rational will. Acting upon them is to act without autonomy, or heteronomously. 
Autonomous action entails accession to the laws one has made for oneself that 
can be subject to universalization:
“Autonomy of the will is the property the will has of being a law to itself 
Hence the principle of autonomy is 'Never to chose except in such a way 
that in the same volition of the maxims of your choice are also present as 
universal law."120
To be autonomous is, for Kant, simply to adhere to the requirements of the 
rational will. Autonomy is, therefore, “the ground of the dignity of human nature 
and of every rational nature”121.
117 Such as that embodied within Faden et al sense1 definition of consent.
118 Faden et al. (1986: 288) concede this even within their analytical definition of consent: 
“[G]atekeeping by allowing autonomous persons - competent persons -  to give informed 
consent and not allowing non-autonomous persons - Incompetent persons -  to give informed 
consent is accomplished by an appeal to the principle that autonomous persons are rightfully 
the decision-makers.”
119 Kant (1991).
120 Kant (1991: 101).
121 Kant (1991: 97).
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Gerald Dworkin reconceptualizes autonomy along different lines from Kant122. 
Reflecting upon the imperatives that motivate human action, Dworkin 
distinguishes two types of motivation, first-order motivations and second-order 
identifications123. According to Dworkin, autonomy is a second-order capacity of 
persons to reflect critically upon first order preferences, and the capacity to 
accept or attempt to change these in the light of higher-order preferences and 
values124. It is in exercising autonomy, “persons define their nature, give 
meaning and coherence to their lives, and take responsibility for the kind of 
person they are”125.
Both definitions of autonomy invoke values of universalizability, rationality, 
meaning and coherence that also inform the ethical discourse of consent. The 
concept of autonomy underpinning consent is universalizable in a Kantian 
sense (in that everyone who is capable of consenting is - supposedly - legally 
permitted to do so) but does not depend upon avoidance of heteronomous 
motives for consent to be valid. For example, take an individual who seeks and 
consents to cosmetic plastic surgery. The motive is almost certainly vanity and 
therefore, according to Kant, an irrational desire or an impulse. However, the 
expression of such a motive through consent does not make a difference to the 
legal validity of the consent given. Equally, the consent would still be legal if the 
person gave a valid consent to the procedure but wished secretly that she did 
not feel that her appearance was so important that she is prepared to devote a 
considerable amount of money and time to the surgery. Thus, the type of 
autonomy embodied in consent is more Dworkinian than Kantian, insofar as the 
values, preferences and desires that motivate consent need not be strictly 
rational in a Kantian sense and may even be in conflict within a person.
122 Dworkin (1988).
123 This is similar to the theory developed some years earlier by Harry G Frankfurt 119711 who
Z  of S d S e l d S " “  °,th6 for ~  - ' « o n ,  manifested Z e
124 Dworkin illustrates with the example of smoking. A person may intend that she smokes a
cigarette, and values the sat.sfaction that it brings. This is an example of a first order motivation 
However, that person may concurrently be aware of the substantial health risks incurred hv 
smoking and desire that he/she give it up. Alternatives that nersnn , u incu[r®d by 
health risks, decide that the satisfaction outweighs the^isks and cnntin! « 6 avjare °Hhose 
examples of second-order desires. In this way, a S  - T i i m  smokin9 J hese are
Dwort<,n whelhor or no! her first-order motivations are congruent with her s e c o T o S d e s ire s
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The revival of normative political and social philosophy in the last four decades 
of the twentieth century has stimulated discussions of autonomy in bioethics126. 
Such discussions often taken place by juxtaposing autonomy with the practice 
of medical paternalism127. As a result, consent is presented as a means to 
respect and preserve decisional competence and has come to be associated 
with liberal values such as equality and rights. To suggest that consent and 
autonomy have become intertwined would not overstate the evolved trend in 
bioethics and biolaw, but it should not intimate that this trend has been seen as 
unproblematic128. Nor should it diminish the equal importance of refusal129.
Wear, in particular, believes that the importance of consent and autonomy have 
been exaggerated and are counter-productive to the goals of medicine:
“Do we really want to say that the notion of autonomy is so sacrosanct that 
even questioning it is offensive, and that the physician who feels that a 
patient is making a tragic foolish, or self-destructive decision at most can 
offer to restate the case, rather than investigate whether there are actual 
and substantial flaws in the patient’s decision-making processes itself? To 
say this would be to elevate the notion of autonomy to that of a fetish.”130
Wear’s appeal to regain a sense of perspective is a welcome antidote to the risk 
of “over-valuing” consent131. An acknowledgement of the value of consent 
should not marginalize the judgment of a physician in re-assessing decisional 
competence in respect of that matter. Indeed, it may serve to strengthen it. 
Apparent substantial flaws in a patient’s decisional processes provide prima 
facie grounds for bringing a patient’s decisional competence consent into 
question (particularly If they are a member of a group for whom FPCLC is 
presumed). They also provide grounds to err on the side of making a judgment 
of incompetence to decide (particularly if the physician is dealing with an
126 Jonsen (1998), Chapter 3.
127 Corrigan (2003: 769). An example is Childress (1995)
123 For critical discussions, see Bloche (1998), O'Neill (2002) and Corrigan (2003)
29 Schneider believes that the emphasis placed upon autonomy by the legal presumotions of 
decisional competence to consent has been fuelled by theories of consent which makes the 
assumption of individual autonomy by patients ‘mandatory1 (1998- 33) This suaalste thS 
autonomy can only be exercised through consent however anH ¡„ A J u ' f  su9Sests ‘hat 
refusing to take part in the consent proiess S t h i n ^  COnSent 0r
for the patient to make, as they are different0 options available
Schneiders view equates autonomy with the exercise of consent alonp decision.
130 Wear (1998:137). 1 a,one-
131 Brownsword (2004).
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individual whose FPCLC is not presumed in law but determined on a case-by- 
case basis, as is often the case with adolescents).
In the context of medical treatment, Wear goes on to claim that many of the 
patients who trigger a reassessment of their decisional competence will have 
done so on the basis of behaviour or reasoning displayed in advance of the 
informed consent process132. It is true that the grounds on which assumptions of 
decisional competence may be brought into doubt include circumstances where 
the standard of decision-making required for the current decision-making 
context have been inadequately demonstrated in similar contexts. However, 
there is a risk of seeking to extrapolate too much from one decision-making 
context to another in order to justify a judgment of decisional competence in 
respect of the latter. There would have to be sufficient similarity between the 
two instances of decision-making at issue and the kind of decisional 
competences they require for extrapolations of this nature to be justified.
In the same way that a definition of decisional competence requires that an 
individual be informable to make that decision, a definition of decisional 
competence to consent requires that an individual receive sufficient information 
in order to make that decision in an appropriate way. For consent to be the valid 
expression of a reasoned choice, it must be offered with as much knowledge as 
possible of the act or procedure to which the individual is consenting. It is 
incoherent to suggest that voluntariness does not presuppose the disclosure of 
this information. In the absence of sufficient information disclosure, any 
resulting consent is obtained through concealment and not because of a 
reasoned choice.
The relationship between the capability to be informed and information provision 
can often lead to the latter establishing the presence of or raising questions 
about the former. There are good grounds to doubt decisional competence, if in 
the process of seeking consent, a physician or researcher observes that the 
patient or subject appears incapable of retaining, understanding and evaluating 
the information supplied to her when presented in a suitable manner. The 
provision of sufficient information about the decision is therefore particularly
132 Wear (1998:142)
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useful for observing instances of decisional competence where there has been 
no previous contact between the person seeking consent and the person from 
whom consent is sought133. In this way, the consent processes builds in 
safeguards that serve to monitor decisional competence. If the informed 
consent process is undertaken thoroughly and sincerely, the chance of 
individuals being presumed competent who are actually decisionally 
incompetent (a so-called ‘false-positive’ judgment of competence134) and vice- 
versa is much reduced. Avoiding false-positive judgments of decisional 
competence is especially important with groups whose decisional competence 
is tenuous or questionable.
All decisions for which consent is required determine their own level of what 
constitutes sufficient information, but in any case it must at least meet a 
reasonable standard of completeness and intelligibly. This is a particular 
challenge where the relevant information is complex or extensive. By way of 
illustration, consider the intrinsic difference between therapy and research. The 
nature of biomedical research often involves more complex intentions, 
procedures and outcomes than treatment135, which gives rise to a prima facie 
recognition that criteria for valid consent must require a higher level of decision­
making competence than for most forms of treatment. Without this recognition, 
competence to consent to biomedical research becomes indistinguishable from 
consent to medical treatment, even though the purpose of research raises 
medical and ethical implications for the potential volunteer that are wholly 
distinct from therapy.
The two most significant characteristics of research are the potential harm that 
may result from participation and the principal motive - the advancement of 
scientific knowledge, irrespective of whether the research has the possibility or 
aim of directly benefiting the participant or how much the interests of the
133 Such as in the context of biomedical research, where the first contact between a clinician or 
researcher and potential subject may well be the informed consent process.
134 “The more the downside risks associated with a false positive determination of competence 
increase, the more one will wish to make sure that a patient is in fact choosing competently”. 
Cutter (1991: x-xi).
135 Examples of information that potential volunteers may be required to understand in order to 
have decisional competence to consent to biomedical research include specialised or 
philosophical concepts, such as randomisation, altruism or the function of a placebo. See Foster 
(2001:57).
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participant are to take precedence136. These implications increase the 
significance attached to ‘false positive’ presumptions or declarations of 
decisional competence that are used as the basis for an ascription of FPCLC. 
To avoid this, the informed consent process needs to distinguish clearly the 
aims of therapy and research in such a way that, in consenting to the research, 
the potential participant does not mistake research for therapy137. If she appears 
unable to comprehend this distinction, then there are strong prima facie grounds 
for reaching a judgment that she is incompetent to make a decision to 
participate on her own behalf.
Why biomedical ‘research’?
Reference to biomedical 'research' is often taken to be unambiguous. The use 
of this term stands in need of justification, however, particularly when 
juxtaposed with the more evocative terminology of ‘experimentation’.
In general terms, experimentation describes a procedure or investigation 
designed to test a hypothesis where it is not possible to predict the results. 
Experimentation has been used to describe methodologies as diverse as those 
in contemporary music composition138 and to empirical lines of inquiry in the 
social sciences139 - it is not merely confined to the medical sphere. One may 
take research and experimentation to be synonymous, although in its 
vernacular sense, experimentation often connotes how a line of enquiry is 
addressed rather than the nature of the outcome it generates.
Attempts at definitions have a contemporary lineage. At the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, Thomas Percival claimed that medical experimentation 
takes place where existing medical practices prove unsuccessful and under
or
136 To suggest otherwise would be to deny the difference between research and innovative 
therapy, whose principal motive is patient benefit.
137 Known otherwise as the ‘therapeutic misconception’. See Appelbaum et al (1982).
138 In contemporary composition, for instance, John Cage has employed ‘aleatory’ u. 
‘indeterminate’ techniques such as I Ching, which rely wholly or partly on chance (Cage, 1961). 
Such chance-based approaches would be inappropriate for research with humans, however, as 
they use the experimental subject material in purely instrumental terms and do not possess a 
sufficiently clear a priori methodology to meet with the approval of ethical review.
139 Such as ‘participant observation’, a research methodology in which data is collected from 
unwitting participants, oblivious to the fact that research is being carried out. The importance 
attached to consent in research ethics has now discredited such methodologies.
circumstances not previously foreseen140. Percival’s observation identifies the 
motive for overcoming the limits of existing knowledge and reinforces the 
unknowable quality of the outcome, although does not speak of anticipated 
outcomes that may attach to the procedure of research design.
Almost 150 years later, McCance endorsed a definition of medical 
experimentation as a procedure undertaken with a subject which is not 
accepted by medical practitioners as offering primary therapeutic benefit or 
assisting the process of diagnosis and where the results cannot be known in 
advance.141. This essentially reframes Percival’s definition and offers little new. 
At around the same time, the World Medical Association stipulated in the 
Declaration of Helsinki what types of medical research involving human 
participants there are, without stating what medical research actually is142. The 
guidance makes explicit reference both to experimentation and to research and 
uses the terms synonymously.
A decade later, Morgenbesser attempted a more streamlined definition, still 
couched in the language o f ‘experimentation’:
“an undertaking is called a biomedical experiment . . .if it is instituted to 
gather data in a statistically significant way which may be used to test a 
medical hypothesis, or more generally, to test a medically related 
hypothesis . . .  if it is of the form ‘If S then . . . ’ where ‘S’ stands in place of 
an action which doctors can be expected to be able to undertake and 
execute”143
More recently, McNeill expressed a preference for experimentation to research, 
in order that the definition include forms of innovative treatment:
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“The distinguishing feature of experimentation is that something new is 
being tried. Experiments necessarily carry with them unknown 
consequences. Once the consequences are known, they are known, they 
are no longer experiments”.”144
140 Percival (1803).
141 McCance (1951), reproduced in Reiser etal. (1977: 275).
142 World Medical Association (1964, rev. 2000) Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for 
Research Involving Human Subjects, Part A 1. :”Medical research involving human subjects 
includes research on identifiable human material or identifiable data”.
143 Morgenbesser (1977:100-101).
144 McNeil (1993:10-11).
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The issue here does not lie with how one construes human experimentation. In 
descriptive terms, this is relatively unproblematic - the above definitions are 
complimentary rather than in conflict. The issue instead is whether it is 
important whether the appellation biomedical research or biomedical 
experimentation is used. Percival and McCance do not provide reasons as to 
why any procedure that is not designed to alleviate a condition should be 
considered experimentation rather than research, given that experimental 
medicine, like research, may in part have therapeutic benefits. Percival and 
Morgenbesser do not offer any grounds why experimentation could not be 
substituted with biomedical research when discussing the testing of a medical 
hypothesis. McNeill does not address why, in preferring experimentation to 
research, a definition of research cannot encompass research with a 
therapeutic dimension, and what it is about using ‘research’ rather than 
‘experimentation’ that would impact negatively on level of protection received by 
participants.
Of all the above definitions, McNeill is the only commentator who explicitly 
rejects ‘research’ in preference to ‘experimentation’. His rejection of the term 
‘research’ appears more a measure of his dissatisfaction of the use of the term 
by Levine145 14678, who according to McNeill, considers that most medical practice is 
experimental. In seeking to distinguish his definition from that of Levine, McNeill 
appears to have taken a view of research which is needlessly restrictive.
Why, then, use biomedical ‘research’ if ‘experimentation’ will suffice? The use of 
biomedical research serves to clarify and distinguish the subject of inquiry. First, 
the language of research has come to predominate references to experimental 
procedures on human participants. The Declaration of Helsinki146, the 
International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human 
Subjects'47 and the Council of Europe Additional Protocol to the Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine on Biomedical Research'48, amongst others, 
bear witness to the frequency with which biomedical research is used in place 
of biomedical experimentation. For the sake of consistency alone, the term
145 Levine (1988).
146 World Medical Association (1964, rev. 2000).
147 Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences r?nn?\
148 Council of Europe (2005).
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biomedical research is preferable to biomedical experimentation. Second, the 
language of experimentation with human participants has been tarnished by its 
association with the ethically flawed medical ‘experiments’ with human 
participants in Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, the United States and elsewhere 
during much of twentieth century. Research is thus preferable on semantic and 
semiotic grounds.
In this thesis, the descriptive element of biomedical research is taken to refer to 
all types of clinical investigations that have as their ultimate aim the pursuit of 
clinical knowledge, including those that have a partial therapeutic intent and 
those that do not. This includes innovative treatments, neuroscientific and 
psychiatric studies, randomised clinical trials (RCTs), and research involving 
new genetic technologies149. The normative element of biomedical research is 
taken to denote investigations that would meet and surpass the standard 
required of ethical review in a legal and political system founded upon human 
rights150, unless specified otherwise.
The evolution of the rights of research participants
The rights of volunteers and potential participants in biomedical research have 
evolved through three distinct stages. Each stage has overlapped or intersected 
with the next, but the evolution of a new understanding of rights in the research 
context distinguished each. In assessing the current status of the rights of 
research participants, more light can be shed upon the extent to which 
ascriptions of FPCLC are an integral part of contemporary guidelines.
The traditional conception of a negative right not to be entered into to 
biomedical research unless express consent was given constituted the first 
stage. This premise of this idea is the normative priority of informed consent as 
the central principle of biomedical research ethics151. Negative rights against
149 It is not possible in this thesis to discuss all the contemporary forms of biomedical research 
but see Smith (1999: Chapter 9 and Chapters 12-19) for an overview of many ’
One that would be compliant with the requirements of the PGC. See Chanter Three 
Beyleveld and Brownsword (1994: 304-314, 392-393) napter Three and
151 Fletcher (1983: 210) has questioned whether consent should be the nriman/ animating 
principle of research ethics: “the evolution of post-Nurembera ethics nf .
highly symbolic and rigid display of reasoningPabout c S M R £  * r
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participation animated the debate from the late 1940s, at least up until the 
1970’s and still have influence now. Seminal examples include the Nuremberg 
Code (1947) and the Declaration of Helsinki (first approved in 1964).
The second was a stage, still ongoing in many respects, where rights in medical 
research were framed predominately in terms of the duties owed to a participant 
by the researcher once she had validly consented to participate. These include, 
for example, a high standard of information disclosure, the right to withdraw 
from the research at any time and proper arrangements for maintaining the 
confidentiality of the results pertaining to patients and volunteers152. These 
duties attempt to reconcile the imperative of protecting human participants with 
the value of efficiency in the conducting of medical research.
The third is the emergence of a positive right to involvement in biomedical 
research whereby the choice whether or not to participate if one so wishes is 
treated as a social right exercisable by the rights-holder. Such thinking is 
epitomised in the preamble to the Additional Protocol to the Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine on Biomedical Research153, and in the ethical 
guidance issued by Alzheimer Europe, who have stated that "people with 
dementia have a right to participate in research, should they so desire” 15\  
Others have gone further, suggesting that more inclusive research strategies 
are important to “gather the experiences and views of people with dementia 
themselves, rather than (or in addition to) those of proxies", which is important 
to “challenge current inequalities in social relations for people with dementia"155. 
This position is also endorsed in the General Medical Council’s 2002 guidance, 
Research: The Role and Responsibilities o f Doctors, which suggests that the 
exclusion of vulnerable groups from medical research “could be a form of 
discrimination"156.
showing moral disgust, but hardly sufficient for the first principle." This objection overlooks the 
semantic importance of consent in distinguishing the moral permissibility of biomedical research 
with human participants from morally impermissible forms of scientific investioation See 
Chapter Four for discussion. a
152 See Fulford and Howse (1993).
153 Council of Europe (2005).
154 Alzheimer Europe (undated).
155 Wilkinson (2002:12-13).
156 General Medical Council (2002).
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The evolution of the rights of research participants has shifted the emphasis in 
biomedical research with human participants from conventional protectionism 
towards empowerment and in doing so has recast protectionism as 
empowerment. By giving individuals an active role in the selection of human 
research participants, the power imbalance between researcher and participant 
narrows. This may give rise to a ‘paradigm shift’ in which those most at risk of 
exploitation in biomedical research are accorded enforceable rights of choice, 
mirroring the earlier transition in values underpinning medical treatment from 
paternalism to autonomy.
The more protection that individuals have to decide for themselves - particularly 
those whose decisional competence may appear to be questionable - the more 
difficult it is for others to take decisions on their behalf about whether or not they 
should participate. We are then confronted with the related question of whether 
biomedical research ethics ought to be moving in the direction of encouraging 
positive rights, at which point the limits of an analytical understanding of the 
rights of research participants is reached. Before we consider the normative 
grounds on which individuals with questionable decisional competence to 
consent ought to be permitted to consent or refuse research participation, an 
understanding of the nature of vulnerability and how it is relevant in biomedical 
research is important.
The meaning of vulnerability
How we think about vulnerability and the conditions that give rise to it have a 
direct impact upon how a political system may in turn define the status, govern 
the relationships and guarantee the needs that are associated with being 
vulnerable. Thinking about vulnerability is also influenced by the perception of 
our own vulnerability and that of others from a social psychological context. 
That vulnerability is a widely under-theorized concept in moral, political and 
legal philosophy may be somewhat surprising, then, given its significance157. 
We should not take this to mean that vulnerability is not of interest to moral,
157 illustrated, perhaps, by the fact that in the current edition of the authoritative two-volume 
reference work, Encyclopaedia of Ethics, (Becker and Becker, 2001) ‘vulnerability’ is not 
included as an entry.
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political or legal philosophers158, but that the meaning of vulnerability is 
considered to be less central and open to fewer interpretations than other moral 
or political concepts, such as justice or rights. This inattentiveness overlooks the 
permutations of vulnerability, which are particularly relevant for biomedical 
research ethics159.
The word, “vulnerable” has its origins in the Latin verb vulnerare, to wound. This 
original meaning is still reflected today, as the Oxford English Dictionary still 
lists “capable of being wounded” as a primary definition of vulnerability160. In 
order to think conceptually about vulnerability, we need to explore the semantic 
resonance that extends beyond propensity to physical harm. Vulnerability also 
includes a predisposition to certain types of psychological and/or developmental 
harm that an individual has an interest in avoiding. It is more accurate to 
conceive of vulnerability as denoting a holistic set of fundamental interests, 
which, if not met through neglect or abuse, give rise to harm, deprivation or 
suffering. These interests include at the most fundamental level, life, physical 
health and mental equilibrium necessary for agency at all. They extend to 
encompass other universal interests such as food, shelter, education, 
healthcare and bodily integrity. On this account, it is possible to conceive of 
vulnerability as connoting the perennial threat to these shared fundamental 
interests all human beings face in the same way, which, if or when such threats 
materialise, gives rise to harm or suffering. Although vulnerability does not 
always connote harm that is inexorable or certain, it is impossible to imagine a 
life that is not in some way affected by the threat posed to such interests.
Human frailty, fallibility and mortality need to be accounted for when 
conceptualising vulnerability. The very fact that one’s capacity for agency can 
be easily restricted or ended altogether by others and our environment is a 
universal experience of the human condition and renders us all, in the same
158 A notable recent exception is Hoffmaster (2006), who suggests that moral philosophy has 
marginalized vulnerability due to its antagonism with autonomy and individualism. Silberfeld 
(2002) also considers vulnerability but as a quality of incompetent persons only. O’Neil (2000) 
and Anderson and Honneth (2005) invoke vulnerability but do not subject the concept to any 
sustained form of conceptual analysis. Goodin (1985) approaches vulnerability as a determinant 
of welfare need, rather than an analysis of the concept in its own right.
159 Apart from Hoffmaster (2006) and Silberfeld (2002), Kipnis (2003; 2004) Kottow (2003'
2004) and Weisstub and Thomasma (2002) have recognised the importance of theorizinq’ 
vulnerability for bioethics. a
160 Oxford English Dictionary, second edition (1989).
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way, vulnerable.161 Vulnerability, therefore" . . . expresses the condition of all 
life as able to be hurt, wounded and killed” 162. The recognition of this 
vulnerability is manifest by the existential anxiety that concerns the possibility of 
our own extinction163. Insofar as this quality applies to all human beings, it is a 
quality that one all too often forgets applies to oneself when identifying ‘the 
vulnerable’ - after all, few people choose to be conscious of -  let alone 
celebrate -  their own vulnerabilities164.
When defining vulnerability, two levels of meaning emerge. The first is the 
common experience of existential vulnerability, which I call ‘baseline 
vulnerability'. The second relates to those individuals who for some reason 
experience a heightened state of vulnerability. On this account, vulnerability is 
not conceived of on an ‘all or nothing’ basis, but rather on ‘more than usual’ 
basis.165
Heightened vulnerability flourishes in conditions of mutual unconcern. 
Underserved differences in circumstances and abilities along with the vagaries 
of chance contribute to inequality and exploitation when societal institutions do 
not address them. This applies both to baseline vulnerability and to heightened 
vulnerability. Indeed, neglect of heightened vulnerability could lead to instances 
of baseline vulnerability becoming instances of heightened vulnerability. The 
principal aim of the law in a socially just society in relation to vulnerability is both 
preventive (i.e. to provide for mechanisms that minimize the prospect of 
vulnerability, through healthcare, education, welfare etc) and protectionist (i.e.
161 Beyleveld (2001).
162 Kemp (1998: 5).
163 Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001:117). In this context, one is reminded of the poignancy of 
Roberto Unger’s aphorism, Salvation through the acceptance of vulnerability is the only kind of 
salvation there really is’. (1984:164).
164 The ambivalence of the self toward vulnerability is captured in O'NeiH's claim that “[¡Idealised
accounts of justice tend to ignore vulnerability and relativized accounts to legitimate it". (2000:
1
165 George W. Harris (1997) argues that it is in our vulnerability to character breakdown that the 
nature of human dignity is manifest. Harris uses the example of a mother forced to choose 
which of her children should die so that the other may live. He claims that for this woman to be 
vulnerable to anguish (and eventually suicide) is an expression of her dignity. However, this 
seems to suggest that in order to act with dignity in the face of vulnerability we have only one 
inexorable course of action available to us, which may lead to the end of capacity for agency 
altogether. This is a thesis which sits uneasily with the conception of human dignity arising out 
of the free will of agents and the possibility of responding to psychological suffering in a way 
which does not consume us.
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to safeguard important interests of those who for whatever reason experience 
heightened vulnerability).
We can explain heightened vulnerability by reference to a range of cognitive 
and circumstantial factors166. These include immaturity, old age, physical illness 
or injury, mental illness or impairment, lack of education, socio-economic 
disadvantage (including both lack of resources and opportunities), trauma 
(physical or psychological), institutionalisation (punitive and therapeutic) or 
membership of a minority group that experiences prejudice or persecution. The 
possession of one or more of the above characteristics typically predisposes the 
individual to heightened vulnerability through dependence, disempowerment or 
other social inequality associated with that condition or with those 
circumstances. The impact that heightened vulnerabilities have upon the ability 
of the person to act successfully and independently in the world around them 
emphasises this and the broader relational dimension of vulnerability. At the 
extreme, a failure to be able to engage at a basic level with the immediate 
environment gives rise to a sufficient range of vulnerabilities to ‘lock out’ the 
individual from a world of independent interaction167.
As the two forms heightened vulnerability may take are not mutually exclusive 
and may overlap, it is helpful to identify in which respect individuals are primarily 
vulnerable, particularly for the purposes of identifying vulnerability in research 
participants. The mentally disordered and impaired and children are primarily 
cognitively vulnerable (albeit to different degrees) due to incompleteness or 
imbalances of their perception and ratiocination that can limit or undermine 
decisional and task competence. These are intrinsic vulnerabilities insofar as 
their source lies within the agent’s being. The economically disadvantaged, 
prisoners, the uneducated and persecuted are primarily circumstantially 
vulnerable as the circumstances that make them vulnerable are contingent 
upon human activities, especially social, political and legal arrangements. 
These are extrinsic vulnerabilities insofar as their source lies outside of the 
agent’s being.168
166 Berg et ai. (2001:266).
167 In many ways similar to societal incompetence.
168 It should be stressed that this conceptualisation of vulnerability does not seek to valorise the 
social milieu within which heightened vulnerabilities are understood. The challenge to the
Consent, vulnerability and research
63
Cognitive vulnerability may denote a permanent or temporary quality of the 
individual’s mental state. It is enough to recognise at the particular point in time 
we investigate a individual’s decisional competence that she either currently is 
or has at some stage been affected by a mental disorder that could lead to 
cognitive vulnerability169. Cognitive vulnerability cannot be thought of as fixed or 
abstract concept -  rather it is an experience that can be described and 
explained, albeit perhaps according to normative criteria that supplies the basis 
of psychiatric diagnosis170. Of course, it is possible to accept that circumstantial 
vulnerabilities could themselves exacerbate or even create cognitive 
vulnerabilities (such as in the case of a terrorist suspect subject to indefinite 
detention who experiences clinical depression as a result), to the extent where 
the line between circumstantial and cognitive vulnerabilities blur. However, 
because we can still identify the origin of the heightened vulnerability, the 
distinction between cognitive and circumstantial vulnerability is nonetheless a 
useful heuristic device.
There is persistence in many experiences of vulnerability which, especially in 
cases of cognitive vulnerability, is difficult to address. O’Neill argues that 
through an acceptance of the vulnerability of all, it may be possible to contain 
vulnerability where it is most prominent171. This argument endorses an 
institutional response towards vulnerability that is an ideal-typical feature of 
social democracy. However, it does not sufficiently account for what to do with 
cognitive vulnerabilities such as mental illness or severe learning disorders, 
which legal or political responses alone cannot ameliorate172. The challenge to
medical model of disability offered by the social model and by the Disability Rights Movement 
yields many valuable insights for liberal-egalitarian bioethics. Whilst I do not consider the 
taxonomy of vulnerability l have presented in this context as ‘medicalising’ those vulnerabilities, 
I am aware it could be open to dispute in others, which would require a lengthier discussion 
than is possible here to properly address. For an illuminating Foucauldian critique of 'disability' 
and ‘madness’ that identifies these contexts, see: Tremain (2002).
169 This will probably, although not necessarily, have been diagnosed in terms of one of the 
standard nosological systems, such as DSM-IV or ICD-10.
170 Sadler (2005).
171 O’Neill (2002: 88-89).
172 Michael Kottow (2003; 2004) draws a distinction between vulnerability and susceptibility in 
order to emphasise this point: ‘[vulnerability can be reduced by equal protection to all members 
of society under a principle of justice. Susceptibility is a determined state of destitution and can 
therefore only be reduced or neutralised by measures that are a) specifically designed against 
the destitution in question and b) actively applied” (2003: 463). Kottow conceives of vulnerability 
as something which can be reduced by (presumably) state or other collective action. For 
vulnerabilities to be ameliorated in this way and be of benefit to all suggests that Kottow
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accept such persistent vulnerabilities and to consider the institutional responses 
that are appropriate to them then confronts us. We need to be clear about what 
kind of values should guide these responses. Broadly speaking, we could 
choose to apply one of three types of value framework. The first type, 
autonomy-centred frameworks, tends to endorse ascriptions of decisional and 
task competence as far as possible on behalf of vulnerable individuals. The 
second type, paternalism-centred frameworks, tends to endorse ascriptions of 
decisional and task incompetences as far as possible on behalf of vulnerable 
individuals. The third type, which represent a hybrid of the above, advocate 
paternalistic behaviour only as an aid to the expression of decisional or task 
competences or to protect those whose decisional competence is irreparably 
hindered. Whichever framework we favour, we must be consistent in applying it. 
To apply a different value framework to the same cognitively vulnerable group in 
similar circumstances without adequate justification risks giving rise to 
incoherence and illegitimacy173.
Deciding whether an institutional response to cognitive vulnerability should be 
guided purely by autonomy, paternalism or both should turn upon whether: a) 
the individual or groups of individuals appear to be able to exercise agency, and 
if so; b) can benefit from the empowerment proposed. Consideration of b) is 
only possible in the presence of a).174 Judgments of benefit require empirical 
evidence as well as moral argument. This is in order to avoid a situation where 
moral arguments justify treating individuals with persistent cognitive vulnerability 
as if they have baseline vulnerability by presuming the same potential for 
decisional and task competences and holding them as fully to account for their 
choices, when available empirical evidence suggests that they do not have and 
cannot develop these competences. Were such a situation to arise in the 
context of medical research, we would not be protecting the autonomy of the
believes vulnerability can be ameliorated through something akin to a principle of equality 
before the law. The equation of susceptibility with destitution is to define susceptibility as being 
remedied through welfare rights. In doing so, there is no apparent scope for cognitive 
vulnerability. In drawing this distinction, Kottow has not produced a framework analogous to 
coanitive and circumstantial vulnerability, but instead to baseline vulnerability and circumstantial 
vulnerability. This framework is more restrictive for thinking about different types of 
vulnerabilities than the one advanced here.
173 Consider, for example, the current position in England and Wales where it is legally possible 
at sixteen years of age to join the armed forces, buy nicotine and have a sexual relationship but 
not to elect the Government and have the final say in refusing medical treatment.
174 Because it does not make sense to say that non-agents can be empowered.
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individual through empowerment but instead expecting the individual to make a 
choice which she is probably mentally incapable to make, irrespective of how 
much information the researcher may provide the person and how sensitive is 
the manner in which consent is sought. This is analogous to expecting an 
asthmatic non-swimmer to swim one hundred metres after the principles of 
swimming had been explained to her simply because she appeared in all 
outward respects physically fit.
Cognitive vulnerability and consent to biomedical research
Potential participants in biomedical research who are cognitively vulnerable may 
have questionable decisional competence to consent and may not have a 
rebuttable presumption of FPCLC enshrined In law. Their participation in 
research gives rise to distinctive moral and legal problems, typically not 
generated by potential adult participants of full mental health or average 
intelligence175. By extension, the question of judging decisional competence is 
not an issue with potential participants who are manifestly unable to consent, 
such as neonates, infants and young children, the comatose and persons in a 
persistent vegetative state. The questions that exist in relation to their 
participation are the ethics of proxy consent or surrogate decision-making176. 
Such questions lie outside the ambit of this thesis177.
The participation of prisoners and socio-economically deprived persons (both in 
relative and absolute terms) in biomedical research also raises separate 
questions about whether circumstantial vulnerability undermines their decisional 
competence to offer informed consent. Incarceration, institutionalisation and 
poverty are all factors external to the individual that increase vulnerability and 
potentially undermine decision-making competence. Some prisoners and socio­
economically deprived individuals will also experience mental disorder or 
intellectual disability or will still be in adolescence. In this case, their primary
175 This does not mean that individual problems do arise, but they tend not to reflect on the 
S ™ P * a® a whole. Where adults presumed decisionally competent to consent by an ascription 
of FPCLC are found on subsequent examination to lack the requisite decision-making abilities 
^  6XP ^  SUbSUmption withi"  categories of mental disorder or
Berghmans (1998°)* deCiSi° na"y inCompetent adL^ -  advance directives for research. See
177 See Buchanan and Brock (1989) for a thorough treatment.
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source of heightened vulnerability is cognitive, even though they also 
experience circumstantial vulnerability. Such individuals fall within the scope of 
potential research participants under consideration in this thesis. Were the 
sources of circumstantial vulnerability removed, such individuals would still be 
very likely to experience cognitive vulnerability. This is because cognitive 
vulnerability is much more resistant to removal due to its embeddedness within 
the psyche of the person.
When we encounter doubtful competence in research contexts, the higher 
threshold of understanding required compared to that for therapeutic contexts 
fused with the risk of harm to self often resolves the question of decisional 
competence in favour of incompetence. Once incompetence is presumed, any 
decision to participate becomes a matter for a surrogate and is commonly 
resolved by recourse to considerations of ‘benefit’ or ‘negligible/minimal harm’, 
stipulated in ethics guidance or in law, usually determined by a research ethics 
committee and applied by a research investigator and/or the incompetent’s 
surrogate decision-maker. This approach may be justified where there is 
adequate evidence to judge decisional incompetence to consent, but is less 
justified as an appropriate first response for situations where available evidence 
suggests that the individual in question possesses decisional competence, 
although is not presumed to have FPCLC to make this decision.
The tension that arises here relates specifically to uncertainty about whether a 
presumption in favour of decisional competence or the absence of decisional 
competence ought to be applied in relation to discrete groups of cognitively 
vulnerable persons, or whether a case-by-case approach should be adopted in 
making judgments about with individual cases. This again can only be resolved 
in accordance with a clear normative framework. However, in doing so, we 
should not lose sight of the specific context of biomedical research. The 
requirement for a high level of reasoning, comprehension and information 
manipulation is demanding even for an adult with an average level of decisional 
competence. Whilst the theoretical basis upon which possession of decisional 
competence turns is mental ability rather than status, the presence of decisional 
competence may be less readily doubted where a potential participant’s
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heightened vulnerability is circumstantial (such as being imprisoned) rather than 
cognitive (such as being a child).
In certain codes of biomedical research ethics, discussions of vulnerability have 
received more attention than in the academic literature on bioethics in recent 
years, although some of the major codes still conspicuously omit a definition or 
analysis of vulnerability178. Some of those that have incorporated explicit 
mention of vulnerability are underdeveloped. For example, the 1998 Barcelona 
Declaration: Basic Ethical Principles in Bioethics and Biolaw defines 
vulnerability narrowly in terms of a quality which all agents share (which 
correlates to ‘baseline vulnerability’), without indicating when and how 
vulnerability might be heightened. On this basis, there are no grounds for 
making judgments of relative vulnerability and tracing its origins.179
The 2002 C IO M S International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research 
Involving Human Subjects offers a m ore cogent defin ition, stating:
“vulnerability refers to a substantial incapacity to protect one’s own interests 
owing to such impediments as lack of capability to give informed consent, 
lack of alternative means o f obtaining medical care or other expensive 
necessities, or being a junior or subordinate member of a hierarchical 
group.’’180
This definition accommodates a more comprehensive range of vulnerabilities 
that are specifically relevant to the context of biomedical research. The 
corresponding guideline describes vulnerable persons qua persons as 
“relatively (or absolutely) incapable of protecting their own interests’’181; qua 
potential participant in biomedical research as having “limited capacity or 
freedom to consent or decline to consent”182. The CIOMS guidelines emphasise 
that a ‘special justification’ is needed in order to invite vulnerable populations to
178 For example, two of the most significant regulatory instruments the Enron«»« _____
Human Rights and Biomedicine and The Declaration of Helsinki are silent on X fo o n s C e s  
vulnerability in research populations. English legal previsions such as The Medicines for X t L  
Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004 utilize the lanouaop n fv n in lrl J n  M®dlc'n®s f° r Huma" 
what ‘vulnerable’ means. See Schedule 3 Part 1 s 1%  9 vulnerabll,ty without stipulating
PartnerS in the B1° MED-" Pr°ject: ‘Basic Ethical Principles in Bioethics and Biolaw’ (1998:
180 CIOMS (2002:10).
181 CIOMS (2002) Guideline 12.
182 CIOMS (2002) Guideline 12.
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serve as participants in research and that means for protecting their rights and 
welfare must be applied.
The liberal approach of the 2002 CIOMS guidelines contrasts starkly with the 
protectionist approach taken toward the use of vulnerable participants in 
biomedical research contained in the 1979 US Belmont Report, which speaks of 
the ‘injustice’ that occurs as a result183. The examples of vulnerable participants 
given within the definition, namely "racial minorities, the economically 
disadvantaged, the very sick, and the institutionalised”184 are, with perhaps one 
exception, groups of individuals with primarily circumstantial vulnerability. The 
Belmont Report does not mention adults with mentally disorder or mental 
impairment, although one might reasonably infer that, as the ‘very sick’ often 
experience cognitive vulnerability, these groups were also within the 
contemplation of the drafters of the Report. Almost thirty years on, the rigid 
prescriptions it advances appear anachronistic in light of how the rights of 
research participants have evolved.
The Explanatory Report to the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine Concerning Biomedical Research, adopted by the 
Council of Europe in 2005, contains the most detailed taxonomy of vulnerability 
in a contemporary ethical code. It provides a rich taxonomy of vulnerability in 
research according to cognitive, situational, institutional, deferential, medical, 
economic, and social factors,185 similar to Kipnis’s taxonomy of vulnerability in 
research 186. By its own admission, the Explanatory Report is not an 
authoritative interpretation of the Additional Protocol187. However, it suggests 
the lines along which bioethical thinking about vulnerability is informing codes of 
professional ethics and goes some way to demonstrating that vulnerability is 
being taken seriously as a substantive concept in European bioethics and 
biolaw.
183 National Commission for the Protection of Human 
Research (1979).
184 National Commission for the Protection of Human 
Research (1979).
185 Council of Europe, (2004) paragraph 69.
186 Kipnis (2004: 217).
187 Council of Europe (2005) paragraph 7.
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One area where cognitive and circumstantial vulnerabilities clearly overlap is in 
the participation of elderly persons in nursing or care homes in research. 
Reich188 argues that elderly persons resident in nursing homes are captive 
populations liable to exploitation and limited in their ability to make free and 
voluntary decisions and who should not be made victims of their own 
altruism189. For Reich, the degree to which such individuals are vulnerable 
automatically divests them of decisional competence. Thomas and Waluchow190 
take a less severe attitude, but like White earlier, caution against the use of a 
legal definition of competence, in this context for selecting elderly participants 
for research:
“[0]ne should be wary of employing, consciously or otherwise, the legal 
model in selecting subjects for experimental research. It would be a mistake 
to infer that because an elderly person has not been shown to be fully 
incompetent she is therefore fully competent, and to conclude from this that 
one therefore need not worry at all about the capacity for informed consent. 
If there are many points lying between full competence and full 
incompetence, and if a person just might occupy different points at different 
times, then any such inferences would be invalid and fraught with danger. 
One would, in drawing such a conclusion be sweeping under the rug the 
hard choices that must be made, and simply ignoring potentially disastrous 
effects. There is, of course, great temptation to do this. It is far more difficult 
to establish degrees or grades of competency than it is to establish outright 
incompetence. It may be even more difficult to determine where along the 
spectrum lying between the two extremes one should begin to draw lines, 
where one should begin to question whether consent is truly informed, 
voluntary and therefore valid.”191
This argument supports the claim that psychiatric assessments of decisional 
competence are more meticulous and nuanced than a presumption of FPCLC 
allows. In focusing on the risk of false positive determinations of competence, 
Thomas and Waluchow display a ‘competence-scepticism’, which is not argued 
for. That a legal standard of FPCLC fulfils a permissive function does not mean 
that the legal standard cannot be formulated on more restrictive grounds that 
recognise the high level of understanding, reasoning and appreciation required 
for a valid consent to biomedical research on one’s own behalf. Second, 
Thomas and Waluchow, like Robertson earlier, appear to be using competence 
ambiguously. “Degrees . . .  of competency” and “outright” incompetence are
188 Reich (1978).
189 Reich (1978: 331).
190 Thomas and Waluchow (1998).
191 Thomas and Waluchow (1998:133).
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undefined, and could be taken to mean either decisional competence or 
FPCLC. Similarly, we do not know whether the reference to full competence 
and full incompetence refer to agency competence, task or decisional 
competence or a measure of the aggregate task and decisional competences 
required for societal competence.
Suppose we set this aside and concede their argument relating to the problems 
of the legal standard. The logical outcome of their argument is the removal of 
competence from the realm of law to become the preserve of medicine or 
psychiatry and to be determined by purely by the judgment of health care 
professional rather than in accordance with an enforceable legal provision. 
Such thinking offers false promise. It will most likely result in elderly persons 
who have cognitive vulnerability receiving fewer enforceable protections when 
acting as research participants under codes of research ethics than they could 
do under the law. An avoidance of or a dislike towards legal definitions of 
decisional competence does not imply that the law cannot be used effectively to 
rectify the failings in its own previous attempts to define decisional competence.
Why conduct biomedical research with cognitively vulnerable 
groups?
Recent developments in neuroscience, such as functional neuro-imaging, 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and deep brain stimulation (many of 
which have been reported in the mainstream press in recent years) have 
reinvigorated widespread interest in biomedical research with cognitively 
vulnerable human participants, particularly research into the origins and 
treatment of mental disorder 192 . New drugs intended to manipulate 
neurochemical states for both treatment and 'enhancement’ purposes are 
emerging at a rate that has lead Farah et al to term this trend "the 
psychopharmacopia of the early twenty-first century” 193. During the same 
period, there has also been a fuller appreciation of the prevalence of mental 
disorder within the population -  a recent study reported that 27% of adults
192 See Malhi and Sachdev (2002), Farah (2002) and Farah et al (2004 and 2005) for an
discussion of recent developments and specifically, George and Belmakpr mnnn/ ™  tiuo  ^
DeLong and Wichmann (2001) on deep brain stimulation 3ker (2000) on TMS and
193 Farah eta!(2004:421).
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across the EU are experiencing or have experienced at least one form of mental 
health problem over the last twelve months194. This is shifting attention back 
towards the enhanced scientific knowledge obtained through research and the 
putative benefits for cognitively vulnerable groups that flow from this, rather than 
concentrating on its risks and the safeguards to which it must adhere.
Degenerative mental disorders such as Alzheimer’s disease195, which afflicts 
almost six million elderly citizens across the European Union, variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD, the human form of BSE)196, which has been 
found to develop in adolescence, along with depressive and schizophrenic 
disorders197, are conditions into which neuroscience has the potential to make 
significant contributions for understanding and treatment. Numerous research- 
council funded programmes rely upon the participation of research participants 
who themselves have been diagnosed as suffering from the conditions 
mentioned. This research, by its very nature, cannot be conducted with healthy 
volunteers.
Researchers are also collaborating between different areas of neurological 
study on an international basis. Trials conducted by the University of 
Pennsylvania with input from neurologists worldwide published in 2003 claimed 
to establish a link between Alzheimer’s disease and Parkinson’s disease198. 
More generally, there has been progress made in understanding risk factors 
such as homocysteine, genetics, such as the suggested propensity gene 
apoE4, disease processes, pathology and causality, such as the ‘cell cycle 
hypothesis’. Such studies are set to multiply as the pace of scientific 
understanding quickens.
Patient support groups have also given their support to specific research 
programmes. For example, a clinical trial to investigate whether vitamin 
supplements can prevent or ameliorate Alzheimer’s disease was conducted in 
2002 by The University of Oxford in conjunction and with the imprimatur of the
194 Wittchen and Jacobi (2005).
and cerebra' ca"
Zerr and Poser (2002), Meikle (24/12/02) and BBC News O n'/Tne"/“ Î/OI .derT>en 1 a
G?/sson e/a?(2003)°ffman ^  (200t^ > and Ho,tzfleifr>er and Nemeroff’(2006d’
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Alzheimer’s Research Trust. According to the Trust, the proposed trial involved 
3600 elderly people with "mild cognitive impairment"199. This degree of cognitive 
impairment inevitably bears upon the decisional competence that members of 
this group possess.
Many of these reasons for research share a common origin, namely the 
facilitation of medical understanding and a concern to develop treatments to 
offset the most destructive effects of such conditions. The scientific reasons for 
the participation of mentally disordered cognitively vulnerable individuals in 
biomedical research are set out in the Nuffield Council on Bioethics report, 
Mental Disorders and Genetics, the Ethical Context. These are:
• classification and diagnosis;
• genetic counselling;
• development of new and improved drug treatments;
• improved preventive measures;
• gene therapy200
The absence of any admission of therapeutic benefit to the research participant 
within the Nuffield Council’s definition is indicative of the frequent 'non- 
therapeutic’ value of such research, which is primarily anticipated to have long­
term benefits to scientific understanding that will not directly benefit the 
research participant concerned, or at least certainly not in the way so-called 
‘therapeutic research’ conventionally would. It is therefore important that the 
potential research participant is capable of understanding this and that she does 
not misperceive therapeutic aims.
The value of including children in medical research is evident from studies 
which focus on conditions unique to children as a developmental age group, or 
in the case of adolescents with mental health problems, to ascertain their 
responsiveness to for example, psychotropic medication which may need to 
administered in different quantities than with adult patients. This a view *290
199 Lavery (03/05/03).
290 Nuffield Council on Bioethics (1998; 24). Gene therapy is a procedure where a gene is 
introduced into a cell so that there is a beneficial effect to the patient as a result of the qenes 
action within the cell.
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endorsed by the UK Medical Research Council in their 2004 ethics guidance 
Medical Research Involving Children201. More recently, this position has been 
enshrined across Europe within Directive 2001/20/EC on the implementation of 
good clinical practice in the conduct of clinical trials on medicinal products for 
human use202. Paragraph 3 states:
. . there is a need for clinical trials involving children to improve 
the treatm ent available to them. Children represent a vulnerable 
population with developmental, physiological and psychological 
differences from adults, which make age and development related 
research important for their benefit”203.
The significance of the potential benefits medical research with children yields 
for their collective welfare creates a tension with strict consent-based 
requirements which inevitably lengthen the process of recruiting participants 
and conducting the research, thereby reducing the occurrence of such research 
projects. How one chooses to resolve this tension is connected with the value 
one attaches to consent relative to the other values at stake. The involvement of 
parents or carers in decision-making is one strategy designed to minimize the 
risk of medical research exploiting young people whilst ensuring that the child 
still can have some role in decisions about her participation204. Such practices 
of surrogate or shared decision-making raise ethical questions of their own205. 
However, in this thesis, our concern is with the grounds on which we should 
make a judgment of decisional competence to consent on an older child’s own 
behalf where there is clear evidence to suggest decisional competence may be 
present. I do not intend to discuss how to proceed where it is reasonable to 
judge that a child does not have decisional competence to consent, as in the 
case with neonates, infants and young children, or not enough decisional ability 
to assume sole decision-making responsibilities.
The increasing recognition that cognitively vulnerable individuals are needed for 
scientific progress and increased insight into the aetiology of disorders that 
affect those groups is a background upon which to appraise measures to
201 Medical Research Council (2004: 7-8).
202 Directive 2001/20/EC. OJ L 121,1.5.2001, p. 35. All EU member states were obliged to 
implement this directive into their domestic legal systems bv 2004
203 Ibid.
204 See Ross (1998) for a discussion.
205 See Buchanan and Brock (1989: Chapter Five).
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regulate the participation of those groups in medical research. Clearly, 
standards of decisional competence do not change with increasing scientific 
need and thus one should be wary about any attempt to relax standards of 
decisional competence for ulterior motives. Theorizing vulnerability allows us to 
recognise where vulnerabilities are more real than apparent, and how to go 
about dealing with them.
The discussions of vulnerability contained within the revised CIOMS guidelines 
and the Explanatory Report are both encouraging, but they need to address 
definitions and standards of decisional competence to consent as part of a 
meaningful strategy for selecting research participants from cognitively 
vulnerable groups. To avoid reaching an impasse or erring in such situations, 
we must have recourse to moral reasoning that coherently resolves ethical 
questions raised when one is uncertain whether to judge a cognitively 
vulnerable person competent or incompetent to consent on their own behalf. In 
short, we need a moral strategy for resolving instances of doubtful competence.
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Chapter Three
Gewirth’s theory of agency rights
Moral philosophy is essential to conceptualising decisional competence in two 
ways. First, how one chooses to understand the value of a judgment of 
decisional (in)competence is determined by the substance of the particular 
moral theory to which one is committed. Second, to echo Jeffrie Murphy’s 
observation at the beginning of this thesis, how one chooses to err in cases of 
doubtful competence -  in favour of preserving decisional competence for as 
along as possible or making a judgment of decisional incompetence at the 
earliest opportunity -  is guided by the importance one’s chosen moral theory 
attaches to maximising or minimising prospects for self-determination.
This chapter explains the structure of the Alan Gewirth’s argument to the PGC 
and the foundation of his theory of agency rights. I also consider the 
significance of consent and assistance in decision-making under the PGC, in 
order to explore the implications endorsing the PGC has for our understanding 
of competence and consent. This will facilitate my objective to present an 
argument from the PGC206 in relation to judgments of decisional competence in 
Chapters Four and Five. I end this chapter by illustrating how the PGC provides 
a cogent account of morality in its own right by briefly contrasting its 
epistemological foundations with John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness and 
David Gauthier’s rational contractarianism. I have chosen Rawls and Gauthier 
as comparators with the PGC because, like Gewirth, they both detail the steps 
of their arguments carefully and seek to provide an explicit foundation for moral 
action. Curiously, neither Rawls nor Gauthier address the argument to the PGC
Beyleveld distinguishes the argument to the PGC and arguments from the P r r  in the 
following terms. The argument to the PGC consists of the sermons "6 P * n the 
RM that purports to establish the PGC as dialecticallv neep<5<5arv ®/’9u,ment Propounded in
any agent A%un,en,s ,rorn,h? PGC. a . , *  
resolution of practical moral dilemmas. Beyleveld (1991: 398 n 10) * S to " e
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in their work, whereas Gewirth discusses the work of both philosophers207. 
However, I do not propose to analyse or refute counter-arguments to the PGC 
here, as Deryck Beyleveld has already undertaken this comprehensively208. The 
primary purpose of the chapter is to serve as an introduction to Gewirth’s theory 
and the scope of its application, with particular reference to consent and 
decision-making.
The argument to the PGC
In RM209, Gewirth argues that the action of any agent has two fundamental 
features. The ability of the agent to control their behaviour through unforced 
choice whilst having knowledge of relevant circumstances is voluntariness or 
freedom. The aim of the agent to attain some end or goal that constitutes their 
reason for acting is purposiveness or intentionally. The aim or goal in question 
may either consist of either the action itself or the consequences that the action 
is intended to bring about.
Gewirth then relates this to the experience of a hypothetical moral agent. For 
any entity to qualify as an agent, it must be able to act for freely chosen 
purposes210, either ocurrently or prospectively. This meshes with the account of 
agency competence proposed in Chapter One. Agents need not necessarily be 
human beings - they could just as well be androids - as human beings do not 
exhaust the possible class of beings who could display the generic features of 
action211. For the purposes of this discussion, however, assume that an agent 
who is also human being -  let us call her Elsa - is reflecting on her own action. 
Elsa represents any agent -  including you or me -  at anytime, anywhere, in any
207 See RM (19-20,108-109 and 340-341) for discussion of Rawls and Gewirth (1996:11-12, n. 
9) for discussion of Gauthier.
Beyleveld (1991).
209 RM: 22-198. The argument to the PGC as presented in this chapter closely follows the more 
concise structure presented in Gewirth (1984).
210 RM, 44; Beyleveld, (1991: xxxvi). By ‘entity’, I denote any human, animal, android or object 
that may conceivably possess agency. I prefer ‘entity’ to ‘being’ in order to avoid the association 
with ‘having a life’ or ‘being alive’, which is a contingent rather than a necessary feature of an 
agent’s existence.
2fl This explains why we understand Gewirth’s theory more accurately as a theory of agency 
rights (hence the title of this chapter), rather than a theory of human rights (Beyleveld, 1991 ■ 
447, see also Gewirth’s acceptance of this in 1982: 77).
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place. The steps of her reflection are contained in speech marks. When she 
performs an action, Elsa intends:
(i) “I do X for end or purpose E."
X constitutes the means required in order to attain end or purpose E. Examples 
of this statement could be the reading of a book (X) in order to gain knowledge 
(E) or diving into a lake (X) in order to rescue a drowning child (E). Given the 
pursuit of E is the result of a freely expressed choice, Elsa considers that E has 
sufficient value so as to motivate her to act in order to achieve it. Therefore, 
from her standpoint, (i) entails:
(ii) “E is good”
Two things are important here. First, the value that Elsa attaches to E need not 
necessarily be a moral value and will vary according to her particular choice. 
Elsa may equally well intend to act to pursue a morally relevant end as much as 
a morally irrelevant end. However, common to any end or purpose E is the idea 
that the Elsa must value the means employed to achieve E. Therefore, for her 
to will the end of her action, she must also will the means212. Second, in order 
for the Elsa to act to achieve E, she must have the “proximate necessary” 
conditions for action. These closely relate to the generic features of action, 
voluntariness/freedom and purposiveness/intentionality, outlined above. But in 
order for purposiveness to be extended to the general conditions required for 
success in purpose achievement, it requires a broader scope. This is provided 
by the concept of well-being. According to Gewirth, well-being consists in:
“having the various substantive conditions and abilities, ranging from life and 
physical integrity to self-esteem and education, that are required if a person is to 
act either at all or with general chance of success in achieving the purposes for 
which he acts.”213
212 This is similar to Kant, who formulates means-ends rationality in similar terms: “Whoever 
wills the end, so far as reason has decisive influence on his action, wills also the indispensable 
necessary means to it that lie in his power.” Quoted in Wood (1999: 62).
213 Gewirth (1984:15).
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Voluntariness, freedom, purposiveness, intentionally and well-being are the 
necessary conditions of successful human action, which Gewirth summarises 
as freedom and well-being. It follows that Elsa holds:
(iii) My freedom and well-being are necessary goods
This means Elsa values freedom and well-being in a categorically instrumental 
way. Elsa may also express this as:
(iv) I must have freedom and well-being
‘Must’ in this context is a practical prescriptive requirement. This means that it is 
directly relevant to what the agent is prepared to claim and do in respect of the 
pursuit of her own purposes214, namely having the necessary conditions of 
action. Mindful of this, it then may be said:
(v) “I have rights to freedom and well-being"
In order to prove that (v) is the logical extension of (iv), imagine that Elsa were 
to deny (v). Given the correlative duties of other individuals to act or refrain from 
acting in order to protect the object of the right to which Elsa makes a claim215, it 
follows that Elsa would also deny:
(vi) All other agents ought at least to refrain from violating or eliminating 
my freedom and well-being”
From denying (vi), Elsa must accept:
(vii) It is not the case that all other agents ought at least to refrain from 
violating or eliminating my freedom and well-being.”
An acceptance of (vii) entails:
214 RM: 193.
2,5 According to analytical jurist Hohfeld, human rights are • • u
accepted by Gewirth in the context of the rights bestowed b v m e P r r ^ ' u 9^ '  This idea is 
Gewirth (1978). a wea oy the PGC. See Hohfeld (2001) and
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(viii) “It is permissible for other agents to violate or eliminate my freedom 
and well-being".
By accepting (viii), Elsa must accept:
(ix) “It is permissible that I may not have freedom and well-being”.
However, it is clear that (ix) contradicts (iv), in which Elsa recognises the 
necessity of freedom and well-being for action. Since every agent must accept
(iv) , then Elsa must reject (ix). Since (ix) follows from the denial of (v), in which 
Elsa recognises her right to freedom and well-being, every agent, including 
Elsa, must also reject that denial. Therefore, every agent must logically accept
(v) , where the agent recognises her rights to freedom and well-being.
The rights claimed at this stage in the argument are prudential and not moral. In 
order to elicit the transition from a prudential to a moral right claim, Gewirth 
appends several additional steps to the argument.
The sufficient and necessary reason upon which every agent predicates her 
rights to freedom and well-being is that she is an agent, capable of both current 
and prospective purposivity. Gewirth calls this prospective purposive agency, 
abbreviated by Beyleveld to ‘PPA’. Accordingly, the agent then must accept:
(x) “I have rights to freedom and well-being because I am a prospective 
purposive agent (PPA)”216
Here, ‘because I am a PPA’ is the sufficient and necessary justifying criterion.
We can demonstrate the validity of (x) by the Argument for the Sufficiency of 
Agency (ASA). Imagine Elsa rejects (x) and instead insist that the only reason
216 | use this abbreviation interchangeably with the term ‘agent’, although agent will be used 
predominately in this thesis to minimize the use of abbreviations.
Gewirth’s theory of agency rights 80
she has the generic rights of agency was due to the fact that she has blue 
eyes217. Consequently, the Elsa would have to acknowledge:
(xi) “I have rights to freedom and well-being only because I have blue 
eyes”
In acknowledging this, Elsa would contradict herself. This is because, through 
this claim, Elsa is compelled to accept that, were it not for her having blue eyes, 
she would not have the generic rights. In this case, she would have to accept:
(xii) “I do not have rights to freedom and well-being”
The acceptance of (xii) would conflict with the need for Elsa to necessarily hold 
that she has rights to freedom and well-being. Accordingly, Elsa must reject the 
view that her having blue eyes is the sufficient and necessary justifying criterion 
of her having the generic rights of agency. Elsa must therefore accept (x).
At this point, we move from the realm of prudential right claims to moral right 
claims. Now that Elsa has accepted (x), Elsa must also accept:
(xiii) “All PPAs have rights to freedom and well-being."
Gewirth derives (xii) from (x) through the use of the logical principle of 
universalization (LPU). This requires the application of the PGC to all those 
other individuals who are PPAs. Gewirth explains this principle in the following 
terms:
“If some predicate P belongs to some subject S because S has a certain quality 
Q (where the ‘because’ is that of sufficient condition) then P must logically belong 
to all other subjects Sf to S„ that also have Q”218
In this case, Elsa must logically concede that all other PPAs have the generic 
rights, given that Elsa accepts her own possession of the generic rights
217 This could be any contingent factor.
218 Gewirth (1996: 18).
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depends upon her being a PPA. Elsa is then logically committed that she must 
take favourable account of the generic rights all other agents simply because, 
they, like her, are agents.
Given that all other agents are actual or potential recipients of Elsa’s original 
action, Elsa and all other agents are compelled to accept on the pain of self- 
contradiction:
(xiv) “I ought to act in accord with the generic rights of my recipients as 
well as of myself.”
This Is expressed as the maxim of the PGC:
(xv) “Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of 
yourself.”
Gewlrth calls this the Principle of Generic Consistency because, as he sees It, 
the argument combines logical consistency with the generic features and rights 
of action. As all agents hold the generic rights equally, we can think of the 
generic rights as agency rights. Therefore, to accept the PGC is to accept it as 
the sufficient and necessary justification of the existence of agency rights as 
well as the supreme principle of morality.
Our understanding of the argument to the PGC is deepened if it is separated 
into three central stages219. The first consists of steps (i) to (iv). Here the agent 
must accept that she must have the generic features of agency in order to act 
for any freely chosen purpose, simply by virtue of being an agent. The second 
stage consists of steps (v) to (x). Here the agent is compelled to accept that she 
has a claim right to the generic features of agency, on the pain of contradicting 
that she is an agent. The third stage consists of steps (x) to (xiv). Here the 
agent must logically accept that all other agents (PPAs) have the same rights to 
the generic features of agency as she claims for herself.
219 Beyleveld (1991: 21-46).
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Fundamentally, Gewirth establishes that the rights specified by the PGC are 
grounded in the nature of free and purposive action and belong equally to all 
beings capable of such action. Although Gewirth conceives of the PGC as the 
justifying ground of human rights220, its responsibilities and protections extend 
to all agents. In so far as the PGC obviates ‘speciesist’ objections levelled at 
conventional attempts to ground human rights as distinct from animal or 
ecological rights221, it is an egalitarian moral principle in the strongest sense.
The methodology of the PGC
Gewirth calls the philosophical method the PGC uses a dialectically necessary 
method, a method that is important to our correct understanding of it. The 
method is dialectical in so far as begins from statements presented as being 
made or accepted by an agent, such as Elsa. It is concerned with the ‘"first 
person conative perspective” of the agent222, indicated by the way in which the 
steps of the argument are framed (“I do/l must/l need . . etc). The dialectic 
nature of the method also allows an examination of what the agent’s statements 
logically imply223.
The dialectical necessity of the method derives from the fact that the PGC 
prescribes what all agents must logically claim and accept224. The opposite of 
this is an assertoric method, where the agent considers statements objectively 
true without relating them to her perspective as an agent. In other words, 
Gewirth draws the provisions of the PGC from the necessary claims of agency. 
Although the PGC begins initially as relative to the prudential right claims of an 
individual agent, Gewirth argues that this does not compromise how convincing 
the rights-claims are or the categorical nature of the PGC225. According to 
Gewirth, “whatever is necessarily justified within the context of agency is also 
necessary for morality”, which follows from the premise that agency constitutes 
the context of all moral action226. Correlatively, that which “logically must be
220 Most notably, in RM and in Gewirth (1982); (1984) and (1996).
221 Such as Singer (1976).
222 Gewirth (1984: 20).
223 Gewirth (1984: 20).
224 RM: 44.
225 Gewirth (1984:21)
226 Ibid.
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accepted by every agent is necessarily justified within the context of agency”227. 
This means that, notwithstanding the dialectical necessity method of the PGC, 
the principle of morality it generates we can state assertorically228.
Gewirth offers two justifications for using the dialectical method229. First, “certain 
inferences that would not be valid apart from the conative first-person 
perspective of the agent are valid within that perspective”230. To illustrate this, 
Gewirth analyses the terms in which he frames the argument to the PGC. 
Contrast the move from:
(i) “I do X for end or purpose E” 
to
(ii) “E is good”, 
with:
(ia) ’’Some agent A does X for end or purpose E” 
to
(ii) “E is good”
Gewirth claims that (ii) does not follow from (ia) but (ii) does follow from (i)231. 
We understand the difference between these two inferences that gives the 
former its validity if we recall the example of Elsa. In the inference from (i) to (ii), 
“E is good” is stated by Elsa (the agent herself) in the context her own 
purposive action. Conversely, in the inference from (ia) to (ii), “E is good” is 
made assertorically, as if it were being stated about an agent and her action by 
a third party232. However, Gewirth points out that the purpose for which an 
agent acts is not in fact good just because it is her chosen purpose -  it could of 
course be very bad233. What does follow - and what is captured by the use of 
the dialectically necessary method - is that the agent believes her purposes to
227 Ibid.
228 Ibid.
229 RM p. 42-47 and Gewirth (1984: 21).
230 Gewirth (1984: 21)
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be good234. According to Gewirth, the proper meaning of (ii) is not sufficiently 
explicated by an objective statement that some agent performs a purposive 
action, unless that statement is made by the agent herself235. The “evaluative 
endorsement” contained in (ii) follows from the statement of action contained in 
(i) because the purpose in question is that of the individual agent which she 
accepts236.
The second reason Gewirth uses to justify the dialectically necessary approach 
“is that it restricts the argument to what every agent is logically or rationally 
justified in claiming from within his agent-relative standpoint for purposive 
action”237. In taking a non-arbitrary starting point, Gewirth obviates accusations 
of speciousness or question-begging premises. A non-arbitrary starting point is 
one which logically binds all agents involvement in action of some kind -  even 
that which seeks to bring about an end to one’s agency, such as suicide238. 
That there are practical judgments about action made by all agents that are 
logically irrefutable (irrespective of the content of that action) serves to ground 
the nature of action perse. When the argument is followed to its third stage (the 
move from prudence to morality), this yields valid criteria against which to 
assess the rightness of action, the denial of which entails self-contradiction239.
What dialectical necessity amounts to in practice is a heuristic for critical self­
reflection whereby an agent is able to scrutinize the array of practical and moral 
judgments that she endorses, affirming those which are consistent with the 
PGC and rejecting those which are not240. This is not as Gewirth observes, to 
reduce ethics to logic but to illustrate that morally impermissible action is by 
definition rationally unjustifiable241. From the claim that an agent requires the 
generic rights in order to engage in action of any kind, then, we are logically 
committed to accepting these tenets of the dialectically necessary method.
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
Ibid.
Ibid.
Gewirth (1984: 22).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
RM: 45-47.
Gewirth (1984: 22).
Gewirth’s theory of agency rights 85
Defining the content of agency rights
We saw earlier that in order for an agent to have the necessary means to 
pursue her freely chosen purposes, she must make a rights claim over the 
generic features of action, namely freedom and well-being. Although we can 
define freedom and well-being at a general level, they also have a specific 
content which is important to understand the practical ramifications of Gewirth’s 
argument.
For Gewirth, well-being is constitutive of three different kinds of good: basic, 
non-subtractive and additive. Basic goods represent the preconditions of all 
agency, and include life, physical integrity and mental equilibrium. An agent’s 
right to basic goods is infringed when, amongst other things, she is killed, 
starved, tortured or unwillingly intoxicated. Rights under the PGC to the basic 
goods are further undermined where an agent is experiencing an infringement 
of their basic goods and another agent who could provide assistance without 
incurring similar hardships herself chooses not to do so242.
Non-subtractive goods are “the abilities and conditions required for maintaining 
one’s capacity for purpose fulfilment and capabilities for particular actions”243. 
Rights to these goods are infringed when the agent has her scope for making 
future plans restricted, when important information relevant to the context of her 
intended action is withheld or where some factor operates to frustrate the use of 
her own resources for the achievement of an end consistent with the PGC. 
Lying, cheating, theft (assuming property arrangements that are themselves 
consistent with the PGC), deception and exploitation undermine rights to non- 
subtractive goods 244.
Additive goods are “the abilities and conditions required for increasing personal 
capacity for purpose fulfilment and capabilities for particular actions” 245. 
Humiliation, denial of access to beneficial educational opportunities or 
discrimination on morally irrelevant grounds such as gender, sexuality, ethnicity,
242 Gewirth (1982: 56).
243 Ibid.
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conscience, nationality or socio-economic background infringes rights to these 
goods246. Actions that foster a climate of anxiety, mistrust or resentment or that 
encourage the dissemination of practices that would ill-dispose agents to acting 
in accordance with the PGC interfere with the development of wisdom, self- 
respect and other “self-regarding virtues” in a person further infringe this right. 
Circumstances of ignorance, passivity or superstition or where freedom of 
expression or civil liberties is curtailed in such as way as to impinge upon the 
agent’s ability to act successfully to achieve her purposes exacerbate this. 
Gewirth uses a particular nomenclature to distinguish interferences with these 
three different types of well-being. When the right of an agent to basic well­
being is violated, the agent experiences basic harm; when the right of an agent 
to non-subtractive or additive well-being are violated, the agent experiences 
specific harm247.
Gewirth defines freedom as:
“a person’s controlling his actions and his participation in transactions by his 
own unforced choice or consent and with the knowledge of relevant 
circumstances, so that his behaviour is neither compelled nor prevented by 
the actions of other persons.’’248
The converse of this -  Gewirthian unfreedom -  arises when an agent is 
exposed to violence of any kind, psychological or emotional abuse, coercion (of 
a type that is not permissible under the PGC), manipulation and deception “or 
any other procedures that restrict or remove his informed control of his/her 
behaviour by his/her own unforced choice”249. The right to freedom under the 
PGC entails a right to autonomy and privacy which ensures that the agent may 
never have the will of others imposed on her unless it is with her explicit, fully 
informed consent250.
By definition, a morally wrong action will contravene at least one of the 
dimensions of freedom and well-being. The extent to which an action is morally 
wrong is dependent upon the degree of harm and the extent of encroachment
246 Gewirth only mentions three types of discrimination; however, it is clear that the PGC would 
accommodate a prohibition on all the additional forms of discrimination mentioned above
247 Ibid.
248 Ibid.
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on freedom that an agent would suffer were the action to proceed. The 
infringement of the right of one agent by another agent is tantamount to holding 
that a right claimed by the individual for herself in so far as she is a agent may 
be denied to another agent even though she too has a claim to this right 
because she is an agent. Immoral action is therefore an expression of 
irrationality. While this does not necessarily foreclose ascriptions of 
responsibility for immoral action under the PGC, there are grounds for 
suggesting that if an agent consistently acts contrary to the PGC, is incapable of 
guiding her action so that it conforms with the PGC or infringes the PGC 
particularly gravely, then her societal competence will diminish and so too her 
level of responsibility.
The only absolute right, according to Gewirth, is the right to life251. As such, it 
can be easily envisaged that there will be occasions on which the rights to 
freedom and well being will conflict with each other. This could occur in three 
ways252:
(i) the freedom of agent A may conflict with the well-being of 
agent B when A uses his freedom to inflict some basic or 
specific harm against B;
(ii) the rights of different persons to well-being may conflict with 
one another, as in the example where L must deceive M to 
prevent the torture of N;
(iii) the right of a person to freedom may conflict with his own right 
to well-being. Instances of this include suicide, sado­
masochistic sexual practices or even excessive work when it 
interferes with one’s health.
That we can envisage conflicts between competing human rights creates a 
problem for their resolution. One way of doing this is to claim that human rights 
or at least their realisation are conditional upon circumstance. This seems to be
251 Gewirth (1981).
252 Gewirth (1982: 57).
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an unpromising response. It does not give us grounds for identifying which 
human rights are engaged in which circumstances and what authority the 
circumstances have to attenuate their force. Another way that is more promising 
is to view rights as occupying levels of a hierarchy, similar to Ronald Dworkin’s 
idea of ‘rights as trumps’253 254. This admission, however, does not detract from the 
necessity of the human rights themselves as guarantors of the generic features 
of agency. It simply means that human rights, framed as mere descriptions of 
what they are rather than accounting for the circumstances in which they are 
applied, do not generate their own criteria for resolution when two or more may 
be in conflict. Gewirth appends three grounds of resolution to his theory of 
agency rights, which he orders in terms of their importance for preserving 
agency .
Resolving conflicts of rights under the PGC
Gewirth specifies three ways in which the PGC extends to resolve conflicts of 
rights. The first seeks to prevent or remove transactional inconsistency, which 
circumscribes the right to freedom255. Where an agent intends to use her 
freedom in order to violate the freedom or well-being of other persons then the 
freedom of the violating agent can be curtailed in the relevant respect. This 
curtailment follows from the maxim that the argument to the PGC yields - that 
each agent must act in accordance with the generic rights of all other agents.
There are two exceptions to this. The first is where agent A may coerce or harm 
another agent B in order to prevent B from coercing or harming either A or 
some other agent C256. For instance, if B physically assaults either A or C, A 
and/or C may physically assault B in order to resist or prevent the assault. 
However, the nature and extent of the defensive physical assault should be no 
more than is necessary for the purposes of resistance or prevention.
The second is where coercion is justified when it is inflicted in accordance with 
social rules or institutions that are themselves justified by the PGC. This
253 Dworkin (1984).
254 Gewirth (1982: 58).
255 Ibid.
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amounts to a principle whereby in cases where there is an actual or intended 
infringement of one agent’s generic rights by another, the PGC provides that the 
beleaguered agent can take action so as to prevent this violation257. The 
justification of the action taken will depend upon the feasibility and importance 
for subsequent action of removing the inconsistency.
The second criterion for the resolution of conflicts of rights is the degree to 
which the right is needed for successful action of any kind258. To this end, the 
rights to the generic features of action are prioritised in terms of the necessity of 
the object of that right to the possibility of action, when the protection of the 
greater right involves the infringement of the lesser right. The example Gewirth 
uses to illustrate this is where agent A’s right not to be deceived is overridden 
by agent B’s right not to be tortured. The right to freedom may be similarly 
restricted when the agent intends to infringe her own well-being, but only where 
there is doubt over her ability to fulfil the “emotional and cognitive conditions of 
freedom or voluntariness” 259. In these cases, appropriate interventions, 
including reasonable force, may be used in order to prevent an agent from 
causing unintended harm to herself. However, interference with the freedom of 
an agent for her own benefit can only be used to prevent harm she causes to 
her own basic goods 260. Since her basic goods are the fundamental 
preconditions of action, they are required if she is to maintain her status as an 
agent. If one were to interfere with her freedom in order to prevent her causing 
harm to her own non-subtractive or additive well-being, then this would be 
unjustifiable under the PGC. This is because freedom is itself more necessary 
for her actions than these other levels of her well-being261.
We can derive two conclusions from this. First, an agent intent on self-harm 
must ultimately be allowed to pursue her purpose if the emotional and cognitive 
prerequisites of voluntary action are met. Second, no-one has a right to restrain 
other agents from making choices that some agents may see as being 
misguidedly self-destructive, such as indolence or gluttony, where those actions
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do not impinge upon the generic rights of those other agents themselves262. As 
Gewirth observes:
“[The PGC] does not justify wholesale interference in the lives of others; it 
does not apply to projects that may lead only to decreased physical or mental 
efficiency . . . Persons must be left free to live their lives as they please and 
to make and perhaps profit from their own mistakes”263
Whereas conflicts of rights are resolved where they exist between agents or in 
relation to one agent whose reflexive capacities are most likely to be absent, the 
PGC cannot provide a resolution to conflicts of rights when the agent concerned 
has the decisional competence to waive the benefit of a given right. If this 
troubles us, it is more likely to be because we are ourselves uncertain about the 
decisional competence of this agent, rather than by what the choices entail.
Direct and indirect applications of the PGC
To establish the viability of an argument from the PGC, we must first consider 
the modalities of its application. These are direct and indirect methods. The 
direct application of the PGC places a requirement that the actions of individual 
agents are in conformity with what is morally permissible under the PGC264. In 
terms of its indirect application, the PGC creates obligations on social rules and 
institutions. In order for these rules and institutions to be valid, they must 
advance an equality of freedom and well-being for all agents265. Any agent who 
promotes, preserves or acts in accordance with them will by definition fulfil their 
moral duties towards other agents266. It is possible that the indirect approach 
may provide for individuals to be coerced without violating their rights to 
freedom and well-being, in such cases where the rules or institutions that 
require such coercion are themselves justified by the PGC267.
It should be remembered that whilst agents are free to choose purposes of this nature the 
potential social costs incurred justify extensive educational measures that would allow those 
individuals to more conscientiously pursue their additive well-being. See RM: 240-248 and 265.
J RM\ 265.
264 Gewirth (1982: 60).
265 Ibid.
266 Ibid.
267 For example, the indefinite detention of a psychopathic serial killer in a psychiatric hospital or
other non-pumtive environment. Ul
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Gewirth subdivides the indirect applications of the PGC into two distinct forms. 
Procedural applications ensure the moral justifiability of social rules and 
institutions in so far as all agents subject to them have accepted them through 
their free and informed consent268. These derive from the freedom component 
of the PGC, and are consistent with established social contractarian theories269. 
Instrumental applications, on the other hand, ensure the moral justifiability of 
social rules and institutions insofar as they function to uphold the well-being of 
all agents. These derive from the well-being component of the PGC.
According to Gewirth, each of these applications themselves can be of two 
kinds - optional or necessary. Optional procedural applications pertain to the 
consent required for individuals to choose to join or participate in voluntary 
associations270. Necessary procedural applications pertain to the consent that is 
required in order to mandate a general decision procedure, such as elections 
for political representatives, governmental officials or the introduction of a 
specific law271.
Instrumental applications of the PGC take either a static or dynamic form272. 
Static instrumental applications protect agents from violations of their rights to 
basic and some non-subtractive goods and to sanction those who commit such 
violations. The closest approximation to this in existing institutional 
arrangements is the criminal law, although this does not mean that the PGC 
would endorse the array of punitive sanctions that such systems commonly 
employ273. Dynamic instrumental applications uphold longer-term protections of 
basic, non-subtractive and certain additive goods where the efforts of the agent 
alone are insufficient obtain them274. An expansive and properly resourced
268 Gewirth (1982: 60).
269 For a comprehensive overview of such theories, see Boucher and Kelly (1994).
270 Gewirth (1982:61).
271 Ibid.
272 Ibid.
273 The PGC does have an important compassionate dimension manifest in both its 
interpersonal and institutional application (Gewirth, 1996, xv, 21-22, 83; Gewirth, 1998: 71,87). 
This extends to inform Gewirthian criminal justice ethics. Brown (1998) proposes a theory of 
punishment derived from the PGC, although does not intend for this to specify what the precise 
content of the sanction would be in certain types of cases. I believe that any criminal justice 
system founded on the PGC would favour restorative justice practices and rehabilitation rather 
than punitive incarceration, because of the primacy of well-being and the absence of any place 
in the PGC for vengefulness. Commentators tend to overlook this dimension of the PGC, given 
the fixation with the structure of the argument rather than its application
274 Gewirth (1982: 61).
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welfare state, which ensures at the very least equality of opportunity in the 
conditions necessary for successful action, embodies these protections.
Although the PGC does offer clear prescriptions for what must be fulfilled both 
by the actions of individuals and by the role of the state, not all the human rights 
it creates warrant legal enforcement275. However, all legally enforceable rights 
justified by the PGC are species of human rights. This amounts to a claim that, 
in a PGC compliant polity, not all moral rights should become legal rights but 
that all legal rights are moral rights. Those rights that should receive protection 
in a PGC complaint polity are those whose breach seriously violates the agent’s 
basic, additive or non-subtractive goods (e.g. bodily integrity, education, 
reputation) but not those whose violation results in a minimal impact on the 
agent’s interests (e.g. there can be no right against trivial promise breaking).
Using the framework delineated above, Gewirth identifies three different 
methods to enshrine in law the applications of the PGC that warrant legal 
protection276:
(i) The static-instrumental justification of legal protection277. This serves 
to protect basic and other important rights from violation by other 
agents, corporate entities and the state and is manifest in the 
coercive or prohibitive aspects of the law (such as the criminal law). (i)
(ii) The dynamic-instrumental justification of legal protection278. It is a fact 
of life that agents are, through no fault of their own, positioned 
unequally in terms of their ability secure and maintain their generic 
rights. The rules that emanate from this justification serve to remove 
this inequality, through the provision of healthcare, education, 
housing and monetary benefits on behalf of the state to all who need 
them. The dynamic-instrumental protection also comprises the 
regulatory function of the state to ensure that the standards of
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services and utilities are maintained at a level commensurate with the 
respect for the rights of all agents under the PGC.
(iii) The necessary-procedural justification of legal protection279. This 
constitutes the civil liberties enshrined through constitutional 
provisions and institutional design. It requires that all laws and 
governmental action be informed by procedures that use consensual 
methods280. The significance of this is extensive. The protection 
provides for fundamental civil liberties such as freedom of 
association, movement, assembly, expression and political 
participation, and also a form of social libertarianism whereby the 
state refrains from interfering in the freely chosen actions of any 
agent so long as they do not interfere with the generic rights of 
others. A vast sphere of social activity must therefore be beyond the 
reach of official regulation, whilst the right to engage in these 
activities must receive state protection281.
When applying the PGC to issues of decisional competence, and the moral 
justification for ascribing FPCLC to consent or to refuse research participation, it 
is the dynamic-instrumental and necessary-procedural justifications of legal 
protection with which we are primarily concerned. The levels of education and 
information necessary to make such a choice can only be provided by state 
action that is designed to support individual autonomy, which goes to the first of 
these justifications. Whether the state has a moral justification to interfere with 
the content of an individual’s choice is a matter of civil liberties and goes to the 
second of these justifications.
Consent and the PGC
Consent serves a twofold function under the PGC. First, it protects the 
individual from an unwilled interference in her life where there is no overriding 
human rights-based justification for doing so. Second, the right of choice that
279 Gewirth (1982: 61-62).
280 Gewirth refers to this as “the methods of consent” Ibid
281 Gewirth (1982:63).
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consent offers gives expression to human dignity282, as being a dignity-holder is 
derivative from being an agent283. As Brownsword acknowledges, consent is not 
itself a human right but instead “parasitic upon” a morally prior framework of 
rights and duties 284. The role of consent is to function as a procedural 
justification to grant or withhold authority for interference with the object of the 
right (e.g. not to have one’s bodily or psychological integrity interfered with) 
where no over-riding human rights-based justification is engaged285. Consent is 
therefore a process that legitimises the waiver of the benefits of the rights at 
stake on the sufficient and necessary condition that a) the individual concerned 
can understand the full implications of waiver and b) this does not jeopardize 
the rights of other agents. The placing of consent as a procedural value in 
Gewirthian theory allows us to avoid the pitfalls of viewing it as an end in itself, 
which as Brownsword argues, can lead to a problematic fixation with consent.
In the context of biomedical research, consent is invoked at the level of defining 
biomedical research with human participants and gives it its ethical character286. 
Consent performs a similar function in defining biomedical research as it does in 
forming part of the definition of sexual intercourse (without which the definition 
of the act would become that of another, namely rape). The implicit presence of 
consent in the definition of biomedical research separates it from a notion of 
physical or psychological violation in the name of medical progress287. Unlike 
sexual intercourse, the scope of consent is not limited to the person who is to 
participate (i.e. FPCLC consent), but extends to proxy consent if the individual 
concerned is decisionally incompetent. The same ethos underpins consent 
provisions in the earliest codes of research ethics of the post-Second World war 
period, such as the Nuremberg Code and the World Medical Association 
Declaration of Helsinki.
Nonetheless, the PGC goes much further than simply justifying consent as the 
conduit for the legitimate waiver of a negative right. The generation of a positive
282 Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001:242)
283 Gewirth (1998: 208).
284 Brownsword (2004: 229).
285 Brownsword (2004: 225, 228).
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rights claim from the structure of the argument means that consent -  as a 
procedural justification behind the modification or waiver of a substantive right -  
places a duty of assistance on the part of others to help the person understand 
the implications of waiving the benefit of that right. This is a corollary of the 
positive rights-claim to the object of the right itself. It follows from the PGC- 
protected right to have knowledge of circumstances relevant to the particular 
context of action288. This duty of assistance requires responsiveness to the 
needs of the agent in question if we are to make a sincere effort to assist her to 
understand, even if (due to decisional incompetence) it transpires that she 
apparently cannot understand. The processes leading up to offering or 
withholding consent should be sensitive to the psychological needs and 
dispositions that accompany the experience of cognitive vulnerability in 
particular and of baseline vulnerability in general. Failure to do so amounts to a 
denial of the duty that follows from the positive dimension to the right.
The consequences of this for consent in biomedical research are wide-ranging. 
There is an ethical duty incumbent upon anyone undertaking research and 
those responsible for its oversight to be mindful of the cognitive and/or 
circumstantial vulnerabilities of the individuals approached to participate289. The 
ethos therefore shifts from obtaining consent to empowering the potential 
participant to decide290. On a practical level, this involves putting in place 
mechanisms to assist actively the potential participant’s understanding of the 
research. Where an individual has a questionable ability to make decisions 
about participation, further and more specialised assistance is warranted, 
ideally from someone who does not have a direct interest in the research going 
ahead.
The case of individuals with cognitive vulnerability epitomises the importance of 
appropriate assistance. For them, the mere provision of simplified consent 
forms, greater explanation of research procedures or provision of information in 
alternative formats alone may not offer an improved decision-making situation 
relevant to their needs. If we accept the importance that Gewirthian theory
288 Gewirth (1978: 250-52, 258, 260).
289 This should not be seen as mere compliance with ‘best practice’ in ethical review, but 
amounts to a duty to seek out new ways to be responsive to these vulnerabilities as far as 
possible.
90 See McMillan and Gillett (2002: 225) for a discussion of the empowering potential of consent.
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attaches to the justification of consent and the way in which it should be sought, 
then we have a reason for preserving the decisional competence of potential 
research subjects as far as possible.
On a more theoretical level, the Gewirthian view on consent moves the 
bioethical debate away from unhelpfully bifurcated thinking about autonomy and 
paternalism. Instead, the Gewirthian approach recognises that individuals 
should receive assistance in making decisions for themselves and that this is 
not something that is likely to happen without active interpersonal support. Such 
interventions are best articulated as duties which attach to particular roles (e.g. 
physician, researcher or counsellor), although we can also imagine them arising 
in more mundane, everyday contexts (where a person at a bus stop may read 
out the bus times to a partially sighted person in order to help her plan her 
journey). These represent interventions that seek to promote the autonomy 
interests of the individual concerned, and elicit her decisional independence, 
motivated by a sincere concern for her dignity and capability as an agent. We 
will return to this in Chapters Five and Six.
An evaluation of the PGC against two alternative rationalist 
ethical theories
(i) John Rawls
One of the most well-known and widely debated theories to emerge in the moral 
and political philosophy during the last century is in the work of John Rawls291. 
In A Theory of Justice292, Rawls establishes what he considers the integral 
elements of a theory of justice as fairness. Justice in this sense is only possible 
if social institutions do not operate to allow individuals to benefit from talents 
and endowments arbitrarily bestowed at birth. *19
291 In this section, my concern is with the 'early1 Rawls of ,4 Theory of Justice (1972 rev ed
1 9H9! / ? er tha£ the f 6r’ Ra,Wli? f P° litiCal Liberalism 0993). In A Theory of Justice, Rawls 
undertakes an attempt to construct a moral theory of rights (his account of 'justice as fairness’l 
as contrasted with the concern of Political Liberalism, which is to theorize £ e  as^faknessIn ’a 
way that is (supposedly) acceptable to all citizens in a democracy (the idea of an'overianninn 
consensus’). Insofar as Gewirth’s aim In Roasoo and Morality is to argue for a rig h ^ b a S  9
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The central stages of Rawls’s account take the following form. In order to create 
the framework for a just society, we must first construct a thought experiment. 
We should imagine ourselves in the ‘original position’ -  a position of strict 
equality in which nobody has antecedent knowledge of her eventual human 
traits (e.g. gender, ethnicity, sexuality, religion, intelligence, (dis)abilities, etc.). 
This, Rawls claims, is known as the ‘veil of ignorance’293, which occludes all 
foresight of these socially significant facts. Behind this ‘veil’, we are to construct 
principles of justice that would benefit all to an equal extent, irrespective of 
whatever human form or situation we actually come to occupy. In this way, 
Rawls believes, we are motivated to adopt the same concern for the fate of 
everyone in society.
The principles we would devise under this fictitious ignorance would amount to 
a hierarchy of importance or a “lexical order of priority”294, with the first taking 
precedence over the second, the second over the third and so forth. Rawls 
states the content of these principles as follows:
(i) Each person is to have a right to the greatest equal share of liberties 
compatible with a similar right for all;
(ii) (a) Social and economic inequalities are to be attached to offices and 
positions open to all according to fair equality of opportunity;
(b) Such inequalities are justified if and only if they benefit the least 
advantaged in society. Rawls refers to this as the “difference 
principle”.295
The first principle is commensurate with the notion of equal liberty. This means 
that everyone would be free from prejudice, oppression or persecution of any 
kind. The second principle prescribes that equality of opportunity should allow 
anyone with sufficient skill and ability to flourish, irrespective of socio-economic 
background. The difference principle (iib) affects the principle of the distribution
293 Rawls, (1999: 118-123).
294 Rawls (1999: 37-38).
295 Rawls (1999: 266-267).
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of inequalities (iia) as it provides for differential outcomes only insofar as this 
improves the position of the most deprived.
Rawls’s theory of justice is essentially an attempt to use rational choice theory 
as the first principle of liberal egalitarian thinking. When placed in the ‘original 
position’ of equality in respect of the distribution of freedom, power and wealth, 
and unaware of one’s human characteristics when concealed by ‘veil of 
ignorance’, Rawls believes that individuals will choose this egalitarian moral 
principle as a result of applying rational choice processes. However, there are 
two ways in which Rawls’s attempt to justify this moral principle fails, both of 
which the argument PGC avoids.
The first flaw arises in the inability to appeal to independent rational justification 
(using the canons of inductive and deductive logic) to endorse the use of the 
veil of ignorance or the original position. In as much as Rawls is correct about 
the unequal distribution of abilities, talents and endowments, it follows that 
individuals are not similarly situated to undertake the thought experiment that 
the Rawlsian project requires of them. Even if we were to concede to Rawls that 
reasoning in the original position behind the veil of ignorance is a capacity 
exercisable by all, a problem remains. The demands that the processes of 
abstraction place on individuals, particularly the veil of ignorance, surpass that 
minimal assumption of ignorance that rational persons commonly accept when 
making choices under of uncertain conditions296. It is also questionable whether 
individuals could sufficiently alienate themselves from knowledge of their own 
selfhood (even if only temporarily) in order to eschew fully all their contingent 
human qualities (particularly the most embedded ones such as character and 
temperament) that comprise their existential position297.
One might counter that Rawls’s argument is persuasive independent of whether 
an individual chooses to understand it or has the capacity to follow it. However, 
the methodology Rawls uses generates its own limitations on how far this line of 
defence extends. The methodology involves a contingent or assertoric process 
that requires evaluation on its own merits. Unlike Gewirth’s argument to the
296 RM: 20.
297 Sandel (1998).
Gewirth's theory of agency rights 99
PGC, nothing about it is necessarily true. To claim that the argument is forceful 
presupposes that the person making this claim considers it to represent a 
persuasive basis on which to ground moral principles of justice. This inevitably 
requires scrutiny of the argument and the capacity to understand counterfactual 
reasoning. The methodology also rests upon an understanding that risk- 
averseness is the most appropriate basis on which to go about decision-making 
under conditions of uncertainty. This is a contingent rather than a necessary 
claim that invites controversy.
As such, whilst Rawls’s argument may be valid within its own terms of 
reference, it is not necessarily true. Gewirth’s argument to the PGC, 
alternatively, has premises that are dialectically necessary and therefore 
rationally ineluctable for any agent. Although the argument itself operates at a 
similarly high level of abstraction, and requires the capacity for sustained logical 
reasoning if one is to follow it successfully, the PGC does not require that the 
agent understand the argument - or even agree with it - in order for it to have 
force. In other words, the PGC is necessarily true irrespective of my capacity to 
know that this is the case, or my keenness to dispute this298. This does not 
apply to Rawls’s theory of justice.
The second flaw emerges in the criterion for arranging the principles of justice, 
which Rawls terms the “lexical order of priority”. Rawls defines this as:
“[A]n order which requires us to satisfy the first principle in the ordering 
before we can move on to the second, the second before we consider 
the third, and so on. . . [This] avoids . . . having to balance principles at 
all; those earlier in the ordering have an absolute weight, so to speak, 
with respect to later ones, and hold without exception.”299
Whereas the criteria for resolving rights claims under the PGC is derived from a 
hierarchy of goods whose importance for human action is determined their 
weighting, Rawls’s lexical order is not strictly determined by the principles of 
justice but instead by external considerations that are separate from the 
principles300. This amounts to Rawls’s own presumption about the motives that 
would influence people to choose particular principles of justice over others in
298 See Beyleveld (1991: 149-150, 305-306, 477).
299 Rawls (1999: 38).
300 RM: 340-341.
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the original position behind the veil of ignorance301. These motives themselves 
have no ineluctable rational foundation, unlike the motive of an agent to 
recognise her claim to the generic rights under the PGC. By comparison, 
Rawls’s lexical ordering appears somewhat arbitrary, reflecting the particular 
preferences of secular Western liberalism, without providing a rational 
justification of that liberalism.302
Rawls does present a meticulous and attractive proposal about how individuals 
can devise social and political arrangements to discharge their moral obligations 
in a rational way. However, this only provides us with a rational way to identify 
the individuals who are the recipients of our moral obligations and the interests 
of which we must take favourable account when discharging our moral 
obligations towards those individuals. What Rawls does not do is to provide a 
rationally compelling answer as to why one should be moral at all. In short, 
Rawls provides a rational way to be moral but does not explain why rationality 
entails morality.
(ii) David Gauthier
The moral contractarianism of David Gauthier is quite distinct from the liberal 
egalitarianism of either Rawls or Gewirth. In Morals by Agreement303, Gauthier 
elaborates a basis for morality founded upon principles of rational choice. 
However, this is where the similarity with Rawls’s theory ends. Gauthier defines 
a person as someone who selects what is likely to give the greatest expectation 
of value or utility to herself304. In the absence of conditions of perfect 
competition, any agent who acts in this way will undoubtedly disadvantage 
themselves and others305. The purpose of morality, according to Gauthier, is to 
constrain the pursuit of self-interest to ensure that everyone can benefit equally 
through the actions of each other306. However, it is not morality itself which 
Gauthier seeks to defend. Rather, his principal concern is with the justification
301 Ibid.
Ibid. Gewirth observes how this is particularly evident in the prioritising of individual liberty 
over economic security. 1
303 Gauthier (1986).
304 Gauthier (1986: 9).
305 Illustrated by the tale of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
306 Gauthier (1986: 9,11).
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of rational and impartial constraints upon human conduct307. In concentrating on 
the application of these constraints to ensure Pareto optimality, Vallentyne 
observes of Gauthier that, “[¡]t is not merely that his theory might fail to capture 
some traditional moral concerns, but rather that its connection with these 
traditional moral concerns is purely contingent.”308
Gauthier’s definition of rational choice draws on a distinction between two main 
types of choice situation. Parametric choice situations are those where the 
choice environment is fixed, and where choices are rational provided they 
ensure the greatest anticipated utility309. Strategic choice situations are those 
where the agent recognises that the outcome of choice depends in part upon 
that to which it would be rational for all other agents to agree310 31.
One of Gauthier’s central concerns is to delineate the initial bargaining position. 
These constitute the hypothetical results of non-cooperative interaction 
constrained by the Lockean Proviso™. The outcome of such interaction is the 
complete cessation of all social cooperation. However, this cessation also 
applies to the operation of coercive or harmful activity.312. This solution, he 
argues, applies the principles of the initial bargaining position that minimizes the 
maximum relative concession that anyone need make313. The relative 
concession a person makes for a given option is the ratio of:
(a) the excess of (i) the utility for that person of her most favourable
admissible option over (ii) the utility for that person of the given option
to:
307 Vallentyne (1991:2).
308 Vallentyne (1991: 2).
309 Gauthier (1986: 21, 85, 170-171, 183-184). By ‘utility’, Gauthier means the most effective 
manner through which the agent can achieve her goals.
310 Gauthier (1986: 21,24, 61, 68,76-78,157-158).
311 Briefly, this is a constraint delineated in the political writings of John Locke that no-one 
should make herself better off by making someone else worse off. The term originates in Nozick 
(1974:175-182).
112 Vallentyne suggests that some will consider the initial bargaining position to be reflective of 
how individuals behave in the absence of cooperation. In these circumstances, he claims, it is 
sometimes rational for individuals to improve their own position by worsening that of others 
(1991:7).
113 Vallentyne (1991: 8).
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(b) the excess of (i) the utility for that person of her most favourable 
admissible option over (ii) the utility for that person of the initial 
bargaining position option314.
Gauthier insists that it is rational that we comply with rational agreements as 
rationality requires that all agents adopt a policy, known as ‘choice disposition’, 
of complying with the terms of rational agreements under certain broadly 
defined conditions315. This is because a choice is rationally permissible if and 
only if it conforms to a policy that is rational to adopt316. Moreover, if there are a 
sufficient number of individuals inclined to comply with rational agreements and 
whose characters are trustworthy and reliable, then it is in our own interests to 
adopt a policy whereby we maximise our own utility. This is on the condition that 
that we honour the rational agreements that we have made with others who are 
themselves disposed to honouring their rational agreements. Gauthier refers to 
this as ‘constrained maximisation’317, which is contrasted with the comparatively 
disadvantageous position that would be elicited if we cultivate a trustworthy and 
reliable character whilst disregarding compliance with rational agreements318. 
Exclusion from the benefits of bargaining arrangements is the almost certain 
response if we were not to comply, as other rational agents would have no 
grounds to depend upon our integrity319. For these reasons, Gauthier believes 
that rationality prescribes compliance.
Unlike Rawls, Gauthier employs rational choice theory to derive moral principles 
from a morally neutral choice situation. In so far as Gewirth also begins from the 
starting point of prudential requirements for human action, we can detect an 
affinity here between Gauthier’s contractarianism and the PGC. Nevertheless, 
this is where such affinities begin and end. Because Gauthier seeks to ground 
morality in rational agreement, he maintains that such agreement requires 
mutual advantage. Unlike Gewirth’s theory of agency rights, Gauthier conceives 
of the parties to such agreement to include only those currently living members
T  GK|UthieÜ (1986;  136' 148) an?,Vallentyne 8). An admissible option is one that is both
as much u,iiiiv as ihe ini,iai bar9ai"ins
316 Vallentyne (1991:10).
317 Gauthier (1986: 167-170).
318 Gauthier (1986:173).
319 Vallentyne (1991:10).
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of society whose cooperation would benefit other living members of that society. 
Children and the disabled, for instance, are not parties to the agreement since 
they offer no benefit to what able-bodied, intellectually developed adults could 
obtain through bargaining amongst themselves320. Applying this principle to 
health care, Gauthier claims:
“From a technology that made it possible for an ever-increasing 
proportion of persons to increase the average level of well-being, our 
society is passing to a technology, best exemplified by developments in 
medicine, that make possible an ever-increasing transfer of benefits to 
persons who decrease that average. Such persons are not party to the 
moral relationships grounded by a contractarian theory.”321
Gauthier’s adoption of a social Darwinist position towards those who impede the 
initial bargaining position rather than one which would help disadvantaged 
groups pursue their interests and develop their autonomy, demonstrates that his 
theory Is founded upon mutual unconcern, to an extent that many would find 
intuitively disturbing322.
Even if Gauthier’s uncompromising position on contractarian relationships is set 
aside, the question still remains, however, why constrained self-maximisation 
should ground moral principles. The identification of natural inequality amongst 
persons in Gauthier’s moral contractarianism is, like in Rawls’s justice as 
fairness, is a sensible starting point323. However, following Gewirth, l believe 
that Gauthier fails to achieve the impartiality that he claims for his theory324, 
even in spite of his attempts to defend it325.
The problem arises when we begin to analyse why those who benefit from the 
distribution of natural inequalities should undertake to enter into an impartial 
bargain with those who are disadvantaged by the distribution in the first place. 
Although disadvantaged individuals may have something to offer those who are 
advantaged, at a cost the naturally advantaged can afford, this itself does not
320 Gauthier (1986: 268).
321 Gauthier (1986:18).
i c l s ; h?986-' ,here is !“  place in this »“»O' moral intuitlonism(Gauthier, 1986. 269). Of course, the same applies to the PGC, althouah it aives rke to far
fewer counter-intuitive moral conclusions 9 19 V6S r se t0 tar
323 Gewirth (1996:11-12, n. 9).
324 Gewirth (1996:11-12, n. 9).
325 Gauthier (1988; 1991).
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constitute a necessary let alone a sufficient reason why individuals enter into 
bargaining arrangements. To accept this would commit one to a contingent and 
narrow view of human motivation, as opposed to the universal premise from 
which Gewirth starts, the need for freedom and well-being if one is to act with 
any chance of success at all. Gauthier appears to make the mistake of much 
liberal moral theory insofar as he appears to conflate rationality with idealised 
decision-making in market economics and the model of the self it presupposes. 
In doing so, Gauthier devises a rational method to be moral, but like Rawls, 
does not answer our question of why it is rational to be moral.
Summary
Gewirth’s theory of agency rights provides a rationally ineluctable theory of 
morality which is compelling both as a purely abstract ethical principle and as 
the foundations of a political and bioethical theory which stresses universality 
egalitarianism and care. In addition to providing an argument for agency rights, 
it also recognises the inherent dependence and vulnerability in all agents and 
suggests lines along which institutions and social practices could be designed in 
order to offer support for all agents in need of it. This may be countered as 
another visionary ‘grand narrative’, but if the argument to the PGC is accepted, 
then it is not possible to deny the existence of the generic rights without 
contradicting what I am implicitly committing myself to in the act of that denial.
Following Brownsword, the proper place of consent is Gewirthian theory is as 
an important procedural safeguard of rights to bodily and psychological integrity. 
Consent may not constitute a substantive right in itself, but its ethical and legal 
value derives from its ability to create and modify relationships which the 
generic rights circumscribe. It follows that, in a PGC compliant polity at least, all 
individuals require appropriate forms of education and empowerment to be able 
to engage in decision-making to the extent of their abilities. Difficulties arise 
when the existence of abilities for individual decision-making are merely 
assumed without an attempt to consider whether some decision-makers will 
require support to elicit their decision-making abilities. That some agents 
experience cognitive vulnerability in ways that could undermine their decisional
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competences illustrates these difficulties. Practices that support individual 
decision-making epitomize the positive right to assistance under the PGC.
There is nothing in either Rawls or Gauthier’s theory which serves to undermine 
the argument to the PGC nor to offer a more compelling approach to the 
justification of morality. The comparison with Rawls and Gauthier has illustrated 
the superiority of grounding morality in necessary features of human action, 
rather than through screening out morally irrelevant characteristics of human 
existence as in Rawls, or presupposing that all human interaction is conducted 
from the perspective of self-interest, as in Gauthier.
Of course, one might object that to choose two theories of a similar kind with 
which to compare the PGC is arbitrary, highly selective and negates 
approaches generated from postmodernism, feminist theory and non-Western 
philosophy326. To analyse the PGC in terms of the vast scholarship in this area 
would require a thesis in itself and, for present purposes, would not necessarily 
make Gewirth’s argument for agency rights any clearer than it has been 
presented here. Mindful of the ways in which the PGC operates, the next 
chapter sets out the precautionary basis on which we must apply the PGC and 
on which the moral defensibility of judgments about decisional competence 
depend.
326 For a discussion of these approaches as applied to bioethical issues, see Shildrick (1997V 
Wolf (1996) and Alora and Lumitao (2001) respectively.
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Chapter Four
Proportionality, precaution and 
judgments of competence
It is one thing to endorse a theory of morality; it is quite another to be clear 
about how we come to identify members of the moral community, and the moral 
status of the entities within it327. By itself, a definition of agency cannot offer an 
argument for making ascriptions of agency competence, let alone to identify 
whether an agent has the ability or potential to develop task and decisional 
competences. Devising such an argument may seem like a straightforward 
application of the theory to the empirical world. However, on closer examination, 
matters are not so simple.
The very idea of a moral community raises a fundamental question of moral 
epistemology. All moral theories, including the PGC, need to answer the claims 
of the sceptic as to how we can know that entities worthy of moral consideration 
exist. That there are other such entities is a proposition many moral theorists 
are frequently too hasty to accept and too reluctant to examine328. Whilst it may 
seem intuitive to presume the existence of other agents, this presumption needs 
to be argued for to avoid the sceptic’s charge that we are simply begging the 
question in favour of the existence of other agents. Even if we can draw 
conclusions about agency in circumstances where there is sufficient evidence to 
do so, an additional question remains regarding which way to err when the 
evidence for agency is less conclusive.
F°r a I U C i d *  lis ting  accounts of
328 This is especially true within the tradition of Kantian and post-Kantian ethics The oossihilitv 
of other agents receives sustained attention in work of Levinas (1981) and Lacan (20061 who 
conceive an inter-relationship of self and ‘Other’ These annmiiihflo l  ° , an wh0
post-modern current in which the experience of self implicates the e x iX n re 'V  ¡T°re '¡eC£?t
sense one gains self-knowledge in part through experience of other agerts h  so f^asthe* 
separateness of agents dissolves, such approaches havp a , ' m so raras the
However, they still do not provide an explanation as to why we are I S “  '0"8 for ontology.
that there are other entitles - human o, otherwise - worthy o o n s id 'e S  ^
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Two issues here require our attention. First is the epistemological ground of 
agency ascription under the PGC. The second is how far this extends. Both 
concern how we come to identify agency-relevant characteristics and the moral 
status of those whose agency competence appears to be intermittent or partial. 
To explain each will allow us to identify when cognitively vulnerable human 
beings appear to be agents and whether we can treat them as potentially 
capable of developing task and decisional competences. More specifically, it will 
allow us to go on to consider whether cognitively vulnerable human beings have 
the potential for developing the competence to consent to biomedical research.
The aim of the present chapter is twofold - to explain the epistemology of 
agency ascription under the PGC and from that to draw some preliminary 
conclusions about which entities may be able to develop task and decision­
making competences. My argument relies upon and develops the framework 
devised by Beyleveld and Pattinson329. The chapter begins by explaining the 
justification for accepting that there other agents apart from ourselves under the 
PGC, and then proceeds to examine whether entities who do not consistently 
display agency competence may nonetheless have the potential for developing 
specialised decision-making competences.
The Principle of Proportionality (PP)
In RM, Gewirth claims that the distribution of the generic rights of freedom and 
well-being are not limited to those that have ‘full’ agency. Instead, the scope of 
the PGC permits proportionate allocation of the generic rights to partial 
agents330 (or marginal agents331), including children, adults with intellectual 
disabilities and mental disorder, foetuses and non-human animals. The degree 
to which an entity can claim the generic rights follows from the degree to which 
the entity approaches being a ‘full’ agent332.
329 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998,2000), developed in Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001). 
Rresented S ^  Chap er Wl be to one or more of these instances in which the argument is
The term Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998, 2000) use to describe those who do not possess 
capacities for voluntary action to the extent of full agents possess
The term used by James F. Hill (1984) to describe the same
332 RM: 121-128; 140-145.
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Gewirth states the PP in the following terms. It Is helpful if for ‘Q’ we substitute 
‘agency’, and for ‘R’ ‘the generic rights' under the PGC:
“When some quality Q justifies having certain rights R, and the possession 
of Q varies in degree in the respect that is relevant to Q’s justifying the 
having of R, the degree to which Q is had is proportional to or varies with
the degree to which R is had......... Thus, if x units of Q justify that one have
x units of R, then y units of Q justify that one have y units of R .”333
Gewirth argues that this principle demonstrates the degree to which partial 
agents have the generic rights depends upon the degree to which they possess 
the generic capacities of action (the GCA) 334. The GCA are the practical 
abilities of the generic features of action, which can be held by degree both 
above and below the level required for agency335. Gewirth also claims that such 
doctrines underpin traditional accounts of distributive justice336. Whilst this latter 
claim is valid, the former argument is false. To explain this, let us explore in 
more detail a fundamental aspect of the PGC introduced in the last chapter.
The necessary and sufficient condition for possessing the generic rights is the 
ability to form a proactive evaluative relationship between oneself and one’s 
own purposes. In this thesis, following Beyleveld, I will abbreviate this ability as 
‘rpvp’337. In order for any entity to have rpvp, the entity must possess the GCA 
to a level that would allow such a proactive evaluative relationship to exist. The 
condition of rpvp is absolute and does not vary338. Possession of the GCA 
above the level required for rpvp will bear upon task and decision-making 
competences but makes no difference to that agent’s moral status or the degree 
to which one is an agent -  there are no 'super-agents’ under the PGC339. Since 
only agents can hold the generic rights340, it follows that to have the GCA to the 
degree needed for rpvp is both a necessary and sufficient condition of having 
any generic rights at all.
333 RM: 121.
334 RM: 122,141.
335 RM: 122.
336 RM: 121.
337 The abbreviation ‘rpvp’ denotes relation: proactively valuing purposes which Beyleveld 
(1991) uses originally. I use it here for the sake of convenience
ha RM: 123.
339 RM: 124-125, Beyleveld (1991: 250-256).
340 RM: 122-123.
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As we saw in the last chapter, the PGC requires agents to claim rights because 
they are instrumental to the pursuit of their own ends or purposes, irrespective 
of what these may be. An agent need only value categorically instrumentally the 
generic needs of action, rather than agency as such341. It follows that the 
generic rights are a species of rights that correspond with the broader ‘will 
theory’ of rights (also known as the ‘choice theory’ of rights)342. An immanent 
feature of agency under the PGC is that an agent must have the capacity to 
decide not to exercise one or more of their generic rights or to waive the benefit 
of these rights343. Consequently, it is possible for an agent to waive the benefit 
of both a positive and a negative right that the PGC bestows344, such as the 
right to physical well-being (in refusing medical treatment) and, in certain 
contexts, the right to life (in suicide). To be able to waive the benefits of a right, 
one must have rpvp, the precondition of being a rights-holder under the PGC. 
However, partial agents by definition do not have rpvp. As having the GCA to 
the degree needed for rpvp is both a necessary and sufficient condition of 
having any generic rights at all, it is not possible to ascribe generic rights to 
partial agents345. Accordingly, Gewirth commits “the fallacy of disparateness”346 
in respect of his formulation of the PP.
Beyleveld and Pattinson reject the PP as formulated by Gewirth. They argue 
that it does not follow from x units of Q justifying that one have x units of R that 
y units of Q justify that one have y units of R. This is because:
(a) “either Q or R might be something that can be had entirely or not 
at all, but not in part;
(b) either Q or R assuming that both can be had to variable extents 
might not have a variable possession that is quantifiable in 
percentage terms, or even at all; or
(c) having 100% of Q, though sufficient to have 100% of R, might also 
be necessary to have any R at all.”347
341 RM: 136-137, 266; Beyleveld (1991: 28-30).
342 Discussed In Jones (1994: 32-36), Kramer, Simmonds and Steiner (1996:195-232) and 
Edmundson (2004. 119-132). For an engaging critique of the will theory, which comes down in 
support of a modified form of its antithesis, the 'interest theory’, see Cruft (2004) Wenar (2005) 
presents an alternative neo-Hohfeldian account
543 RM\ 334; Beyleveld (1991:18).
344 Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001:72 and 74, n. 14).
345 Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001:118-119)
346 The ‘fallacy of disparateness' is expounded by Gewirth (1960). One commits the error where 
one compares fields or subject matters on disparate levels or in disparate respects.
347 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998: 9; 2000: 46). H
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Beyleveld and Pattinson reconfigure the PP as a necessarily true principle 
which states that proportionality between variable Q and R exists insofar as the 
degree to which R is had is a function of the degree to which Q is had348. There 
is no assumption of necessary proportionality between the two variables, but 
instead recognition of the logical inference between the two. This is the only 
interpretation of the PP within the PGC that does not alter the ontology of the 
PGC349.
The fundamental practical difference between Gewirth’s formulation of the PP 
and the reformulation provided by Beyleveld and Pattinson is that Gewirth 
grants the generic rights to partial agents qua partial agents in proportion to 
their approach to full agency. Beyleveld and Pattinson, on the other hand, 
maintain that only agents as such have the generic rights, although the PGC 
necessarily accords moral status to apparent partial agents in proportion to their 
display of rpvp350. Whereas Gewirth argues for the moral status of partial 
agents, Beyleveld and Pattinson argue for the moral status of apparent partial 
agents. This means that the moral status of any entity is proportional to the 
probability that it is an agent, not to the degree of approach to agency351.
However, this is not all which separates Gewirth’s account of moral status from 
that of Beyleveld and Pattinson. In RM, Gewirth appears to assume that we can 
know with certainty who are agents and who are partial agents. This rests upon 
a mistaken premise that if an entity behaves like an agent, it actually is an agent 
and if it does not behave in this way, it is not352. Beyleveld and Pattinson argue 
instead that our inability to access other minds dispels any such claims to 
certainty353. When applied under precaution, the revised PP accounts for
348 “When possessing some quality Q justifies having some property R, and it is not the case 
that the extent of having Q sufficient to justify R to the maximum extent possible is, at the same 
time, necessary tojustify having R to any extent at all, the degree to which R is had is a function 
of the degree to which Q is had. Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998:121
349 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998: 49). ’
350 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998: 3).
Z  Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998: 29); Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001-1231
Deryck Beyleveld, personal communication, 19/12/01. '
353 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998: 25-28). For influential , .
minds, see Ryle (1949); Malcolm (1958); Aune (1961) and Putnam (1979)6 pr° b em of other
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considerations that are involved in determining whether we should treat an 
entity as an agent354. Let us consider this more closely.
Precautionary reasoning355
Agency itself is an ontological category, connected inextricably with an entity’s 
ability to act. Although any agent can be certain of being an agent 
himself/herself/itself, our existential limitations and the problem of other minds 
means we can never be completely sure that another entity which behaves like 
an agent actually is an agent356. Indeed, it is impossible to prove beyond all 
doubt that any entity we take to be an agent is not simply an automaton, even 
though the entity’s behaviour might seem intuitively to support an ascription of 
agency357. Behaviour and other empirical evidence that may be adduced for the 
existence of agency in some entity only seems relevant because it rests on a 
metaphysical assumption that there are agents other than myself 358 . 
Precautionary reasoning under the PGC provides a framework that sets out the 
circumstances in which we should treat some entity as an agent, given these 
conditions of uncertainty. The premise of the framework is the idea that the only 
type of claim we can make about another’s agency is that it is possible or 
probable on the evidence we have available. Under precaution, the probability 
of agency increases with ostensible evidence of the characteristics of agency - 
GCA behaviour (GCAb).
Ostensible agents
Mindful of the above discussion, the best I can do is make an informed 
judgment that some other entity - human, animal, android or otherwise -  
appears, on the evidence, to be an agent. Such a judgment ascribes to the 
entity in question that it is ostensibly an agent. Ostensible agency is a 
metaphysical category rather than an ontological one, given the impossibility of
354 Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001:119).
355 This section primarily draws upon ideas presented in Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998 20001
and developed in Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001). ’
356 Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001: 120-121).
357 Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001:120).
358 Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001:120).
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adducing irrefutable empirical proof that there are other agents apart from 
myself.
Therefore, to the solipsist who doubts the existence of other agents, we can 
concede that it is no more possible to prove that some entity is an agent than to 
disprove it -  even where the evidence suggests that the entity in question is an 
agent359. Nevertheless, the evidential proof for the proposition “this entity is an 
agent” has different moral implications from the evidential proof for the 
proposition “this entity is not an agent"360. If I err in presuming the entity to be an 
agent, I restrict my exercise of the generic rights but I do not deny myself -  or 
any other agent -  the generic rights. However, if I err in presuming the entity not 
to be an agent, then I deny the entity the generic rights to which it is entitled as 
an agent. I also deny myself the rights, through incurring self-contradiction as 
an agent361. The two scenarios respectively amount to a 'false positive’ and a 
‘false negative’ presumption of agency.
Although it is not dialectically necessary to hold that there are other agents, it is 
dialectically necessary for any agent to do as much as that agent can to avoid 
violating the PGC, where the avoidance of such violation is possible362. If my 
actions risk the possibility of violating the PGC -  and I can avoid the possibility 
of this violation -  assuming this risk itself violates the PGC363. Therefore, it is 
dialectically necessary for me to err on the side of presuming agency under 
these conditions of uncertainty, provided the consequences of this presumption 
measured in terms of the PGC are better than the consequences of not 
presuming agency364. Given these conditions of uncertainty, and the moral 
stakes involved in denying agency, the circumstances in which a presumption 
against agency would be warranted are very limited indeed365. In other words, it 
is a general rule of the PGC that a false-positive presumption of agency is 
morally preferable to a false negative presumption.
359 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998: 26; 2000: 42).
360 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998: 26; 2000: 42).
361 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998: 25-26; 2000: 42).
362 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998: 26; 2000: 42).
363 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998:26; 2000: 42).
364 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998: 26; 2000: 42).
The only justifiable circumstances I can imagine are where presuming agency would lead to 
clear and direct harm to other beings who are more probably agents, where the criterion of 
more probable harm (see below) would apply.
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We can state the precautionary principle as follows:
“If there is no way of knowing whether or not X has property P, then, insofar 
as it is possible to do so, X must be assumed to have property P if the 
consequences (as measured by the PGC) of erring in presuming that X 
does not have P are worse than those of erring in presuming that X has P 
(and X must be assumed to not have P if the consequences of erring in 
presuming that X has P are worse than those of assuming that X does not 
have P."366
This entails the following categorically necessary principle, which stipulates the 
grounds on which we are logically committed to treating other individuals as 
agents under precaution:
“Where X is an ostensible agent, the metaphysical possibility that X might 
not be an agent is to be wholly discounted, and X ’s ostensible agency is to 
be taken as sufficient evidence that X has the capacities needed to be an 
agent”.367
This principle is, essentially, a moral argument for recognizing that there are 
other minds. If this is accepted, then philosophical debate about the ontological 
possibility of other minds becomes, from a moral point of view at least, otiose.
Apparent partial agents
An apparent partial agent differs from an ostensible agent insofar as it appears 
to have some of the GCA needed to at least some degree, but to an insufficient 
extent to display rpvp at all368. Given an entity can possess the GCA at varying 
levels below that required for rpvp, the degree to which an entity displays GCAb 
below that consistent with rpvp determines the probability that it is an agent. 
Apparent partial agents may once have been agents, may become agents at 
some point eventually in the course of their existence or may never become 
agents, even though we cannot know this with certainty.
Such entities are apparent partial agents insofar as the evidence reduces the 
probability that they are agents. What is common to all apparent partial agents
366 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998: 27; 2000: 42-43).
367 Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001:121).
368 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998:14).
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is that, on the face of it, they appear not to be agents at all369. Of course, there 
remains a possibility, however slim, that they could be agents, in spite of 
appearing incapable of displaying GCAb at a level consistent with having rpvp 
(GCAbrpvp370). For example, it is possible to construct a valid argument that 
bacteria, trees or rocks may be agents whose embodiment or physical 
manifestation frustrates the display of GCAbrpvp, in spite of the counter-intuitive 
reaction this may give rise.
Ostensible intermittent agents
Ostensible intermittent agents differ from ostensible agents insofar as they are 
apparently partial agents some of the time and are ostensibly agents the rest of 
the time371. There are occasions on which the entity appears to display 
GCAbrpvp and other occasions when it does not. An ostensible intermittent 
agent is distinguishable from an apparent partial agent insofar as an ostensible 
intermittent agent appears able to exercise rpvp some of the time and thus 
appears on the evidence to be an agent for as long as it can do this. An 
apparent partial agent appears unable to do this at any time and thus appears 
on the evidence not to be an agent at all372.
The frequency with which an ostensible intermittent agent displays rpvp 
determines the probability of it being an agent. Ostensible intermittent agents 
may once have consistently exhibited rpvp, may consistently exhibit rpvp some 
point in the course of their existence or may never consistently exhibit rpvp. 
Thus, another way of conceptualising the difference between an ostensible 
agent and an ostensible intermittent agent is that an ostensible agent appears 
to have rpvp as a consistent feature of its personality, whereas an ostensible 
intermittent agent does not373.
369 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998:14).
3701 use ‘GCAbrpvp' in preference to Beyleveld and Pattlnson’s ‘GCAbf (which denotes the 
GCA behaviour In full) because GCAbrpvp more clearly denotes the required level of GCA 
behaviour for an ascription of agency. Given GCAb can be displayed at a level above that 
required for an ascription of agency, it follows that GCAbf corresponds to the highest possible 
level at which an entity could display GCAb (whether this could ever be known is a different 
matter), rather than merely to indicate the presence of rpvp.
371 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998:15).
372 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998:15).
373 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998:15).
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Evidence of agency and duties of protection
How should an agent respond where an entity X exhibits GCAb at level lower 
than that which would suggest the presence of rpvp? On the evidence, X would 
be an apparent partial agent. Nevertheless, it is still not possible to infer that X 
is not an agent374. In the same way that I cannot have certain knowledge that X 
is a agent when X is an ostensible agent, equally I cannot have certain 
knowledge that X is not a agent when X is an apparently only a partial agent375. 
To illustrate the corollary of this, imagine I suppose that X is not an agent on the 
assumption that X is apparently only a partial agent. However, unbeknownst to 
me, X actually is an agent. In this case, I will have denied X the status of a 
rights holder under the PGC, and in doing so will have violated the PGC. Due to 
this persistent risk of misapprehension, it is dialectically necessary to do all one 
can to avoid this376.
When X is apparently only a partial agent, it is not possible to avoid the risk of 
denying X the benefits of the generic rights altogether. As Beyleveld and 
Pattinson argue:
“I can, indeed, refrain from harming (and can assist) X in ways that would 
safeguard the benefits that X would receive ifX  had the GR and chose to 
exercise them. I can, indeed, recognise duties not to harm (and to assist) X 
in various ways. However, it must not be forgotten that if X is, in fact, a PPA 
then the PGC requires X (thereby) to be accorded will claim-rights, the 
benefits of which X may waive. But, by not displaying the GCAbf [the GCA 
behaviour in full], X fails to demonstrate (even under precautionary 
reasoning) that X has the capacities by virtue of which it is able to waive the 
benefits of what it is entitled to. Thus, the “duties of protection” that I must 
recognise that I have towards X, where X is apparently only a partial PPA, 
are perforce paternalistic, which is at odds with what X is strictly entitled to 
qua being a PPA (should that be the case).”377
Under precautionary reasoning, just as if X displays all the capacities of an 
agent this constitutes sufficient evidence that X is an agent, it follows that if X 
displays some but not all of the capacities for agency, then this must constitute 
insufficient evidence (but evidence all the same) that X is an agent. Agents owe
374 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998: 27).
375 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998: 27).
376 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998: 27).
377 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998: 27-28).
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duties of protection to entities which are apparently only partial agents in 
proportion to the degree of approach to ostensibly being agents378. These 
duties are owed due to the possibility of them being agents, rather than them 
actually being partial agents or in proportion to the degree of approach they 
exhibit to agency as such379. That we owe duties of protection to entities that 
are apparently only partial agents entails that we must adopt a paternalistic 
approach as a substitute for their own capacity to act autonomously.
The position in respect of ostensible intermittent agents is more complex:
“Imagine X who is a partial PPA, developing towards having the quality rpvp 
as such. At some point in time, X develops all of the capacities needed to 
have the quality rpvp, but does so only ephemerally. At time ti, X has the 
capacities for having rpvp. At a later time t2, X does not display some of 
these capacities, and at a still later time t3, X displays the capacities again. 
But X ’s state, as having the capacities for rpvp or not having them, varies in 
not altogether predictable ways. Gradually however, the frequency of the 
periods during which X has the capacities increases, until the time arrives 
when X has the capacities needed for having rpvp as a standing capacity of 
X’s personality. During the time in which X is developing towards having 
rpvp as a standing capacity, X is an “intermittent PPA”. When X has 
developed rpvp as a standing capacity, X has become an PPA-in-full in the 
sense of a full-time PPA.”380
Here, a dilemma emerges. In the case of ostensible agents, precautionary 
reasoning enjoins that it is dialectically necessary to treat them as agents, 
unless they fail to display all of the capacities of action, in which case they are 
apparently only partial agents to whom we owe duties of protection. However, in 
the case of ostensible intermittent agents, it is dialectically necessary for us to 
act on the presumption that they are, for all practical purposes, agents. This is 
because we have no reliable way of ascertaining the occasions upon which 
ostensible intermittent agents have the generic rights and when they have 
not381.
To illustrate, if we attempt to assess the agency status of David (who, 
unbeknownst to us, is actually an intermittent agent), we encounter two 
problems:
378 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998: 27).
379 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998: 33-34; 50); Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001:123).
380 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998: 32).
381 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998: 32-33).
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(i) The test cannot be used to justify treating David according to the 
outcome of the test due to David’s fluctuating agency status;
(ii) David’s agency status determines the moral permissibility of the 
procedures used to assess David’s agency status.382
For these two reasons, we will not be able to ascertain the status of David 
before any interaction with him. Since we cannot know at any point in time 
whether David is an agent or a partial agent, we must use precautionary 
reasoning. This stipulates that the negative consequences that follow from 
treating David as an agent when he is not are less than the negative 
consequences that follow from not treating David as an agent when he is. In the 
first case, if we assume that David is an agent, we will be attempting to impose 
duties on him that he is unable to discharge383. However, the obligations on 
agents that derive from the presumption that David is an agent do not deny the 
generic rights to others. Alternatively, if we presume David is not an agent when 
he is in fact an agent, then we violate the PGC as we deny David the protection 
of the generic rights384. Because a false positive assumption of agency is 
morally preferable to a false negative presumption of agency, whenever an 
entity is ostensibly an intermittent agent, precautionary reasoning requires that 
we treat entity as an agent385.
The criterion of avoidance of more probable harm
As stated, the PGC requires that we discharge our duties to respect the generic 
rights of all other agents. But since we can only draw inferences that any given 
entity is an agent from the evidence for agency it displays, how should we 
proceed if we are confronted by two entities, both of whom present similar 
evidence of GCAb and there is a particular good which cannot be distributed to 
them both equally?
382 Adapted from Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998:32-33).
383 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998: 34).
384 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998: 34).
385 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998: 33-34).
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Imagine that entity A is an adult chimpanzee and entity B is a two-year-old 
human being. Both are in need of an inoculation against a fatal virus, and only 
one inoculation remains. Both display some evidence that they have occurrent 
purposes that they wish to pursue, although in neither case is there the 
unambiguous evidence of rpvp that a reflectively functional adult human being 
displays. In the case of the chimpanzee, we know that its oblique display of the 
GCAb is the most it will ever be able to exhibit. In the case of the child, we know 
through our empirical awareness alone that it will in all probability develop the 
GCAbrpvp as it grows older, which will almost certainly exceed the possibility of 
the chimpanzee developing GCAbrpvp.
In such a situation, the PGC requires us to fulfil our duties towards those who 
are more probably agents in respect of singular or collective action to secure 
basic, non-subtractive and additive rights to freedom and well-being. It is only 
justifiable to exclude entities that are less probably agents from the benefits of 
PGC-protected rights where, in not doing so, we would compromise our ability 
to discharge our duties towards those who are more probably agents386. In this 
example, we know that the child has greater potentiality for agency through her 
nascent cognitive capacity, even though the evidence for agency she displays 
now is likely to be on a par with the chimpanzee. Conversely, the chimpanzee, 
lacking the child’s potentiality for full agency, will remain apparently a partial 
agent for the rest of its life. We can infer from this that the child is more probably 
an agent, since what it will become (an agent) has its genesis in what it is now 
(an apparent partial agent). The child’s claim to the inoculation therefore trumps 
the chimpanzee’s claim in moral terms387.
Beyleveld and Pattinson describe this principle as the criterion of avoidance of 
more probable harm:
386 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998: 30-31).
387 This does not thereby negate the chimpanzee’s entitlement to the inoculation. It does, 
however, require us to give more weight to the claims of the child than those of the chimpanzee 
in resolving any competing claims. Beyleveld and Pattinson state this in the following terms: “ .. 
if Y is apparently only a partial agent with y moral status (by virtue of Y’s degree of the generic 
capacity for action) but not apparently a potential ostensible agent, and X is apparently a partial 
agent with y moral status and also apparently a potential ostensible agent, then agents must 
take more seriously the possibility that X is an agent than that Y is an agent, by virtue of which 
their duties of protection to X are greater than their similar duties to Y." (2000: 50-51).
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“If my failing to observe a particular duty of protection to Z is more likely to 
mistakenly deny Z the status of an agent than is my failing to observe the 
duty of protection to X (and I cannot avoid failing to observe this duty to one 
of Z or X), then I ought to fail to observe my duty to X rather than to Z.’’388
Beyleveld and Pattinson frame the criterion in the context of duties of protection 
to X and Z (who are both apparently only partial agents, but the criterion can 
extend to apply to situations where X is apparently only a partial agent and Z is 
an ostensible agent or an ostensible intermittent agent).
The criterion of avoidance of more probable harm does not mitigate the 
conscientious effort we must direct towards fulfilling duties of protection to as 
wide a range of possible agent-entities as is within our power. It would not 
absolve the moral failure of denying an entity the protection of the PGC 
protected rights where conscientious collective action could have meant that 
such a choice would never have arisen in the first place. In the above example, 
if the supply of inoculations had diminished to one due to waste, 
mismanagement or corruption, then the agents responsible for this state of 
affairs would also be morally responsible for the fact that the chimpanzee did 
not receive the inoculation. However, the agent responsible for making the 
choice between inoculating the child and the chimpanzee would not be morally 
responsible for this state of affairs (assuming that she had no part in these 
background factors) and would simply be acting in accordance with the PGC in 
less than ideal circumstances.
Degrees of displaying GCAb and its relationship with task and 
decisional competences
Ostensible agents
As ostensible agents exhibit GCAbrpvp as a consistent feature of their 
personality, we have the strongest possible evidence that they agents. We 
acknowledged above that the degree to which agents display GCAb above the 
minimal level required for agency (i.e. for rpvp) will bear upon their task
388 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998: 29); Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001:123).
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competence and decision-making competences as agents389. Many ostensible 
agents will have the capability for developing an extensive range of task and 
decisional competences, which may take an overtly intellectual or practical 
form.
However, to claim a task or decisional competence right is not the same as to 
claim a generic right. A generic right -  such as the right to life -  is claimed 
merely as a consequence of being an agent, whereas a right to perform or 
participate in a specific task or make a specific decision can only be claimed 
though either demonstrable or presumed proficiency. As such, the latter variety 
of rights is contingent on specific features of one’s agency, such as intellectual 
or physical ability or both. For a legal system to fail to recognise such a right 
where it is reasonable to presume proficiency or where demonstrable 
proficiency has been shown could violate the agent’s rights to additive well 
being under the PGC as it would needlessly frustrate the agent’s level of 
purpose fulfilment390.
Legal systems typically bestow presumed task or decisional competence rights 
on all agents upon fulfilling a relevant criterion the agent can reasonably expect 
to achieve automatically (such reaching eighteen years of age in respect of the 
right to vote). Legal systems typically bestow demonstrable task or decisional 
competence rights upon an agent after reaching a manifest level of proficiency 
at that task (such as the right to drive a car). In both cases, the task or 
decisional competence right is not bestowed by virtue of agency per se but by 
virtue of an ’agency plus’ criterion. In the case of the right to vote, the right is 
bestowed due to automatically attaining an age where competence at that task 
or decision is presumed (i.e. agency plus presumed decisional competence to 
vote for a political party). In the case of the right to drive a car, the right is 
bestowed as a consequence of having met a benchmark standard of skill at the 
activity (i.e. agency plus demonstrated vehicle operation competence and road 
use responsibility). With presumed task and decisional competences, an 
individual will have become an agent before reaching that age, whereas with 
demonstrable task or decisional competences, an individual will still be an agent
389 RM, 122-123; Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998:13).
3901 use additive in the same ‘exclusive’ sense that Gewirth does in RM, pp. 56-57.
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irrespective of whether she satisfies this level of proficiency, fails to 
demonstrate such proficiency, or chooses never to develop this proficiency at 
all.
Ostensible intermittent agents
As we saw earlier, ostensible intermittent agents are entities who are apparently 
partial agents some of the time and who are ostensibly agents the rest of the 
time. The threshold between an ostensible intermittent agent and an ostensible 
agent arises where the entity in question appears to display GCAbrpvp 
consistently. The extent to which it is probable that an ostensible intermittent 
agent is an agent is proportionate to how frequently it displays rpvp.
As any ostensible intermittent agent displays rpvp some of the time, they must 
be considered at least to have at least the developable potential for task and 
decisional competences, albeit at a lower level than an ostensible agent. In 
practice, ostensible intermittent agents should be thought of as specific task 
incompetent agents and in most cases will be treated as societally incompetent 
agents391. This means that we should treat ostensible intermittent agents as 
agents of restricted task and decisional competence who possess all the 
generic rights, but lack the abilities and independence necessary in order to 
prevent causing unintended harm to themselves or others. Returning to the 
earlier example of David, we should treat him as an agent yet ensure he 
receives support and assistance to act successfully in pursuit of purposes 
common to everyday societal interaction.
In so far as the GCAb of an ostensible intermittent agent fluctuates between 
GCAbrpvp and a lower level of the GCAb, when the entity concerned evinces 
agency competence, its potential for developable task and decisional 
competences will be as high as it can ever be392. By definition, an ostensible 
intermittent agent will appear to have lapses of the GCA to a degree where it 
temporarily fails to appreciate the consequences of waiving the benefits of the 
generic rights to which it is entitled. However, not all of these lapses will be to
391 Beyleveld and Pattinson (1998: 47-49); Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001:129).
392 At least for as long as it continues to be ostensibly an intermittent agent.
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the same degree. When considering the task and decisional competence of 
ostensible intermittent agents, we can draw a distinction between two types393:
(i) Ostensible intermittent agents who are close to having the capacities needed 
to be an agent in a standing fashion
This group is the closest that may approach being a full agent. Ostensible 
intermittent agents of this type consistently appear to understand the 
implications of waiving rights, but experience periods where display of 
GCAbrpvp is questionable. As stated previously, precautionary reasoning 
denies that it is possible to determine exactly when the ostensible intermittent 
agent has the GCA necessary for rpvp, and when it has not. Since this type of 
ostensible intermittent agent is close to having the capacities needed to be an 
agent in a standing fashion, it follows that it would be extremely difficult to 
distinguish between occasions where it appears to have the task and decisional 
competences that it possesses as an agent and when it lacks them.
It would not be possible to re-evaluate the task or decisional competence of an 
ostensible intermittent agent who displayed rpvp almost all of the time, even if 
the individual actually did not possess rpvp at that point. As with an assessment 
of agency competence, by the time we had made a thorough assessment of an 
ostensible intermittent agent’s specific task or decision-making competence, it 
may well have returned to a state of possession of rpvp and ability to exercise 
those competences. To avoid denying such entities the protection of the PGC 
and infringing their rights to additive well-being, we should always treat such 
individuals as ostensible agents with limited societal competence and respect 
the task and decisional competences that they display394. Allowing for natural 
variations in abilities, talents and skills, there would be little impairment in the 
range of task and decisional competences this type of ostensible intermittent 
agent could develop compared to ostensible agents.
393 Beyleveld and Pattinson do not draw this distinction within their definition of ostensible 
intermittent agents.
394 However, it may be necessary to monitor the exercise of these competences more closelv 
for the sake of that ostensible intermittent agent qua agent and for the sake of other agents
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(ii) Ostensible intermittent agents who are less close to having the capacities 
needed to be an agent in a standing fashion
This second type of ostensible intermittent agent frequently appears to 
understand the implications of waiving rights but experiences protracted phases 
where she appears not to be able to exhibit GCAbrpvp. In other words, it is 
quite plain to observe when this type of ostensible intermittent agent is 
ostensibly not an agent and, by extension, unable to exercise task or decisional 
competences.
It follows that there will be times during which this type of ostensible intermittent 
agent not only fails to display rpvp but also very probably fails to possess 
rpvp395. During these times, she will be unable to exercise intentional control 
over her actions and will sometimes behave in ways that cause unintended 
harm to herself or others because of her apparent inability to act freely and 
voluntarily. This means that ostensible intermittent agents who are less close to 
having the capacities needed to be an agent in a standing fashion will have a 
reduced potential for developing and exercising the abilities to undertake 
specific tasks and make specific decisions, precisely because the periods of 
time in which they cannot exercise these abilities are more extensive.
Under precaution, we should treat as agents all ostensible intermittent agents 
who are less close to having the capacities needed to be an agent in a standing 
fashion. However, more compelling grounds exist for restricting the range of 
tasks and decisions that ostensible intermittent agents who are less close to 
having the capacities needed to be an agent in a standing fashion are permitted 
to undertake than with those who are closer to having the capacities needed to 
be an agent in a standing fashion. Ostensible intermittent agents who are less 
close will have an impaired ability to develop task and decisional competences 
that require consistency in behaviour or sustained concentration over time396. 
They would be more prone to causing unintended harm to themselves and 
others if they were to permit them to develop or exercise these competences.
395 Although of course, we cannot know this with certainty.
396 Such as cooking a meal, driving a car or reading a novel.
Proportionality, precaution and judgments of competence 124
Accordingly, their societal incompetence will be more visible, and we would be 
justified in treating them as societally incompetent agents.
Apparent partial agents
The extent to which an entity that is apparently only a partial agent exhibits 
GCAb determines the possibility that it is an agent. However, at no point do 
apparent partial agents exhibit behaviour that is commensurate with having 
rpvp, which is required to be able to develop or exercise any kind of task or 
decisional competence. Even if an apparent partial agent is actually an agent 
without the capacity to display rpvp (remembering that we cannot ultimately 
prove or disprove this), we could not treat an entity without this capacity as 
having or being able to develop task or decisional competences. The risks 
attached to doing otherwise, measured in terms of the harmful consequences 
for the generic rights of entities who are more probably agents, and for the 
generic rights of the entity in question if (unbeknownst to us) it is an agent, 
would simply be too great. For these reasons, we cannot treat apparent partial 
agents as the bearers of task or decisional competences.
Summary
Gewirth’s Principle of Proportionality cannot claim for itself the status of a 
necessary truth. On this basis, we cannot use it to delineate the Gewirthian 
moral community. Alternatively, Beyleveld and Pattinson’s reformulation of the 
PP as a necessarily true principle, combined with the dialectical necessity of 
precautionary reasoning, offers a compelling response to the central themes of 
this chapter. First, it offers a dialectically necessary argument for making 
ascriptions of agency competence. Second, it repudiates the claim that we are 
begging the question in favour of the existence of other agents -  to suppose the 
existence of other agents is a moral requirement even if the proposition is 
incapable of metaphysical proof. Third, we can apply the criterion of more 
probable harm to resolve conflicts between discharging duties of protection to 
entities that are more probably and less probably agents.
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The categories of ostensible agency, apparent partial agency and ostensible 
intermittent agency are ascriptions of the possibility of agency rather than 
metaphysically verifiable statements about the agentive properties of that entity. 
The duties that we must discharge to an entity falling under any of these 
categories are predicated on the possibility of it being an agent rather than its 
approach to being an agent or it actually being a partial agent (as Gewirth would 
have it). When in doubt as to whether we should treat some entity as an agent, 
we should resolve this dilemma in favour of presuming agency, unless to do so 
would risk a violation of the generic rights of another entity or entities that are 
more probably agents. However, this latter prospect is rare. Even if we err in 
making an ascription of agency, the consequences of a false positive ascription 
are usually better (measured in terms of the PGC) than a false negative 
ascription.
From this, we can reframe the principle established in Chapter One that only 
agents can be the bearers of task and decisional competences in terms 
consistent with the PGC. We should treat ostensible agents and ostensible 
intermittent agents under precaution as having at least the potential to develop 
task and decisional competences due to their consistent or partial display of 
rpvp. We cannot treat apparent partial agents in the same way due to the 
complete absence of display of rpvp. The extent to which an agent displays 
GCAb above the level required to exhibit rpvp (i.e. above GCAbrpvp) will 
determine the range of task and decisional competences that agent will be able 
to develop. This applies both to competences that are presumed legally (on the 
agent’s satisfying a particular criterion) and to those that require demonstration 
before legal recognition is granted.
To deny an agent the right to develop or exercise a task or decisional 
competence may undermine the agent’s additive rights to well-being although 
the consequences are not as grave as mistakenly denying the entity the status 
of an agent altogether. There are also other considerations, such as the 
possibilities of causing unintended harm to self and others which will place 
reasonable limits on the contexts in which such competences are officially 
recognised. In this chapter, we have considered these issues primarily in the 
abstract. In the next chapter, we will open this analysis out to consider how we
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should treat actual groups of cognitively vulnerable human beings under 
precaution, in order to begin the process of considering the decisional 
competence of such cognitively vulnerable individuals to consent to biomedical 
research.
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Chapter Five
The competences of cognitively 
vulnerable groups
Making an informed judgment about the competences of any group of possible 
agents involves two elements. First, we need to elaborate an ethical justification 
of the possibility of these competences. Such justification requires us to decide 
whether we are right to presume certain kinds of competences or to allow the 
development or exercise of a particular competence amongst a group of 
individuals. The measure of ethical justification is a precautionary application of 
the PGC. The second element is an empirical investigation into the possibility of 
members of that group developing or exhibiting a particular competence. The 
central task here is to explain how the physiological and psychological position 
of the possible agent may influence their agency, task and decisional 
competences. Together, this allows for a ‘reflective equilibrium’ between what 
we should assume about members of the group on ethical grounds and what 
capabilities empirical research has shown they possess. If there is a tension 
between the two, then we should usually consider revising our ethical 
understanding to take account of the empirical evidence, unless we have good 
reason not to397.
This process is especially important for cognitively vulnerable individuals. The 
case for assuming or not assuming that they possess a competence may be 
harder to prove than with individuals who lack this form of heightened 
vulnerability. Alertness to fluctuations in ability, unusual ways of expressing 
competence and findings from psychiatric studies will bear upon our judgment 
here. However, for such judgment to have integrity, we cannot treat cognitively 
vulnerable individuals as one amorphous group. To do so would fail to draw out 
the way in which specific cognitive vulnerabilities such as depression or
397 For example, where the empirical evidence is unreliable.
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schizophrenia interact with the display and development of competences. It also 
would not leave us any clearer about which cognitively vulnerable individuals 
are likely to have the occurrent or developable competence to consent to 
biomedical research, and which have not.
In this chapter, I apply the precautionary reasoning framework set out in the last 
to consider the agency, task and decisional competences of five different 
groups of cognitively vulnerable individuals. In particular, I consider the 
relationship between agency, task and decision-making competence and 
cognitive vulnerability by reference to psychiatric nosologies and debates in 
developmental psychology, ethics and the philosophy of mind. The aim is to 
offer an account of the relationship between cognitive vulnerability and the likely 
existence of these competences. The five groups of cognitively vulnerable 
human beings on which I will focus in this thesis are older children and 
adolescents, adults with mental retardation, adults with depression, adults with 
schizophrenia and adults with Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias. The 
choice of groups achieves a balance between examining a diversity of different 
cognitively vulnerable groups and a maintaining a clear focus to allow for 
detailed analysis of each within the structure of the thesis.
By the end of the chapter, we will be able to reach a position on the likelihood of 
occurrent competences and potential for prospective competences we can 
justifiably ascribe to these five groups of cognitively vulnerable individuals from 
a precautionary perspective. This position will inform the discussion in the next 
chapter, where I consider whether some, if any, members of these cognitively 
vulnerable groups may have at least the potential for developing decisional 
competence to consent to medical research, according to psychological and 
psychiatric studies.
Older children and adolescents
In this thesis, I take the category ‘older children and adolescents’ to refer to 
young people between the ages of around twelve to sixteen rather than to 
denote a legal category. By extension, I will use the term ‘adulthood’ in a purely 
developmental sense to refer to a state of maturation commonly reached by
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sixteen years of age where a young person becomes societally competent. This 
is to avoid the contingencies of legal categories of adulthood, as the threshold 
age at which attainment of legal adulthood (or legal majority) is reached can 
vary393. Accordingly, I do not intend it to denote the age of legal majority in any 
jurisdiction. Before we consider the competences of older children and 
adolescents, it is important to draw some salient distinctions between neonates, 
infants, older children and adolescents in order to be clear about how 
precautionary reasoning applies.
Gewirth views children in respect of their proximity to full agency as “potential 
agents, in that, with normal maturation, they will attain the characteristics of 
control, choice, knowledge and reflective intention that enter into the generic 
features of action"398 99. In relation to neonates and infants (aged from birth to 
around four years of age), Gewirth is right insofar as they await the cognitive, 
emotional and physiological developments that will transform their potential for 
agency into full ostensible agency. Because the capacity to form and pursue 
purposes emerges gradually over a number of years rather than all at once, 
neonates almost certainly do not have this capacity, whilst infants are subject to 
cognitive limitations such as an under-developed awareness of the future and 
an inability to identify values and manipulate abstract concepts that bear on the 
process of action 400. It follows that infants will display GCAbrpvp only 
intermittently and will depend upon cognitively mature agents, such as parents, 
carers or teachers for their guidance and welfare. As such, it is difficult to claim 
that infants adopt the purposes of others because they are in most cases 
apparently incapable of the voluntariness and freedom that would allow such 
adoption401. On this basis, we should treat neonates and infants as potential 
ostensible agents under the PGC402.
398 Clucas (2004: 87-88 and 89) also argues that societal competence Is a more preferable 
approach to understanding the significance of adulthood than legal majority
399 RM\ 141.
400 For a discussion of these issues, see Keenan (2001, chapters 6-9).
401 An agent by definition must be able to value proactively the purposes that she has chosen, 
even if she has adopted these purposes from others.
4021 extrapolate this from the analysis in Beyleveld and Pattinson (2000, especially pp. 50-51). 
Clucas (2004) argues that neonates and young children are ‘practical agents’ and 'immature 
agents’ respectively. I agree with Clucas that Gewirth and possibly even Beyleveld Pattinson 
and Brownsword pitch too highly the level at which ostensible agency is reached
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Gewirth is also right that children gain the GCA as they develop. However, 
recent work in developmental psychology and the philosophy of mind 
challenges Gewirth’s association of partial agency with childhood403. Even on 
conservative estimates, most children will have reached full ostensible agency 
between 7 and 11 years of age and it is conceivable that children could reach 
ostensible agency between the ages of three and five404. That children pursue 
freely chosen purposes in their learning, play and interaction with family, peer 
group and teachers provides strong support for this claim. Thereafter, the level 
of GCA above that required for rpvp will increase and become progressively 
more sophisticated as the child grows older. By the time that cognitively 
functional children reach adolescence and the cusp of adulthood, they will 
consistently display GCAbrpvp, and frequently exhibit GCAb to a degree that 
exceeds the minimal level required for agency405. In adolescents, capacities for 
action may be in some cases more sophisticated than in adults406. This is 
manifest in the older child and adolescent’s ability to cultivate and exercise 
specialised task and decisional competences, and ultimately fully-fledged 
societal competence.
As there is no definite point at which a child begins to display GCAbrpvp, there 
will be significant variance between the agentive abilities of different children. 
On the face of it, in every case where a child displays rpvp, precautionary 
reasoning requires an acknowledgement of their ostensible agency. The PGC’s 
dynamic-instrumental justification of legal protection407 also demands official 
recognition of their task and decisional competences and when appropriate, 
their societal competence. To fail socially or legally to recognise task and 
decisional competences is a prima facie denial of their generic rights to additive 
well-being. If we are not to risk this denial, then it is incumbent upon us to 
create laws and to design institutions that respect all the agency rights of
403 For a detailed analysis, see Alderson (1990, esp. Chapter 5); Wellman (1992); Astinqton 
M 993); Mitchell (1997) and Clucas (2004).
404 Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001:129). The seminal work in this area is Piaget (1950 repr 
2001), which influenced Kohlberg (1984) and led to Gilligan’s feminist critique (1982) Although 
Piaget’s theory has been widely criticized, it nonetheless remains influential
405 Cf. Piaget’s ‘formal operational stage’ and Vygotsky’s ‘higher mental functions’ For a 
discussion, see Keenan (2002:129-133).
406 Weithorn and Campbell (1982).
407 Gewirth (1982: 61-62). See Chapter Three for discussion.
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members of this age group, including rights to additive well-being 408. 
Nonetheless, the importance of this should not be viewed in isolation from other 
societal aims. To pursue a policy of individual recognition of young people’s 
task and decisional competences could lead to more serious implications (as 
measured by the PGC) than not recognising these rights.
To appreciate this, let us first suppose that we introduce a policy of according 
legal rights of specific task competence, decisional competence or societal 
competence on a case-by-case basis to any young person who displays GCAb 
above the minimal level required for agency. This would require each young 
person to undergo detailed assessment to ascertain whether or not she 
possessed the competence in question and could exercise it to the satisfaction 
of the assessors. The rigor of the assessment procedure would increase with 
the complexity of competence in question. This would inevitably involve a 
significant use of administrative time and resources.
Within a PGC-compliant polity, administrative burdens do not constitute 
sufficient reason for not implementing a policy, particularly if the official 
recognition of an agent’s societal competence is at stake409. However, this does 
not imply that administrative burdens involved in respecting the rights of some 
agents cannot have repercussions that are more serious for the rights of other 
agents under the PGC410. It is highly probable that deployment of such 
resources for this purpose would interfere with the generic rights of other 
ostensible agents -  adults and children - to have certain types of basic and non- 
subtractive goods provided by the state411. This would be so even if, as a PGC- 
compliant polity would require, tax rates were high and levied progressively412. If 
a PGC-compliant legislature had to choose between funding a case-by-case 
competence recognition programme and another to provide sheltered 
accommodation for the homeless, to fund drugs to treat breast cancer or to 
sustain community support programmes for people with mental disorder, the
408 This is perfectly compatible with the claims that children and adolescents require support for 
their emerging autonomy and protection from exploitation. See Clucas (2004: 91-95).
409 Clucas (2004: 92).
410 For a wider discussion of the regulatory problems encountered in a PGC-compliant polity, 
see Beyleveld and Brownsword (2006).
411 Such as education, housing, welfare, etc.
412 For a discussion of the incompatibility of the PGC with modern capitalism, see Beyleveld and 
Brownsword (1994: 307 and 452).
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deployment of resources should be allocated to fund one of the latter objectives, 
rather than the first413. We should only pursue case-by-case competence 
assessment programmes where the effects of such a policy do not threaten 
directly or indirectly the violation of more important PGC-protected rights.
In any event, case-by-case competence assessment becomes less important in 
terms of adolescents and young people on the cusp of adulthood, where 
threshold tests of task, decisional or societal competence may be used. Under 
the PGC, policy makers and legislators should set these thresholds after careful 
consideration of the consequences for the generic rights of all agents affected. 
Once the majority of that group begin to display competence to decide in those 
spheres, any legal system founded upon the provisions of the PGC ought to 
give effect to those rights414. This argument supports the position of those who 
are keen to reduce the age at which the state politically enfranchises young 
people from eighteen to sixteen. It also causes us to reconsider the value of 
paternalistic practices in other areas of public life, such as the fetters placed on 
16 and 17 year olds refusing life-sustaining medical treatment in England and 
Wales415.
Adults with mental retardation416
By ‘adults with mental retardation’, I refer to a range of mentally impaired adults 
that fall within the definition of mental retardation offered by the World Health 
Organisation ICD-10 nosology. This states:
413 The likelihood that, in early adolescence at least, few children would be found to be societally 
competent strengthens the grounds for this decision.
414 Or even one committed to human rights. See Beyleveld (1996).
415 Discussed in Chapter Seven.
416 For reasons of analytical clarity and out of respect for the different experiences and identities 
of each group, I distinguish adults with mental retardation from adults with forms of mental 
disorder. Moral and political philosophers do not universally adopt this approach, however. 
Some bracket intellectual disabilities together with mental illness when discussing agency and 
decisional competence, epitomised in Wellman’s of analysis of “the mentally limited” (1995: 
126-132). Lomasky (1987: 202-212) emphasises the need to distinguish those who have lost 
the ability to pursue freely chosen ends from those who never had the capacity, but regrettably 
places both within the epithet “defective human beings” (ibid. 202). Gewirth unhelpfully refers to 
“the insane and other such mentally deficient persons” when discussing the agency status of 
adults with mental impairment and mental health problems (RM: 120), which Cavadino has 
rightly described as insensitive (1997: 240). Viewed together, this is scarcely an improvement 
on Lockes idiots and madmen (1997:156-157) three centuries before. I use the term ‘adults 
with mental retardation’ to avoid any pejorative connotations.
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“Mental retardation is a condition of arrested or incomplete development of 
the mind, which is especially characterised by impairment of skills 
manifested during the developmental period, which contribute to the overall 
level of intelligence, i.e. cognitive, language, motor and social abilities.”417
Mental retardation itself is not an absolute but a scalar quality. Impairment may 
be concentrated in specific areas of mental activity and need not be global or 
experienced to the same degree. There are a number of permutations of this. 
For example, one individual may suffer from cognitive impairment yet possess 
normal motor or social capabilities, another may experience cognitive 
impairment to a lesser degree with significantly impaired motor abilities but have 
no impairment of social capabilities. In the case of adults with mental 
retardation, it is helpful to be clear about what kind of retardation would still give 
rise to a display of GCAbrpvp, and when disabilities of this type may prevent its 
display.
In the fourth edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), mild mental retardation 
corresponds to an intelligence quotient (IQ) level of approximately 50 or 55 to 
70; moderate retardation from 35 or 40 to 50 or 55; and severe mental 
retardation from 20 or 25 to 35 or 40. Profound mental retardation is an IQ 
falling below 20 or 25418. Individuals with an IQ of less than 40 will have 
considerable difficulties comprehending and engaging in basic human 
interaction. Higher intelligence quotients, particularly between 60 and 70, will 
predispose an individual to greater levels of comprehension and understanding, 
which education and therapy can improve.
Despite the widespread measurement of intellectual (dis)abilities in terms of IQ, 
we should treat this approach with scepticism. IQ is unreliable as a measure of 
accounting for the myriad ways in which each human being can demonstrate 
their intelligence, as it is narrow, class-biased and culturally specific419. 
Although basic forms of intelligence that comprise voluntariness and purposivity 
will be required for agency, the ability to act for freely chosen purposes is not
417 World Health Organisation (1992: 226).
418 American Psychiatric Association (1994: 40).
419 See for a general critical discussion, Block and Dworkin (1977).
necessarily contingent on IQ420. Ascriptions of agency to adults with mental 
retardation turn on whether they appear, under precaution, capable of acting at 
all, not whether they are capable of doing so according to a socially constructed 
standard. If we remember that the ability to act requires, at its most fundamental 
level, nothing more than to value an end and to value instrumentally the means 
to that end, then it is difficult to see how this could be measured solely by a test 
of linguistic, arithmetical and logical reasoning. An adult with mental retardation 
who, for example, attends a day centre to meet other adults in a similar position 
to herself or pursues her favourite hobby of painting acts for freely chosen 
purposes, irrespective of where her IQ happens to lie on the scale. Although we 
cannot discount the implications of IQ measurement entirely -  an IQ falling 
below 20 or 25 could inhibit the display of GCAbrpvp - in this thesis, I will take 
degrees of mental retardation to refer to degrees of display of GCAb rather than 
IQ.
Under precautionary reasoning, there would be little difficulty involved in making 
an ascription of ostensible agency to individuals with mild cognitive retardation. 
The minor diminution in cognitive capacity will leave their display of GCAbrpvp 
unaffected. Impairment of GCAb above the level required for rpvp may affect 
the development of certain task or decisional competences but would be 
unlikely to affect societal competence. Alternatively, individuals who experience 
moderate cognitive retardation are still ostensibly agents, but compared to 
individuals with mild cognitive retardation, their range of task and decisional 
competences will be more heavily impaired. This is likely to affect their societal 
competence.
We should treat individuals who experience severe or profound cognitive 
retardation as ostensible intermittent agents who are close to having the 
capacities needed to be an agent in a standing fashion, or ostensible 
intermittent agents who are less close to having the capacities needed to be an 
agent in a standing fashion. This depends upon how the retardation manifests 
itself and the amount of time during which they do not display GCAbrpvp. They 
would be almost certainly societally incompetent and would be significantly
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420 Although specific task and decision-making competences may be connected with 
intelligence.
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limited in their display of task and decisional competences and their apparent 
ability to develop them. Viewed together, the response of precautionary 
reasoning towards adults with mental retardation affirms the expectation that 
the probability of such an individual displaying societal competence will vary in 
inverse proportion to the level of retardation. It also strongly supports the widely 
held contemporary view that many adults with mental retardation are, either 
alone or with appropriate support, capable of making decisions for 
themselves421.
It is uncontroversial that we should treat an individual suffering from social 
retardation as an agent under precautionary reasoning. Most adults who suffer 
from social retardation, such as those suffering from autistic spectrum disorders 
(ASDs) including Asperger’s syndrome are entirely unaffected in respect of their 
abilities to act for freely chosen purposes422. It is also highly likely that they 
could develop, for example, academic competence to the same degree as an 
agent who does not experience such retardation, in the same way that an agent 
suffering from language retardation could still become an accomplished cellist. 
We should only understand their inability to cope with social interaction as 
impeding their societal competence if it leads to them causing unintended harm 
to themselves or others. In these cases, we would consider the individual who 
experiences severe retardation of a social nature to be in greater need of 
assistance in everyday social situations and to have a more limited range of 
actual or developable task or decisional competences. Severe instances of 
social retardation may actually indicate a deeper mental impairment423, in which 
case the response to this from the perspective of precautionary reasoning 
should be the same as that towards cognitively retarded individuals, outlined 
above.
The issue of adults who are likely to possess rpvp but whose means to display 
this is limited through motor impairment warrants particular consideration. 
Cases such as motor neurone disease epitomize this, where the motor 
retardation of sufferers prevents them from enunciating speech or writing text,
421 See Cantor (2005: 28). Gunn et al. (1999) provide a significant multi-disciplinary investigation 
and analysis which affirms this view.
422 Frith (2004). For discussions that evaluate the ASD sufferer’s range of skills and abilities 
see Hill and Frith (2004) and Gillberg (2002).
423 Frith, ibid.
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even if they are perfectly capable of comprehending language and ideas424. In 
this context, let us consider Jocelyn, a fictional motor neurone sufferer in the 
advanced stages of the disease. She is perfectly capable of comprehending 
language and ideas, and manipulating abstract concepts, although there is no 
means for her to communicate other than using a keypad-controlled voice 
synthesiser. Her intentions, decisions, beliefs, reasons and emotions have only 
the conduit of modern technology to express themselves.
That we should treat Jocelyn as an ostensible agent under the PGC is beyond 
doubt. It seems clear that she has rpvp and is able to act to achieve freely 
chosen ends. Since in any case we cannot have direct access to her mental 
state, all the evidence can do is to build a more complete picture that she is, on 
the balance of probabilities, an agent. When building this picture, typically our 
focus will be on how well Jocelyn can express her agency competence in 
optimum conditions (be it through a voice synthesiser, sign language or any 
other means). The knowledge of how Jocelyn’s behaviour would be frustrated in 
the absence of the artificial means of display contextualises our empirical 
observation of her behaviour when given those means of display. Jocelyn’s 
behaviour with the voice synthesiser, then, is clearly dispositive in erring on the 
side of presuming agency.
Nevertheless, we can go further than this. Where we have reliable grounds for 
believing that a human being or any entity retains an inherent capacity for 
agency, but lacks the means to express this independently, precautionary 
reasoning requires we should continue to treat that entity as an agent425. In 
making this judgment, we should draw on as much information as is available 
about the entity’s mental state, in past, current and future periods426. We are
424 The theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking and ‘right-to-die’ litigant Diane Pretty are good 
examples of this.
425 This is analogous to the reasons for presuming that my partner is an agent when she is 
asleep. She retains her prospective ability to act even though she is not able to act now due to 
an altered state of consciousness. The overwhelming evidence that she is an agent whilst 
awake and the knowledge that her display of rpvp will return on waking will always override any 
countervailing claim that she is not an agent whilst she sleeps because she occurently does not 
display rpvp (when the effects of acting on both propositions are measured by the PGC).
426 This raises issues of psychological connectedness and continuity within debates surrounding 
personal identity and the ‘unity’ of selfhood. Even if we were to concede Parfit’s argument 
(1984: 302-307) that my future self essentially represents a different person from that which I 
am now, we would still have to address the question of whether this has any bearing on agency 
since agency does not necessarily presuppose a ‘self in Gewirthian theory. This is particularly ’
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morally enjoined to weigh such evidence for agency more strongly than 
evidence against agency, even where we can present evidence to show that the 
entity may temporarily lack rpvp at a particular point in time and that it is an 
ostensible intermittent agent (such as a human being in a catatonic state)427. It 
follows that we must do all we can to act on the presumption that the entity is an 
agent, unless we have a conflict between discharging our duties to an entity that 
is more probably an agent, in which case the criterion of more probable harm 
applies.
To illustrate this, consider the example of a human coma sufferer. She has the 
means to display agency independently but has apparently lost agency 
competence, at least in the short term. We ascertain the agency status of the 
coma sufferer given the neurological evidence that the coma sufferer probably 
lacks the capacity for intentionality428 and with knowledge of how the coma 
sufferer would have been able to use her intact means of display (capacity for 
gestures, voice projection, etc) had she not have lapsed into a coma429. This 
leads us to the conclusion that, for the time being at least, the coma sufferer is 
apparently only a partial agent.
When applied to Jocelyn (and others like her), neither approach for ascertaining 
agency status is relevant. Even where she lacks the technological aid, she can 
still raise a finger to communicate430. This means that there is no neurological
so if we take the ‘self to mean “an embodied repository of integrated psychological states” 
(Radden: 1994:11), which is particular to human beings, rather than merely a “mental 
presence” (Strawson, 1997:407).
That it is possible (even if not probable) that such an entity will regain rpvp at a later date is 
evidence which should incline us to treating that entity as an agent, even though the moral 
weight attached to the possibility of regaining rpvp will in most case be stronger than the 
scientific likelihood of it happening.
428 Although a recent study with a patient in a vegetative state lead by Adrian Owen of the 
Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit at The University of Cambridge found evidence of brain 
activity in response to suggestions to imagine engaging in physical activity, such as hittinq a 
tennis ball. The authors note “her [the patient] decision to cooperate with the authors by 
imagining particular tasks when asked to do so represents a clear act of intention, which 
confirmed beyond any doubt that she was consciously aware of herself and her surroundinqs" 
(2006:1402). Even if subsequent research were to cast doubt on these findings the moral 
weight that precautionary reasoning attaches to them is considerable.
This counterfactual proposition assumes that the coma victim had not sustained physical 
injuries that would compromise the means of display
43 Even the most limited form of communication -  the systematic blinking of an eyelid to 
indicate yes and no -  still evinces rpvp under precautionary reasoningThis position is 
affirmed in English law in Re AK (Medical Treatment: Consent) [2001 ] 1 FLR 129
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evidence to suggest she lacks rpvp when unassisted431. Nor is it possible to 
suggest that the abilities of display are intact but dormant, as the nature of her 
condition means they have been lost irrevocably. Instead, we ascertain 
Jocelyn’s agency status through an appreciation of her latent rpvp. This 
requires us to broaden the principle elaborated earlier, that the probability of 
rpvp possession informs ascriptions of agency. In most cases, display of 
GCAbrpvp determines this. However, in cases such as Jocelyn’s, it is enough 
that we have knowledge of her enduring capacity for autonomous action432. 
From the perspective of precautionary reasoning, that she cannot sustain rpvp 
behaviour herself is of no consequence. It follows that we should treat Jocelyn 
as an agent just as much in circumstances where the electronic apparatus to 
facilitate her communication is absent.
However, insofar as assistance greatly enhances Jocelyn’s communication 
capabilities, Jocelyn has a generic right under the PGC to assistance in 
communication. How is this so? Precautionary reasoning requires us to work on 
the proposition that Jocelyn is an agent, but whose heightened vulnerability 
arises from the contingent circumstances of not being able to communicate 
effectively without assistance. Under the PGC, communication amounts to the 
capacity for purpose fulfilment (a non-subtractive good). Successful 
communication may also bear upon the having of mental equilibrium (a basic 
good)433. To suggest that an agent may not claim rights to assistance with 
communication would constitute a failure to recognise why communication is 
valued under the PGC.
As we saw in Chapter Three, all agents can expect to receive support from 
others in securing the generic rights under the PGC. This applies in respect of 
the fulfilment of basic, non-subtractive and additive rights434. As a matter of 
PGC-governed social justice, other agents are under a duty to assist agents like
431 Although were she to become fully ‘locked in’, her cognitive capacity may then only be able 
to be ascertained using an EEG-based brain-computer interface, the success of which is 
currently unclear. See the study by Hinterberger et. al. (2005).
432 This knowledge would have to be obtained through rational investigation amenable to logical 
scrutiny -  it could not be knowledge gained by superstition, prejudice or ‘parroting’. Cf. 
Dworkin’s criteria for moral positions elaborated in Taking Rights Seriously (1978, Chapter 10).
433 The connection between successful communication and the maintenance of mental 
equilibrium is, I think, too strong to be speculative.
434 RM\ 67; Gewirth (1996: 31 - 44); Beyleveld (1991:18).
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Jocelyn in exploring effective methods of communication, in order to allow her 
to communicate with us and for us to communicate with her. This duty bears 
especially upon those individuals who have a particular responsibility for her 
welfare, such as carers or medical practitioners435. By extension, we can state 
that in circumstances where such communication aids are not available, agents 
owe duties of protection to Jocelyn to protect her from the harmful and 
exploitative consequences of not being able to communicate. This represents 
two general principles that apply in respect of the moral treatment of any entity 
with latent or heavily restricted means of display of rpvp.
Adults with depression
There are several varieties of depression contained within psychiatric 
nosologies436. The DSM-IV definition of a ‘major depressive episode’ captures 
many of the common symptoms of depression, which I will take as the focal 
meaning for the purposes of this thesis:
“Five (or more) of the following symptoms have been present during the 
same two week period and represent a change from previous functioning; 
at least one of the symptoms is either (1) depressed mood or (2) loss of 
interest or pleasure. . . .
1. depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day, as indicated by
either subjective report (e.g., feels sad or empty) or observation made by 
others (e.g. appears tearful)----
2. markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities 
most of the day, nearly every day (as indicated by either subjective account 
or observation made by others)
5. psychomotor agitation or retardation nearly every day (observable by 
others, not merely subjective feelings of restlessness or being slowed 
down)
6. fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day
7. feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt (which may 
be delusional) nearly every day (not merely self-reproach or guilt about 
being sick)
8. diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness, nearly every 
day (either by subjective account or as observed by others)
Cf. Gewirth s discussion of the role of the signalman, RM' 222-223
6 DSM-IV lists three:‘major depressive disorder’ ‘dv^thvmin
not otherwise specified’ (1994; 318). ICD-10 includes ‘denrPQciv/o ^  clePressive disorder
depressive disorder', and within that „
condition, specifically whether or not it has somatic svnHmmae « a ,°  seuer'ty of the 
psychotic features (1992; 28-29). syndromes and whether or not it has
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9. recurrent thoughts of death (not just fear of dying), recurrent suicidal 
ideation without a specific plan, or a suicide attempt or a specific plan for 
committing suicide.”437
The psychiatrists Goodwin and Ghaemi elaborate on this:
“Mood is bleak, pessimistic and despairing. A deep sense of futility is often 
accompanied, if not preceded, by the belief that the ability to experience 
pleasures is permanently gone. There is a slowing or decrease in almost all 
aspects of emotion and behaviour: rate of thought and speech, energy, 
sexuality and the ability to experience pleasure”.438
Under precautionary reasoning, in the vast majority of cases we should treat 
adults experiencing depression as ostensible agents. In the most severe cases, 
adults experiencing depression will appear ostensibly as Intermittent agents if 
the fluctuation and severity of mood inherent in the disorder gives rise to 
exhibiting rpvp at time U and not exhibiting it at time t2. To be clear about this, it 
is helpful to draw some distinctions. Mild or moderate experiences of the above 
symptoms will not influence having or displaying rpvp or the range of decisional 
or task competences that the person exhibits. There is also unlikely to be 
sufficient impairment of social functions that would warrant treating the person 
as a societally incompetent agent. When the depressed person visibly retains 
GCAb that exceeds that required for agency and when her behaviour gives no 
indication of an erosion of ability at a specific task or a specific decision, we 
should not doubt the presence of that task or decisional competence. In other 
words, the existence of mild or moderate depression per se should not affect 
judgments about the task and decisional competences of an individual where 
these are apparently undiminished.
Extreme phases of severe forms of depression, such as manic or clinical 
depression with psychotic features, may debilitate motivation and induce 
feelings of worthlessness to such an extent that the ability of the sufferer to 
value proactively her purposes or to act so as not to cause unintended harm to 
herself or others is temporarily impaired439. During this time, the agent will lack
437 American Psychiatric Association (1994: 327).
438 Goodwin and Ghaemi (2000: 677).
439 Of course, in practice, distinctions between mild, moderate and severe depression will hinnp 
upon the frequency, nature and degree of the symptoms that are apparent A DsvcWatS will9 
therefore took first to the patient's condition in order to reach a c fa S tta to ^ tS s T O S w Iiw
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societal competence. In such cases of severe depression, the erosion of task 
and decisional competences can also be significant. Sufferers may no longer be 
able to perform tasks that were previously an entrenched part of their personal, 
domestic or occupational life because of apathy or lethargy induced by the 
condition440. Despair, hopelessness and negative expectancy may occlude 
perception, which give rise to a ‘depressive realism’ that can diminish the 
capacity to recognise the value of trust in themselves and others441. An 
important issue also arises as to what extent the person’s value structure has 
fragmented and the integrity of their pre-existing self has eroded442. In spite of 
the ramifications of this latter point for discussions of selfhood and personal 
identity, it need not bear on considerations of agency under Gewirthian theory. 
As we have already acknowledged, the relevant question in making ascriptions 
of agency is whether the entity can still act simpliciter rather than act in 
accordance with previously expressed values or within the terms of reference of 
a pre-existing self.
Whilst we must assume under precaution that all persons who are experiencing 
severe depression are agents, our judgments about the continuance of specific 
task and decision competences of those persons will vary according to the 
impact of the condition on the performance of those competences. This will also 
lead one to draw inferences from the degree to which she displays rpvp in a 
standing fashion that bear upon the permissibility of the individual developing 
new task and decisional competences. Where a person suffering from severe 
depression displays rpvp in a way that is less close to a standing fashion, we 
should treat the depressed person as a societally incompetent agent, with a 
restricted range of task and decision competences. Insofar as it would be a
than looking first to an ‘ideal-type’ definition and considering how well the patient’s condition fits 
with one of these. See World Health Organization (1992:121).
440 Bech (2000: 683-684). For a powerful part-autobiographic account, see Wolpert (2001).
441 As discussed in Garrett (1994), who argues that the pessimism associated with depression is 
irrational, even if it leads to more accurate self-observation, because it undermines the ability to 
pursue the good life. This meshes with the discussion in Beyleveld and Brownsword that a 
‘dignified’ character and ‘dignified’ conduct are conducive to acting in accordance with the PGC 
(2001:138-141). This does not imply that people experiencing depression of whatever degree 
lack dignity, however.
442 Which could gives rise to a ‘multiplicity’ of selves (several apparently complete selves 
residing within the same body), although this more likely within dissociative identity disorder 
(Radden, 1994: 38-57). For penetrating contemporary discussions of the broader issues 
surrounding multiple selfhood and personal identity, see Williams (1970); Parfit (1984 
especially Chapter Twelve), Glover (1988), Haskar(1991) and Noonan 2003)
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decision motivated to protect the PGC rights of the depressed person qua 
cognitively vulnerable agent, it would be a warranted act of paternalism443.
In a similar way as judgments of agency competence can be made with regard 
to comparing behaviour over time following the onset of the disorder, one may 
be able to make a comparative judgment to contrast the level of a particular 
type of task or decisional competence at U (before the condition) and t2 (after 
the onset of the condition). This helps to identity where there has been a 
marked deterioration in a particular competence of this type. What is at issue is 
not the quantitative loss of task competence following the onset of the disorder 
but the qualitative effect of this loss.
The degree to which the depressed person appears incapable of performing or 
participating in the range of activities at which she had previously task or 
decisional competence will determine the extent to which she appears either a 
specific task or decisionally incompetent agent or a societally incompetent 
agent. Apparent incapability may be determined by empirical observation or by 
subjecting the person to an assessment444. In any event, severely depressed 
persons whose task competence has been eroded to the point where they can 
no longer cope independently with routine interactional situations will need to be 
subject to some assessment of their abilities in order to provide an appropriate 
level of support in such situations445.
Precautionary reasoning also allows us to make judgments about the degree of 
societal incompetence of persons with depression. Whether we should treat the 
depressed person as a societally incompetent agent with a heavily or marginally 
restricted ability to engage in routine interactional situations independently 
depends upon to what extent the depressed person’s GCAb above that required 
for agency has diminished from time U to time t2. Marginal diminution suggests 
that the person is more likely to retain her ability to engage in routine 
interactional situations independently, unless of course, the person already 
experienced societal incompetence before suffering from depression. Greater
443 Which calls to mind Wikler’s claim that “the strongest argument for paternalism aoDlies
where the aim is to protect from harm rather than to ensure a benefit" (1979- 3851 PP 
I discuss assessments of decisional competence in Chapter Six
445 In any PGC-compliant polity or one that sincerely aspires to protect human rights.
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diminutions will usually suggest a heavily restricted ability to engage in routine 
interactional situations independently. To allow the individual to continue 
exercising certain specialised task and decisional competences on the 
assumption that they are intact risks the individual causing unintended harm to 
herself446 or others447. This is particularly likely if the course of the diminution is 
rapid or if her GCAb fluctuates.
The approach suggested by applying precautionary reasoning does not 
correlate the agency status of the depressed person to the intensity of 
depression suffered and nor does it assume that forms of depression which 
exhibit fluctuations in mood and affect necessarily erode rpvp. By the same 
token, precautionary reasoning would not make the loss of societal, task or 
decisional competences “an essential criteria of severity”448 of depression, but it 
would allow inferences to be drawn from their loss that are relevant to how we 
should treat the agent. It is also important to remember that a physician may 
responsibly prescribe antidepressant drugs in order to control the most 
destructive aspects of the person’s depressive behaviour449, on the proviso that 
this was motivated by concern for the patient’s welfare rather than as part of a 
wider policy of insidious social control. Crucially, precautionary reasoning 
requires us to look beyond the effects of the condition to search for any 
evidence of action at all, whilst at the same time creating an opportunity to gain 
an enhanced insight into the debilitating nature of a particular case of 
depression through examining changes in task and decisional competence450.
446 For instance, lack of appreciation of the relevant circumstances of a decision or the capacity 
to express a choice could erode competence to make financial decisions and decisions about 
consenting to or refusing medical treatment, due to an extreme inability to concentrate, lack of 
energy or irrational feelings of self-reproach.
447 A severely depressed psychotherapist, for example, may be overcome with nihilism and 
fatigue whilst conversing with a client if returning to practice before having recovered from the 
condition, thus causing a transference of those feelings onto the client at an especially 
vulnerable time. Similarly, a severely depressed bus driver may not care whether he stops at a 
red light, thus threatening the safety of his passengers, other road users and himself.
448 The ICD-10 guidance cautions against incorporating ‘social performance' in these criteria. 
See World Health Organization (1992:121).
449 This could offset the impact upon societal, task or decision-making competences.
450 Rudnick (2002:153) endorses this comparative approach in relation to the preferences of the 
depressed person.
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Adults with schizophrenia
Schizophrenia typically causes an individual to experience a transformation in 
their cognitive functions and experience of social reality451. Extreme forms of 
depression and bipolar disorder share some of these symptoms, but in 
schizophrenia, these are typically more pronounced. DSM-IV gives the following 
definition of schizophrenia:
“Two (or more) of the following, each present for a significant portion of time 
during a one month period (or less if successfully treated):
1. delusions
2. hallucinations
3. disorganized speech (e.g., frequent derailment or incoherence)
4. grossly disorganized or catatonic behaviour
5. negative symptoms, i.e., affective flattening, alogia, or 
avolition"452
Most experiences of schizophrenia are such that the force of misperceptions of 
reality, which includes false beliefs about oneself, delusions about the world and 
significantly fluctuating desires453, heavily compromise the capacity for rational 
understanding. Motility may be impaired through catatonic motor dysfunction 
(such as posturing, rigidity or excessive movement) 454 , which in turn 
undermines the continuity of task competences. Withdrawal, self-neglect and 
extremes of behaviour can undermine social functioning and the performance of 
both task and decisional competences. As in cases of manic depression and 
bipolar disorder, this may be sufficiently great so as to evince ‘separate selves’, 
where the sufferer exhibits character traits and dispositions that are so 
inconsistent with the sufferer’s pre-existing personal identity that a new self or 
selves emerge to succeed the former, or to displace it entirely455.
One of the greatest challenges to the pursuit of freely chosen purposes whilst 
suffering schizophrenia is the experience of delusions and auditory and visual
451 Birchwood and Jackson (2001: 3).
452 American Psychiatric Association (1994: 285). The DSM-IV criteria are more stringent than 
the ICD-10 classification, which requires the persistence of symptoms continually over six 
months (Birchwood and Jackson, 2001: 3). The ‘sub-types’ of schizophrenia include paranoid, 
disorganized, catatonic, undifferentiated and residual types (American Psychiatric Association 
(1994: 286-290).
453 American Psychiatric Association (1994: 274-275).
454 American Psychiatric Association (1994: 276).
455 See the discussion by Radden (1994, Chapter Four, esp. pp. 61-66).
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hallucinations456. These often give rise to deluded premises for action (e.g. 
others intend to persecute or harm that person), false beliefs about the nature of 
mind and intentionally (e.g. that others can read the person’s mind, or that 
thoughts have been inserted into her mind), false perceptions of cause, motive 
or effect (e.g. that television or the Internet is sending messages informing the 
person how to behave or is controlling their behaviour), or beliefs of grandeur or 
invulnerability (e.g. that one is Jesus Christ, that one is being spoken to by God 
or that one will recover from a life-threatening illness through divine 
intervention). In extreme cases, the consequences of acting on these deluded 
premises could involve violence, although in most cases the sufferer directs this 
towards herself, rather than others457.
In light of these extraordinarily devastating symptoms, one of the main 
challenges for psychiatry is how we might go about understanding 
schizophrenia. Karl Jaspers, a pioneer of philosophical psychiatry, conceded 
that schizophrenia was inscrutable, deeming the condition “incomprehensible” 
and “closed to empathy”458. Such views allowed medicalized interpretations of 
the condition to thrive. Yet at around the same time, Anglo-American 
commentators were proposing a radical challenge to conventional psychiatric 
thinking about schizophrenia. For very different reasons, so-called ‘anti- 
psychiatrists’ Ronald Laing 459 and Thomas Szasz 460 both considered 
schizophrenia to be a form of self-expression in which conventional psychiatric 
practice should not intervene. Laing saw schizophrenia as representing an 
attempt to live through an unbearable situation. Rather than a manifestation of 
mental disorder, schizophrenia presents an opportunity for personal growth that 
liberates the sufferer from oppressive family relationships, in which we can find 
the origins of the condition461.
456 Auditory and visual hallucinations are the most common, although olfactory (smell-related), 
gustatory (taste-related) and tactile (touch-related) varieties may occur.
457 Allebeck etal. (1986), discussed in Birchwood and Jackson (2001: 6).
458 Quotes attributed to Jaspers are taken from Read (2001:449). The work for which Jaspers is 
renowned in this area is his General Psychopathology (1968, reprinted in two volumes, 1997).
459 Laing first expresses his ideas on schizophrenia in The Divided Self (1960, reprinted 1990).
460 Szasz's seminal work is The Myth of Mental Illness (1974, reprinted 2003).
461 This was the uncompromising position taken in the earlier of Laing’s writings, before The 
Politics of the Family (1972).
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Szasz, alternatively, views the notion of mental illness as pathologizing 
voluntary requests for help in living, whilst providing an artifice for offenders to 
evade criminal responsibility462. On this account, once people suffering from 
schizophrenia are labelled mentally ill, they become the helpless victims of 
psychiatric power and a coercive state463. More recently, philosophers have 
turned their focus to the language of schizophrenia, disagreeing on whether it is 
a form of “hyper-rationality” 464 or simply “nonsense” 465. The world of the 
schizophrenia sufferer as interpreted from a Gewirthian standpoint may be 
similarly unintelligible (as Gewirth’s theory of mind relates to what it means to 
be an agent rather than how we can make sense of mental illness), but we can 
nevertheless still look for evidence of rpvp amongst the solipsistic “mass of 
contradictions”466 of schizophrenia.
However florid the symptoms are, it is highly likely that the schizophrenia 
sufferer will retain the capacity to value purposes, even if she perceives 
someone or something else to have given them to her, or they are in a constant 
state of flux. The difficulty arises when we consider in what sense we may take 
them to be the agent’s own voluntary purposes. Purposes that the sufferer 
apparently values under the influence of a schizophrenic delusion (e.g. walking 
around the streets at night in order to decode messages she believes are being 
communicated to her through the registration numbers of parked cars) will be 
different from those valued during a period of lucidity. This alone may be 
insufficient to impair the exercise of certain task and decisional competences (in 
the example above, we assume that the sufferer is still able to find her way 
around a residential area, or distinguish a car registration number from the 
manufacturer’s badge) but the motive behind exercising them is deeply 
irrational.
462 Reznek (1991: 94). Szasz presents this argument most forcefully in Law, Liberty and 
Psychiatry (1974).
463 Szasz, ibid.
464 Sass (1995). Sass’s approach draws heavily on the ideas of Wittgenstein (1952 repr 20021
465 Read (2001:456). ’ h
466 Read (2001:469).
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Through the application of precautionary reasoning, we can find a resolution to 
the problem of deluded purposes, at least on a moral level467. As we already 
have seen, denial of agency is the most serious violation of the PGC and we 
must treat any evidence that it may be present as persuasive468, even where 
the entity in question is constrained in its exercise of agency. In one important 
sense, there is no difference between a case where physical coercion is 
currently undermining the voluntariness of an individual’s actions and a case 
where mental disorder has the same effect. In both cases, the force currently 
undermining the individual’s voluntariness does not necessarily extend to 
negate their having the dispositional features of rpvp469.
To illustrate this, consider the following analogy. A person who a gunman 
threatens on the pain of death to do his bidding could not be understood as 
having lost her agency status whilst complying with his demands (even though 
we would typically absolve the victim of responsibility for any ensuing harm). It 
would be more appropriate to think of the coercion as having overwhelmed the 
agent’s current capacity for free choice470. Similarly, schizophrenia manipulates 
desires and preferences but does not necessarily eliminate the dispositional 
features of rpvp, or the metacognitive capacity to know that the condition is 
manipulating one’s desires and preferences471. It would be more helpful to think 
of the schizophrenia as having driven the exercise of rpvp into abeyance whilst 
the disposition for rpvp endures. Therefore, for as long as there remains a 
possibility that the sufferer retains the dispositional features of rpvp, we should 
treat the sufferer as an agent, albeit one with restricted task and decisional 
competences.
Since the symptoms of schizophrenia tend to vary in proportion to the severity 
of the condition, we can identity a sliding scale along which there is a prima 
facie correlation between its severity and the display of rpvp and task/decision- 
making competences. Where the condition fluctuates, it is possible to suggest
467 Precautionary reasoning cannot address the ontological significance of delusions and 
hallucinations for the schizophrenia sufferer. For an approach that seeks to consider this see 
Phillips (2003).
468 This evidence would have to be interpreted in accordance with the criterion of more probable 
harm.
469 See the discussion in RM: 28-35.
470 Compare Gewirth’s discussion of the gunman scenario, RM: 32.
471 See Breier and Strauss (1983).
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that sufferers of schizophrenia are, like persons experiencing depression, either 
ostensibly agents or ostensibly intermittent agents depending on whether the 
display of rpvp at time U and at time t2 represents a frequent occurrence for all 
instances of such observation. This, combined with understanding of the 
pathogenesis of schizophrenia, yields a precautionary response along the 
following lines. In mild cases of schizophrenia, we should assume that rpvp is 
retained along with most task and decisional competences. In moderate cases 
of schizophrenia, we should assume that rpvp is retained, but that it is highly 
probable the effects of the condition will undermine task and decisional 
competences previously held and may warrant treating the sufferer as a 
societally incompetent agent472. In severe cases of schizophrenia, we should 
still assume that the sufferer retains rpvp, but there may be extensive periods 
when it is not apparent and when most task and decisional competences (and 
the ability to develop new ones) are apparently lost473.
There are two caveats that apply to this. First, whether or not a schizophrenia 
sufferer is taking medication for her condition will not affect the precautionary 
grounds for making a judgment about her agency. We should presume that she 
has a disposition for rpvp which endures irrespective of her taking 
medication474. However, the knowledge that a schizophrenic sufferer (or, for 
that matter, any other mentally disordered person) uses medication to sustain 
mental equilibrium might affect whether we treat that person as a societally 
competent agent and as having competence at particular specialised tasks and 
decisions. Should the medication improve the sufferer’s independent functioning 
in society, the less likely it will be that we should treat her as a societally 
incompetent agent. It may also allow for the return of task and decisional 
competences previously lost. Alternatively, the medication might impair the
472 This is because when in the throes of schizophrenic delusion, the sufferer’s ability to interact 
independently in her environment is impeded to an extent that warrants paternalistic 
intervention (as measured by the PGC).
473 In these severe cases, there may be a profound dissonance between the display of rpvp and 
the having of rpvp (although of course we can never prove this beyond doubt).
474 Although this should not imply that agency under the PGC entails a ‘natural’ state. A 
Gewirthian definition of agency can accommodate the possibility of rpvp brought about through 
artificial means. For instance, a cyborg created by human beings would be an agent, even 
though this agency has not arisen organically. On this account, it is irrelevant to the task of 
identifying evidence of agency how rpvp has emerged or how it is sustained, provided it has not 
come about at the expense of violations of the generic rights of other agents. Agent-entities that 
are the product of a prior infringement of another agent’s generic rights, such as a cyborg 
derived from the brain tissue of an unwilling donor, would be an example of this.
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sufferer’s array of prospective or developable task and decisional competences 
if its effects make the development or exercise of such a competence difficult or 
potentially harmful475. It will also inform our expectations of how we may have to 
treat the person at a future date if her condition persists and she is no longer 
taking medication.
Second, the retention of task and decisional competences will be more evident 
in situations when sufferers experience an isolated, mild episode of 
schizophrenia, or are in advanced states of recovery. In the case of an isolated 
episode, task and decisional competences are likely to return, even if they were 
lost during the height of the condition476. The person’s schizophrenic episode 
should have no continuing bearing upon presumptive or demonstrable task or 
decisional competences as it no longer poses a threat to them and is unlikely to 
do so in the future. In the case of recovering schizophrenia sufferers, the 
consistency with which the sufferer displays GCAbrpvp typically will be greater 
than an individual who is not in remission, although it will take some time for the 
individual concerned to have rpvp restored as a standing feature of her 
personality. In many cases, therapy or medication will help to prevent relapse477 
and will offer a means to reclaim the ability to exercise rpvp. Once the sufferer 
has made consistent progress towards healthy functioning (at least sufficient for 
clinical recovery478), she will be ready for réintroduction to everyday activities 
and situations in order to restore her lost independence. This would require a 
therapeutic environment to nurture autonomy through revivifying pre-existing or 
latent talents and abilities and the exercise of rational judgment479.
475 For example, medications that interfere with the ability to operate machinery or drive a motor 
vehicle would impair associated task competences.
476 Jablensky (2000: 613-614).
477 See respectively, Chadwick etal. (1996); Leff and Wing (1971; discussed in Birchwood and 
Jackson, 2001:101-102).
478 Warner (2003) identifies clinical recovery as a precondition of social and psychological 
recovery.
479 Ideally, such as a ‘therapeutic community’. These 'communities’ would be run by a collective 
of mental health professionals and current and former sufferers and funded by central 
government. It would not support the consignment of recovering schizophrenic sufferers to 
flawed ‘care in the community’ programmes of the type that were introduced in Britain during the 
1980s. For an incisive historical critique of 'care in the community' approaches adopted over the 
last 250 years, see the collection of essays in Bartlett and Wright (1999).
The competences of cognitively vulnerable groups 150
Adults with Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias
Dementia is a progressive, usually irreversible condition that causes cognitive 
vulnerability through degeneration in higher cognitive functions, especially 
memory, reasoning, comprehension and judgment. It particularly affects 
individuals above 65 years of age, although some sufferers are diagnosed with 
‘early-onset’ dementia480. Alzheimer’s disease is the most common form of 
dementia481, but dementia can also arise in Pick’s disease, Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
disease, Huntingdon’s disease, Parkinson’s disease or through vascular 
dementia 482. In all dementias, especially Alzheimer’s disease and Pick’s 
disease, changes in the structure of the brain become apparent, such as 
neuronal depletion, a reduction in neurotransmitters and enzymes, along with 
lesion development, particularly extracellular amyloidal plaques and intracellular 
neurofibrillary tangles483.
DSM-IV defines dementia, which includes Alzheimer’s disease, in the following 
terms:
“The essential features of a dementia are multiple cognitive deficits that 
include memory impairment and at least one of the following: aphasia 
[impairment of language functions], apraxia [impaired motor abilities], 
agnosia [failure to recognise objects], or a disturbance in executive 
functioning [such as abstract reasoning]. The cognitive deficits must be 
sufficiently severe to cause impairment in occupational or social functioning 
and must represent a decline from a previously higher level of 
functioning.’’484
These ‘multiple cognitive deficits’ have enormous implications for the sufferer. 
Soon after onset, independent life becomes progressively difficult to maintain 
due to neuronal loss in the hippocampus (the part of the brain responsible for 
transforming short-term memory into long-term memory)485. Short-term memory 
and language skills are usually the first to decline, leading to visuospatial and
480 American Psychiatric Association (1994:140). Cases involving people below fifty years of 
age are much rarer (1994:141).
48 Lovestone (2000: 390). Alzheimer’s disease accounts for between 60 to 70 per cent of all 
incidences of dementia. Over 20 per cent of individuals above 85 years old suffer from 
Alzheimer’s disease (ibid: 391).
482 The ICD-10 classification also includes dementias of an unspecified type such as senile
dementia. ’
483 World Health Organization (1992:47).
484 American Psychiatric Association (1994:134).
485 Geula (1998), discussed in Jaworska (2006: 94).
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motor impairment. At the same time, skills of information assimilation and recall 
deteriorate, beginning with new information, but spreading to affect entrenched 
knowledge and understanding in the more advanced stages. This impairs 
concentration, logical reasoning, decision-making and communication. 
Throughout, consciousness remains intact, which means that the sufferer is 
painfully aware of her slow deterioration486. Most tragic of all are changes in 
personality. The ability to engage previously held values, character traits and a 
conception of the good diminishes gradually and steadily. This leads to the 
unravelling of selfhood in a process of effacement or "unbecoming”487, captured 
poignantly in the reflections of a sufferer: "Every few months I sense that 
another part of me is missing. My life . . . , my sel f . . .  are falling apart. I can 
only think half thoughts now.”488
Inevitably, this systematic disintegration of higher-level cognitive functions 
impinges upon autonomy and agency. In its early stages, the effect confines 
itself primarily to the loss of task and decisional competences, spreading 
progressively through the middle stages to eventually undermine the success 
with which one can act for freely chosen purposes at all. The extent to which 
agency survives the mental ravages of severe dementia is a topic that has 
generated much interest in bioethics and philosophy of mind. A central question 
is whether the effect of personality change on a sufferer’s identity is qualitative 
only, or sufficiently great as to give rise to a numerical change in the sufferer’s 
identity so that she is, essentially, a different person from the one she was489.
Two approaches structure the terms of this discussion. The first is the view 
initially posited by John Locke and revised by Derek Parfit that psychological 
continuity and connectedness are constitutive of personal identity 490 . 
Psychological connectedness involves the possession of directly connected 
relationships with past, present and future selves whereas psychological
486 Illustrated with great pathos in the film Iris (BBC Films, 2001), a dramatisation of the 
philosopher and novelist Iris Murdoch’s life and eventual affliction with dementia.
487 Fontana and Smith (1989). See also the discussion in Post (1995).
488 Excerpted in Radden (1994: 276; originally quoted In Cohen and Eisdorfer, 1986: 21).
489 McMillan (2006:64).
490 Presented in Locke (1997, originally published 1689) and Parfit (1971; 1984). There are 
notable differences between the approaches of these two philosophers, particularly Parfit’s 
rejection of Locke’s use of memory as a criterion of personal identity, which he believes begs 
the question in favour of personal identity (1971:16). Parfit’s response is to substitute the 
memory criterion with a notion o f ‘g-memory’ (1971:14-15).
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continuity is the possession of “overlapping chains of strong connectedness’’491. 
For Parfit, connectedness is more important than continuity. He supports a 
variety of reductionism, in which the ‘R-relation’ of connectedness displaces 
reliance on some ‘further fact’ about psychological existence, such as having a 
soul or Cartesian ego492. On this account, the dementia sufferer, especially in 
the more advanced stages, would represent a numerically different person 
inhabiting the same body as her former self once did.
The second approach to have informed the discussion I will call the mixed 
account. Proponents of such an approach implicitly or explicitly associate 
identity with brain function and spatiotemporal embodiment. These either tend 
towards ‘a common sense’ view of personal identity in which the physical unity 
of our brains and bodies determine our identity493 or towards ‘animalism’494, 
which argues that our identities are determined by species membership alone 
(e.g. being a human animal) rather than by any psychological property of being 
human. On this basis, we can explain radical change, including dementia, as 
representing a different stage within the life of the same person, rather than as 
a numerically different person inhabiting the same body. Of the accounts of the 
relationship identity and dementia to have emerged in recent years, several 
display an affinity with the mixed account495.
Ronald Dworkin, in Life's Dominion and in an earlier paper, ‘Autonomy and the 
Demented Self, presents such an account that focuses upon the impact of 
dementia on autonomy. In Dworkin’s view, “personal identity does survive even 
the most serious dementia"496. Dworkin’s theory rests upon an assumption that 
the psychological discontinuity between a human being with agency 
competence and the same human being after the loss of agency competence 
induced by dementia does not amount to a rupture of personhood. For the 
same reason, the psychological discontinuity of dementia does not undermine
491 Parfit (1984: 206).
492 Parfit (1984: 206). See also Korsgaard (1989, esp. pp. 103-109) for a discussion of 
reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of personal identity.
493 See Williams (1973) for a leading account.
494 A recent approach developed by Olson (1997).
495 For a conspectus of recent approaches, see Hughes et al (2006)
496 Dworkin (1986: 6). Dworkin has also reaffirmed this view more recently in a reply to critics 
stressing that he takes competence and dementia to be different stages in the history of the ’ 
same person, who remains the same, single object of ethical inquiry” (2004' 367)
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the moral significance of the sufferer’s previously expressed values and 
wishes497.
Dworkin distinguishes between two types of interests he believes human beings 
have - critical interests and experiential interests - in order to elicit what is 
significant about loss of autonomy in dementia. Critical interests emanate from 
a person’s value framework or conception of the good that has endured over 
time. They are distinctive to cognitively functional human beings and generate a 
sense of narrative coherence within one’s life. By contrast, all sentient beings 
possess experiential interests, which derive from a transient desire for pleasure 
satisfaction and pain avoidance498. Of the two types of interest, critical interests 
epitomise autonomous action. Dworkin argues that a dementia sufferer will 
have possessed both critical interests and experiential interests before the 
onset of dementia but that she can only sustain experiential interests in her 
cognitively vulnerable state499.
Dworkin conceives of autonomy as serving to uphold the integrity rather than 
the welfare of the agent in question500. This entails the ability “to act out of 
genuine preference or character or conviction or a sense of self’501. However, a 
purely integrity based account of autonomy would deny dementia sufferers a 
right to autonomy since, in Dworkin’s view they lack the occurrent capacity for 
autonomous action502. Some modification to this account is therefore required. 
In order to respect the autonomy right of the dementia sufferer qua previously 
autonomous person, Dworkin argues that we must respect her earlier critical 
interests in favour of her current experiential interests. He refers to this as the 
‘precedent’ doctrine of autonomy503. Dworkin does emphasise, however, that 
this does not mean that there will never be good reasons for acting in
W Dworkin (1986:5). Dworkin makes it dear that in discussing dementia he is referring 
pnncipally to the loss of agency competence rather than task or decisional competence (1994:
498 Dworkin (1994: 201-204).
499 Dworkin (1994:225).
500 Dworkin (1994:223-224).
501 Dworkin (1994: 225).
502 Dworkin (1994:225-226).
503 Dworkin (1994: 226-229).
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accordance with her experiential interests, but if we do act in this way, we must 
accept that we are necessarily infringing her autonomy504.
Dworkin’s account of critical and experiential interests rests upon a 
controversial demarcation between an agentive and a post-agentive state in 
dementia. That he does not argue for this demarcation and instead assumes it 
makes his account all the more susceptible to criticism. Agnieszka Jaworska 
argues that Dworkin pitches the abilities required for agency competence too 
high505. For Jaworska, the essence of autonomy is the capacity to value 
construed in a minimal sense506. Valuing, for Jaworska, comprises thinking one 
is right to want what one wants, an association between the attainment of the 
desired goal and one's sense of self-respect and independence between the 
significance of pursuing of the goal and one’s own experience507. On this basis, 
she distinguishes the ability to value from the ability to understand the narrative 
of one’s life508. Dworkin’s understanding of autonomy fails to capture this 
fundamental first sense of valuing, instead focusing the second more 
demanding sense of valuing in the context of one’s own life's projects and 
commitments509.
Jaworska argues that dementia sufferers, especially those in the less advanced 
stages of the condition, are capable of this less demanding form of valuing. She 
justifies this claim with reference to recent research in neurophysiology. This 
suggests that dementia leaves intact those areas of the brain which are 
primarily responsible for generating value until the most advanced stages510.
Dworkin (1994: 229). Dworkin s suggestion that it might be "morally unforgivable not to try to 
save the life of someone who plainly enjoys her life" (1994:228) seems to me a compelling 
reason not to honour the person s previously expressed wish to refuse treatment, at least in 
circumstances where pain and suffering does not outweigh this enjoyment Dresser (1995) 
appears to share this view. v '
5°5 Jaworska (1999), Jaworska (2006).
506 Jaworska (1999:116).
507 Jaworska (1999:116). An example of the independence between the importance of the goal 
and one s own experience would be where one values the end for reasons unrelated to any 
improvement in one s state of mind, such as undertaking low paid menial work (which would 
give rise to no pleasure or improvement in one’s state of mind) in order repay one’s student 
debts.
508 Jaworska (1999:124).
509 Jaworska (1999.130). Shiffrin (2004) takes a similar view in relation to the exercise of
autonomy: [w e show respect for the demented by allowing their contemporary interests and 
their voiced will to exert substantial influence on our deliberations - (ibid 213> ^  * d
-  j ™ ° ’Ska (1999:122). Her principal coerces are Damasio (1994) and Ira a k  and Braak
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The primary effect of damage to the hippocampus - which is where the damage 
of the earlier stages is concentrated - is to render the person “unable to update 
her autobiographical narrative” 511, rather than unable to value. By way of 
illustration, Jaworska offers vignettes featuring dementia sufferers who 
demonstrate the metacognitive capacity to be aware of the effect of their decline 
as it is happening to them512. According to the minimal valuing hypothesis, 
valuing occurs even when it takes the form of lamenting the loss of abilities one 
no longer can exercise513.
Jaworska believes that if Dworkin’s account of critical interests is reframed as 
nothing more than “opinions about what is good for me”514, then it can be read 
as supporting a notion of valuing which connotes a sense of the agent’s ability 
to make judgments of value in the present, rather than judgments of value that 
are informed by a narrative self-understanding. What is important according to 
this revised account of critical interests is that we respect the ‘contemporaneous 
autonomy’ of the dementia sufferer qua occurrent valuer rather than her 
precedent autonomy515. This involves enhancing the sufferer’s autonomy 
through support, assistance and dialogue516 and may require preparedness to 
disregard the sufferer’s apparent choice where this decision conflicts with her 
more fundamental occurrent values517.
Others have offered parallels to Jaworska’s argument. In a critical review of 
Life's Dominion, Rebecca Dresser questions the extent to which one may draw 
a clear boundary between critical and experiential interests518. For Dresser, one 
can rationally choose a purpose precisely for its immediate or sensuous 
benefit519. She takes a sceptical view towards whether there is a general 
preference to live one’s life according to a narrative structure, and instead 
suggests that many human beings evince a willingness to adapt to
511 Jaworska (1999:121).
512 Jaworska (1999: 105-108).
513 Jaworska (1999:114).
514 Jaworska (1999:113, quoting Dworkin, 1994: 202).
515 Jaworska (1999:133-134; 2006:99).
516 Jaworska (1999: 126; 133-134).
8,7 Jaworska (1999:135-136:2006:99). The scope for overriding the apparent choice of the
paternalism ?^1 9 8 6 1 q  Y 'n,ereStS bGarS Sim"ari,ies wl,h Fei" ber3's <*
818 Dresser (1995).
519 Dresser (1995: 36).
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circumstances as they present themselves520. Unlike Jaworska, however, she 
concedes that a Parfitian account of personal identity (which Dworkin rejects) 
may be plausible521. Julian Hughes, alternatively, supports the Dworkinian view 
of personal identity522, and sketches a philosophical account of personhood in 
dementia that dovetails with what Hughes claims is the “reality of clinical 
experience”523. He argues for a ‘situated-embodied’ view of the agent, in which 
the agent is constituted by her physiological, social and cultural context - her 
“embeddedness and . . . embodiment"524. On this account, personhood (which 
Hughes uses interchangeably with agency) persists throughout dementia until 
the point of cardiac arrest525. To act on this premise requires that we should 
encourage the agentive abilities of the sufferer for as long as possible526. It 
follows that we are under a moral obligation to assist a dementia sufferer in the 
continuance of her agency.
Viewed together, Jaworska, Dresser and Hughes lend weight to the argument 
that the dementia sufferer - at least in the earlier stages of the condition - is still 
a valuer. In particular, the positions of Jaworska and Hughes appear to support 
an approach compatible with precautionary reasoning. Their respective ideas of 
construing valuing minimally and encouraging agentive capacities meshes with 
the Gewirthian position in two important ways. First, they emphasise that an 
agent is an entity that acts for any purposes it has freely chosen, whatever 
these might be, rather than specifically within the context of a self-generated 
narrative. Second, they reaffirm the positive right to assistance in having the 
basic goods of the PGC when one cannot achieve these through one’s own 
efforts. This underpins the presumptive judgment under precautionary
520 Dresser (1995: 35).
521 Dresser (1995: 35).
522 Hughes (2001: 80).
523 Hughes (2001: 86). Hughes emphasizes that that his use of 'experience’ is not empirical; 
rather it presupposes metaphysical conceptualisation in a Kantian sense (ibid: 87).
524 Hughes (2001: 87-89). Similarly, McMillan (2006) argues from a starting point of situated 
agency but differs from Hughes in that he suggests that the effects of Alzheimer's disease 
prevents the person so afflicted from engaging in the ‘webs of interlocution’ in which personal 
identity is formed (2006: 70). Even if the person is numerically the same, we might have reason 
to believe that she has experienced profound qualitative change. This understanding may have 
the effect of eroding the obligations that family and friends previously felt towards that person 
(2006: 69-70).
“ 5 Hughes (2001:89).
526 Hughes (2001: 90). Such assistance may compensate for the growing powerlessness 
encountered in dementia. As Kitwood (1997) puts it, there is “a vast difference between a 
tragedy in which persons are actively involved and morally committed, and a blind and hooeless 
submission to fate" (1997: 69).
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reasoning that a sufferer of Alzheimer’s disease is an agent until the GCAbrpvp 
ceases to be evident. Given the inevitability of such deterioration, there will 
come a point in the pathogenesis of every sufferer where she ostensibly ceases 
to be an agent and ostensibly becomes an intermittent agent, and then 
ostensibly ceases to be an intermittent agent and apparently becomes a partial 
agent527. However, we should not forget that this is an evidential property of 
sufferers; precautionary reasoning would reject a knowable Dworkinian division 
of agency and post-agency.
As with mental retardation, it is helpful if we divide the severity of the condition 
into different levels. Under precaution, we should treat individuals who are 
mildly afflicted with the disease or who are in the early stages of its 
development as retaining agency competence but with decreasing societal 
competence. At this stage, it would be wise to keep existing task and decisional 
competences under review should one or more of them suddenly fail528. There 
should still be a presumption that sufferers in the middle stages of the condition 
be treated as agents, albeit with considerably impaired task and decisional 
competences, due to the damage to the retention and recall of information.
It is important at this stage for health care professionals and carers to engage in 
activities that would assist in developing what remains of the sufferer’s capacity 
for independent decision-making529, but it may be necessary to treat the sufferer 
(for her sake) as a societally incompetent agent. By contrast, individuals in the 
most advanced stage of dementia will appear to have lost the occurrent ability 
to exercise rpvp, at least most of the time. We can position such advanced 
dementia sufferers on a continuum somewhere between ostensible intermittent 
agency and apparent partial agency, although most would cluster towards 
apparent partial agency. In these cases, attempts to enhance the sufferer’s 
autonomy would be likely to fail or seem clearly futile. Our duties of protection to 
them therefore should be paramount.
527 Tli S i in£!  S^ 96 ° f severity may not be reached in a" cases of dementia, as there is a 
possibility that death may occur first.
For example, such as where an individual who has been able to make indeDendent derisinnQ 
abou. her financial affairs suddanty starts to claim that she can no longef e m e X r  ^ e “  
has invested her money, or starts buying a week’s worth of groceries several times each week 
because she forgets that she has already bought the groceries for that week ^
Kitwood (1997) provides a number of examples of these.
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Summary
Under precaution, there is no doubt that we must treat the vast majority of 
individuals in all five of these cognitively vulnerable groups as agents. From the 
available psychiatric evidence, the presence of cognitive vulnerability very rarely 
erodes agency competence. Only in the severest cases where those cognitive 
functions which sustain rpvp have atrophied (such as in the final stages of 
dementia) or have never developed (such as in the case of profoundly mentally 
retarded adults) can we begin to assume that agency competence may be 
lacking. Even then, we cannot assume that they are not agents altogether - we 
still owe them duties of protection under the PGC (based on their possibly being 
agents who cannot display rpvp).
A precautionary application of the PGC also must be the arbiter of any decision 
about when we should treat cognitively vulnerable individuals as agents of full 
or restricted societal competence and how we should treat cognitively 
vulnerable individuals whose means of display is limited. Under precaution, we 
should reach a decision about an agent’s societal competence or incompetence 
based upon the consequences (as measured by the PGC) for the agent 
concerned and other agents of presuming one way or the other. We must 
continue to assume the presence of agency competence, even if the means of 
display is limited, such as in the case of motor neurone sufferers whose 
communicative abilities are significantly restricted in the absence of artificial 
means of display. In these cases, sufferers have a positive right to 
communicative assistance under the PGC.
The same precautionary approach can also resolve conflict between the 
institutional recognition of young people’s societal competence on a case-by­
case basis and the allocation of scarce resources to some other public good. In 
societies where administrative burdens are high and resources are scare, the 
directing of funds to support health and welfare initiatives is more important than 
directing them towards a case-by-case recognition of societal competence. 
This, however, should not undermine the arguments for a reconsideration of the 
threshold age at which institutional recognition of societal competence is set.
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The presumption in favour of agency competence does not extend in the same 
way to judgments of task or decisional competences. A denial of an ostensible 
agent's task or decisional competence is a serious matter, as it denies an 
agent’s additive right to well-being, but it is not as serious as denying agency 
altogether, as this denies the entity in question the protection of the generic 
rights. A judgment of a continuing task or decisional competence or about the 
probability of its development will depend upon the level of GCAb that the agent 
exhibits above that required for rpvp.
We have seen that in a number of cases, especially in depression and 
schizophrenia, the effect of an. individual’s cognitive vulnerability on her 
intellectual and conative function reduces her ability to exercise or develop task 
and decisional competences. Making a defensible judgment about the impact of 
the cognitive vulnerability on a particular task or decisional competence requires 
empirical evidence about the relationship between the cognitive vulnerability 
and performance of the task or decision concerned. If the empirical evidence 
should establish likelihood about such competence being manifest among 
members of that cognitively vulnerable group, then we have an ethically 
defensible ground either for making a rebuttable presumption in favour of the 
presence of the competence or for channelling resources into nurturing its 
development. Conversely, if the evidence is doubtful, and we cannot undertake 
a case-by-case assessment of competence for the administrative reasons 
outlined above, then there should be a rebuttable presumption against the 
presence of the competence and fewer resources directed towards its 
development. We can state this principle as follows:
Where X is ostensibly an agent and the available evidence suggests that X can 
exercise a particular task or decisional competence, X should be presumed able 
to do this. Where the evidence suggests that X can develop this competence 
with appropriate support, X should be presumed able to do this, and as far as 
possible, be given appropriate support. Institutional structures within a PGC- 
compliant polity (including the law) should permit the exercising or development 
of this competence unless the consequences of permitting X to exercise or
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develop this competence are worse (as measured under the PGC) than not 
permitting X to exercise or develop this competence.
This represents the normative foundation of a theory which I will call 
precautionary task or decisional competence judgment (PTDCJ). It is 
precautionary because it relies upon a precautionary application of the PGC. It 
refers to task or decisional competences in general terms, as we could apply 
the theory to a varied range of specific activities and decisions, such as learning 
to drive, voting in a general election, consenting to or refusing medical 
treatment or training to become a social worker. It also can be applied both to 
the formulation of a threshold test of competence (such as age) or to the 
formulation of a case-by-case determination (such as a test). That 
precautionary reasoning mediates between the application of ethical judgment 
and the assessment of the available evidence allows for a genuine ‘reflective 
equilibrium’ between the permissibility of the presumption and the possibility of 
the competence.
In the next chapter, we will apply PTDCJ using empirical studies in psychiatry to 
consider which, if any, members of these five cognitively vulnerable groups we 
should judge decisionally competent to consent to biomedical research and the 
grounds on which we can make a presumption in favour or against such 
competence.
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Chapter Six
Cognitive vulnerability and 
consent to biomedical research
Whether we can make a judgment about whether an agent possesses the 
competence to make a decision, or even has developable ability to make that 
decision, requires empirical investigation as well as moral argumont533 This 
requires us to investigate relevant empirical studies into competence to consent 
to biomedical research. In this chapter, we will apply PTDCJ using the findings 
of psychiatric and psychological studies to consider which, if any, members of 
these five cognitively vulnerable groups we should judge competent to consent 
to biomedical research and the grounds on which we can make such a 
judgment.
It is helpful to begin by clarifying the meaning of 'judgments' of competence, as 
raised in the last chapter. We can do this by drawing a distinction between 
assessing and judging decisional competence. Assessing decisional 
competence is the process of evidence gathering about the decisional 
competence of a particular individual. A competence assessment tool, such as 
the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Clinical Research (MacCAT- 
CR) or the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE), will typically structure the 
form and substance of the information obtained. Judging decisional 
competence, alternatively, relates to what we do with this evidence. By this, we 
mean what normative significance we attach to it and how we use it to inform 
policy. Judging decisional competence requires a moral evaluation of the 
evidence generated by the competence assessment to form the basis for an 
ethical or legal norm530 31.
530 A view also shared by Roberts (2000: 542)
531 Kim et at. (2001: 713) suggest a different perspective on this distinction For them assessino 
decsional competence to consent can itself be thought of comprising an element onudqmen
in which one measures relevant decisional abilities displayed by thedecisionT S E L  
appropriate standard) followed by a clinical judgment based on whether the decSon-maker has
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Judgments of competence are rarely uncomplicated, however. The morally 
laden dimension subverts any claim to a value-free outcome. As Roth et al 
observe, “[Judgments of competency go beyond semantics or straightforward 
applications of legal rules; such judgments reflect social considerations and 
social biases as much as they reflect matters of law and medicine” 532. Whilst 
we cannot deny the social context in which judgments of competence take 
place, equally well, Roth’s claim serves as a salutary reminder of the need to 
eliminate as far as possible unreflective or irrational value judgments about the 
circumstances in which one should deem an agent competent in respect of a 
particular decision or activity. As we have seen, the PGC offers a non-arbitrary 
starting point for making such judgments.
In this thesis, we are less concerned with how a researcher or physician might 
go about assessing competence or the content of a competence assessment 
test than with the ethical and empirical considerations that should inform a 
judgment that decisional competence is present or absent. This is not to 
separate the two matters entirely, nor to suggest that competence assessments 
are value-free, but to place our focus on the morally laden judgment dimension 
of competence determinations rather than the clinically laden assessment 
dimension 533. Through an empirical investigation into the possibility of 
cognitively vulnerable individuals developing or exhibiting decisional 
competence to consent to research, we will be able to reach a more informed 
position under PTDCJ. Given the ultimate lack of certainty surrounding whether 
an entity we take to be an agent does actually possess a competence, this is 
the best we can aspire to. Before we turn to that, however, let us consider the
demonstrated these abilities satisfactorily within the context of the decision to be made. The 
form of judgment described relates to an analytical type of professional judgment rather than a 
normative one premised on a moral theory. In subsuming the question of judgment within the 
matter of assessment, Kim et al fail to give sufficient emphasis to this second type of normative 
judgment. This type of judgment is unavoidable for researchers and health care professionals 
when they are required to give reasons to explain a judgment of decisional competence or 
incompetence that go beyond recourse to a competence test score or some other quantitative 
indicator (e.g. when justifying a judgment of decisional incompetence to a patient’s family 
members, etc.).
532 Roth etal. (1977: 280).
533 Kopelman (1990: 309) claims that it is impossible for assessments of decisional competence 
to be value free. I also take this view. However, throughout her article, Kopelman appears to 
use ‘assessment’ and ‘judgment’ inter-changeably, which elides the important distinction 
between them.
central normative issue surrounding competence assessment that has a 
bearing on competence judgments.
Decisional competence and supported decision-making
Twenty-five years ago, the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural Research, undertaken 
on behalf of the US government, claimed that an association between a person 
and a particular group of vulnerable persons should not alone determine the 
judgments we make about that person’s decisional competence:
“The fact that a patient belongs to a category of people who are often 
unable to make general decisions for their own well-being . . . should alert 
health care professionals to the greater possibility of decisional incapacity.
But it does not conclusively resolve the matter”.534
If we interpret the phrase “people who are often unable to make general 
decisions for their own well-being” to include at least some individuals with 
cognitive vulnerability, then it is likely that the Commission would maintain that 
cognitive vulnerability is a necessary but insufficient for ground for making a 
judgment of decisional incompetence. In other words, the presence of a 
cognitive impairment in a potential participant may well incline a competence 
assessor to seek to investigate decisional competence, without it constituting a 
sufficient ground to reach a judgment that decisional competence is absent. 
Successive commentators have echoed this point in recent years to the extent 
that it now seems rather trite535.
However, if we are to be guided by PTDCJ, the process of competence 
assessment must not only respect but also enhance the participant’s autonomy 
qua agent. As we saw in the last chapter, the PGC requires that we give other 
agents assistance in obtaining the generic goods when they cannot obtain them 
through their own unaided action. It is therefore vital that the competence 
assessment process amounts to more than a mere detached observation of a
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534 President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
Behavioural Research (1982.171-172).
535 See, in particular, Lo (1990) and Sullivan and Younger (1994). For an argument along the 
same lines which prefigures the President’s Commission, see Baumgarten (1980).
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potential participant’s decision-making abilities. It should represent an 
opportunity to empower the potential participant through presenting as much 
information as possible in a manner which she finds most accessible. The aim 
should be to elicit any latent decision-making skills of the individual through 
dialogue and encouragement. We cannot claim to have made a judgment of 
incompetence in good faith until this process has been undertaken. This is 
particularly salient when considering the decisional competence of cognitively 
vulnerable individuals, for whom the presence of support in the assessment 
process may make the difference between a judgment of decisional 
competence or incompetence. On this point, I agree with Freedman, who notes:
“[The] burden o f informing the person is . . .  a heavy one. If 
understanding cannot be achieved by the ordinary process, then 
further methods must be sought. The method of informing chosen 
must be one designed to enlighten the individual in question. Only 
when it is clear that no manner of informing the patient will serve 
does the issue of competence become moot.”536
With that in mind, it is helpful to consider what type of interventions might 
improve decisional competence prior to making judgments about the presence 
or absence of competence in a particular case. These need not be narrow in 
scope. Interviews, feedback, highlighting prior misunderstanding, and the use of 
repetition as a means of compensating for impaired attention represent 
common approaches to improving an individual’s decisional competence to 
consent or refuse to biomedical research537. I will refer to such methods 
generically as ‘supported decision-making’538.
One recent study has already shown these interventions and others to have had 
some success. Flory and Emmanuel surveyed a selection of research projects 
conducted between 1966 and 1994, which compared enrolment through a 
standard informed consent process and enrolment using efforts to improve 
patient understanding539. These included multimedia, enhanced consent forms, 
counselling and ‘neutral educators’ across a range of subject populations,
536 Freedman (1981: 65).
537 Dunn and Jeste (2001; 598).
381 present an argument for supported decision-making with mentally disordered re^eerrh 
participants in Bielby (2007, forthcoming) '"«many Disordered research
39 F'ory and Emmanuel (2004) Another survey of supported decision-making initiatives 
published recently is Eyler and Jeste (2006). a " lltiailves
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including people with mental disorders and psychiatric patients. Of the efforts 
undertaken in order to improve patient understanding, the authors found that 
time spent talking on a one-to-one basis (whether through neutral educators or 
from a member of the research team) was proven to be the most effective way 
of raising potential participants’ understanding about the nature of the research 
in which they had been invited to participate. They concluded that “direct human 
contact tends to be more successful in improving understanding . . . [this] has 
more potential for active engagement and responsiveness to the individual 
needs of the research participant.’’540
Supported decision-making dovetails with a growing view on decisional 
competence assessment which emphasizes that what is important is not how 
competence is assessed but how decisional competence can be developed 
through “interaction and dialogue”541. The more that we treat competence as a 
dynamic (developable) rather than a fixed (given) quality of an agent (where the 
evidence suggests that the competence can develop with appropriate support), 
the more scrupulous a competence assessment must be and the more ethical is 
our resulting judgment of competence or incompetence. This is because a 
rigorous assessment process will yield more evidence on which to base a 
judgment of competence or incompetence, reducing the margin of error and the 
potential for ‘social bias’. In supported decision-making, therefore, we can 
identify the normative intersection between assessing and judging decisional 
competence, which establishes a basic precondition for drawing any morally 
defensible competence judgments.
Older children and adolescents
Since the mid-1980s, a number of studies have discussed the competence of 
children to consent to medical procedures, many of them in relation to 
competence to consent to treatment rather than research542. The majority of 
empirical studies that have considered the decisional competence of young
540 Flory and Emmanuel (2004:1599).
541 Benaroyo and Widdershoven (2004: 298).
542 Alderson (1993, especially chapter 9), Alderson and Montgomery (1996) and Fundudis 
(2003) focus on treatment whereas Keith-Spiegel (1983) and Nicholson (1986, chapter 7) 
discuss research. Miller et al. (2004) provide a helpful overview of empirical studies on 
children’s competence to consent.
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people to consent to research have focused upon understanding, voluntariness 
and ratiocination as opposed to other elements of competence, such as 
appreciation or communication543.
Around the age of 9 -11 years, children’s understanding of disease, health and 
medicine appears to become more complex544. A seminal piece of empirical 
research from the early 1980s conducted by Lois Weithorn and Susan 
Campbell suggested that by the age of fourteen, adolescents have “generally 
equivalent” decisional competence to make informed consent treatment 
decisions as adults of twenty-one years545. At this age, the young people 
involved in the study were capable of understanding the nature and purpose of 
different treatment options, and most importantly, accepting the consequences 
for themselves of giving permission for health professionals to go ahead with a 
proposed form of treatment. More recently, Toner and Schwartz have applied 
this insight to the context of research546, arguing for a variant of the ‘rule of 
sevens’ where there would be a rebuttable presumption in favour of decisional 
competence to consent to biomedical research above the age of fourteen547. 
This resembles an earlier argument by Nicholson, although it differs in the 
respect that Nicholson would allow parental refusal to override an adolescent’s 
consent to non-therapeutic research above the age of fourteen548.
It is important that in generating hypotheses about the decisional competence of 
adolescents, we do not lose sight of the social context in which decision-making 
takes place549. Socio-economic, educational and ethnic backgrounds have a 
significant role in the way a young person’s decisional competence is developed 
and expressed550. So too is how parents, teachers and other authority figures 
shape the decisional making context by circumscribing the child’s power to
543 Miller ef al (2004: 260).
644 Ondrusek (1998:163), discussing Bauer (1990),
845 Weithorn and Campbell (1982:1595).
546 Toner and Schwartz (2003).
547 Toner and Schwartz (2003:39). The rule of sevens is a concept derived from old English
common law, where children were held to have no capacity until the aqe of seven to be 
presumed to lack capacity between the ages of seven and fourteen and to possess capacity 
over the age of fourteen (ibid.). H
548 Nicholson (1986:151).
549 Alderson (1992: 119).
550 Alderson (1992:122); Weithorn and Schreber (1994:168)
decide551. Moreover, adolescents could also be though of as ‘doubly vulnerable’ 
research participants, insofar as they often lack legal capacity to consent to 
research on their own behalf and are at greater risk of being manipulated into 
participation, due to their greater reliance on adults in the way information is 
presented to them552. Kipnis, alternatively, is sceptical of the claim that some 
types of vulnerability only apply to the child research participant and argues that 
they are evident in all research populations, albeit to different degrees553.
When research is conducted in a hospital environment, it may be more difficult 
for the young people concerned to understand that the hospitalization is 
connected with the research, rather than for some therapeutic purpose. In a 
study conducted by Schwartz into the child’s understanding of involvement in a 
growth hormone study, less than a third of the cohort of 11-18 year olds (6 out 
of 19) appeared to understand that their hospitalization was due to their 
participation in the research554. Yet in another study, a considerable proportion 
of twelfth-grade college students (62%) appeared to understand the concept of 
‘vested interests’ in research555. On the face of it, these findings represent 
inconsistent evidence about the decisional competence of young people. One 
explanation, which offsets this inconsistency, might be that the notion of self- 
interest is easier to grasp when it is practised in an environment not associated 
with beneficence.
Suspicions that age might have a bearing on decisional competence, along with 
the gender and background of the participants and their previous experience of 
research, are not universally borne out by the findings. In another study 
published by Tait et al, the authors could find no connection between 
understanding and gender, ethnic background, type of research or previous 
participation in research. Most surprisingly perhaps was that understanding did 
not differ with time taken to disclose information or to make a decision, although 
it still could have differed in relation to the presentational format used, which the 
authors did not investigate. Less surprisingly, there was a positive correlation
Cognitive vulnerability and consent to biomedical research 167
651 Ashcroft et al (2003:17).
552 See the discussion in Kopelman (2004), from which fho form , , ,  ,,
553 Kipnis (2003:119). nicn term doub,y vu|nerable’ is taken.
554 Schwartz (1972) discussed in Miller et al (2004: 267)
555 Lewis (1981) reported in Miller eta! (2004; 273).
between understanding and older age556. There is also some evidence from 
another study to suggest that adolescent females display a higher level of 
decision-making competence than males of the same age range 557 . 
Developmental differences in the adolescent brain associated with gender may 
explain this558.
Ondrusek et al. conducted a significant empirical study in the late 1990s with 
eighteen children and young adults aged 5 - 1 8  years of age. The purpose was 
to ascertain the quality of consent amongst children who had already agreed to 
take part in a study relating to nutrition. All participants above the age of nine 
(with one exception) identified one strand of the purpose of the study; only four 
of the eighteen participants identified both purposes of the study (calorie 
measurement and improved medical knowledge)559. It is interesting, however, 
that the study seemed not to utilise attempts at supported decision-making -  the 
children were either read the form describing the study (if they were under 
thirteen) or given it to read for themselves (if they were above thirteen). The 
participants were only provided with further information if they or their parents 
asked questions.
Amongst the entire age group, there was a feeling that those involved with the 
research (perceived as authority figures) would be personally unhappy or 
disappointed if the participant exercised their right to withdraw. The authors 
believed this would manifest itself as a reluctance to withdraw should the child 
or young person reconsider their wish to be involved in the research560. This 
misperception clearly compromises the appreciation strand of competence, 
although one might well speculate that it is not necessarily confined to children - 
some healthy adult volunteers may harbour similar concerns. Perhaps most 
concerning is the statistic that only three out of the eighteen volunteers gave 
altruistic reasons as their motive for participating in research561. Of the four
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participants who were over 17 years of age, only one gave such an altruistic
__ __ _ _562reason
The research of Ondrusek et al sounds a note of caution, particularly in respect 
of the consent of younger children562 63. However, in the case of older children it is 
less conclusive, particularly given that the authors did not investigate the impact 
that supportive measures might have on improving understanding. Given the 
type of comprehension problems displayed, supportive measures would seem 
best employed in assisting the young person to understand the methodological 
vocabulary of the research. Foster has rightly argued that for a researcher to 
consider a young person decisionally competent to consent to research, the 
young person would need to be able to understand methodological concepts 
involved in biomedical research such as randomisation and blind allocation of 
treatment564. It is also equally desirable for the young person to have a grasp of 
the normative concepts of altruism or supererogation, even if she could not 
articulate them in those terms565. An attempt at supported decision-making 
should seek to promote this understanding, and we should be inclined to treat 
an inability to grasp salient concepts involved in or raised by the research as 
evidence against competence.
That many adolescents have developing or under-developed emotional 
competences is another factor that is likely to impinge upon decisional 
competence to consent to research. Tan and Fegert argue that, in relation to 
treatment, there may be a discrepancy between the presence of intellectual
562 Ondrusek e ia /(1998:164).
563 Ondrusek et al. (1998). This was the group to whom they reserved their primary conclusion, 
which was to raise the age at which assent is sought from children in clinical research from 
seven to nine years of age.
564 Foster (2001:58)
565 This touches on the separate question of whether the young person has an obligation to
participate in biomedical research. Although we need not venture too far into discussions of 
obligation here, it is sufficient to say that the political and economic context in which research 
place takes influences the force of any such obligation. The practice of biomedical research in a 
global deregulated market economy gives rise to concerns about exploitation that would not 
exist in an ideal-type Gewirthian community of rights. I have some sympathy with the view taken 
by Harris and Holm (2003) and Harris (2005) that there is a moral obligation for adults and 
children to participate in biomedical research in particular contexts, and believe that this is 
broadly compatible with the PGC. However, the exploitative potential of global capitalism 
considerably undermines this obligation, especially where the benefits of medical research are 
liable to be used for private profit rather than shared for community benefit. For a discussion of 
the problematic ramifications of corporate culture for biomedical research, see Annas (1999) 
and Krimsky (2003). ’ '
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requirements for understanding and their emotional correlates, which may not 
develop until some time later566. In addition, the experience of mental disorder 
or family problems might significantly delay the emergence of these emotional 
abilities567. Tan and Fegert appear to premise this upon a separation of pure 
ratiocination and emotional insight in decision-making. However, if we attach 
greater meaning to the emotions than their existence as mere physiological 
reactions would allow, it is questionable whether we can separate the 
intellectual and emotional elements of understanding in this way. It would seem 
bizarre (and possibly incoherent) to reach a judgment that decisional 
competence is present in the absence of an observable emotional repertoire568. 
Indeed, if we accept the premise that emotions are an expression of cognition 
rather than their antithesis, then any test of decisional competence must also 
account for the ‘emotional competence’ of the decision maker569.
Overall, there is a dearth of empirical studies examining the decisional 
competence of young people to consent to research, which undermines our 
ability to draw definitive conclusions. From the evidence that is available, 
following mid-adolescence, there is a difference between instances of 
decisional competence in relation to treatment and instances of decisional 
competence in relation to research participation. However, it is entirely plausible 
to suggest that some adolescents - even if only a minority - have the decisional 
competence required to offer first-person informed consent to biomedical 
research. This is no different from recognising that some adolescents are 
competent to go scuba diving or to sit an advanced level mathematics exam 
several years early. That many adolescents are given very important 
responsibilities through acting as babysitters or acting as carers for family 
members casts doubt on the claim that they should, prima facie, be considered 
decisionally incompetent to consent to research570.
Judging a young person’s decisional competence to consent to biomedical 
research turns upon whether there is sufficient evidence to show that the young 
person is capable of understanding and appreciating the consequences for
566 Tan and Fegert (2004: 291). See also McCabe (1996) for a discussion of these issues
567 Tan and Fegert (2004: 291).
568 See, for discussion, Charland (1998a).
569 Charland (1998b) persuasively argues for this claim.
570 Koren eta!(1993:147).
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herself of participation. This requires us to consider the young person’s 
emotional integrity as much as conventional ‘intellectual’ aspects of decision­
making. Nevertheless, an awareness of emotional integrity will not necessarily 
help us identify it. To create a suitably detailed account of the young person’s 
decisional abilities, we must engage appropriate forms of supported decision­
making. Only once we have exhausted the means of support available for the 
young person to develop decisional competence to no avail can PTDCJ lead us 
to the conclusion that a young person is, on the evidence, unable to consent or 
refuse research participation on her own behalf.
Adults with mental retardation
Regrettably, there are no studies which examine the competence of adults with 
mental retardation to consent to biomedical research, and very few on consent 
to treatment571. This is clearly problematic from the perspective of seeking an 
empirically informed view on the decisional competence of this group to consent 
to research. However, the treatment-based studies offer some insight as to how 
we may seek to improve decisional competence in a research setting, 
especially where supportive measures are used. This is not to say we can pre­
empt the outcome, but we have greater understanding of the function of the 
process.
Arscott ef a/ adapted a vignette-based competence assessment instrument 
devised in an earlier study by Morris et al and used it to ascertain the decisional 
competence of forty participants with a learning disability572. Three vignettes 
were used, describing a restraint scenario, psychiatric intervention and medical 
intervention. Whilst only 12.5% of the participants were found to be competent 
to consent to each of the three vignettes, 65% of the participants were found to 
have sufficient decisional competence on at least one vignette573. Of these, 
participants were found to be competent to consent to the vignette involving 
surgery more commonly than the psychiatric or restraint vignettes. This 
contrasts with the findings in Morris et al, who found that 40% of a cohort of
571 To date, these studies include Morris et al (1993), Arscott et al (1999) and Wonq et al 
(2000).
i72 Arscott et al (1999); Morris et al (1993).
573 Arscott et al (1999:1371).
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fifteen participants with mild learning disabilities had decisional competence to 
consent to treatment. In a group with severe learning disabilities, this was as 
low as one participant out of fifteen574.
Arscott et al accept that an improved performance on the vignette relating to 
psychiatric medical treatment may have been expected, given that all the 
participants in the study were taking medication at the time of involvement; 
however, such an improved performance did not materialize575. In their view, 
this supports the claim that individuals with learning disabilities in general lack 
sufficient understanding about their medication576. In spite of the encouraging 
finding about competence on one or more of the vignettes, a failure to 
understand in the medical context suggests that understanding in the context of 
biomedical research may be even more limited. On this basis, we should be 
cautious about reaching a judgment of decisional competence.
Wong et al sought to improve decisional competence with twenty adults who 
had a learning disability577. Those who were found to lack competence were not 
approached, unless they demonstrated a willingness to participate578. The 
participants were asked to give their consent to a blood test, which they had 
been advised to take by their GP. The authors provided an uncomplicated 
printed explanation of the study for potential participants to read, followed by a 
verbal summary 579. Two means of explanation were used - continuous 
explanation and systematic explanation of each stage. The authors also limited 
the response required from the potential participants to basic recognition and 
gestural acknowledgment580.
The authors assessed decisional competence using a semi-structured interview 
which drew on the content of the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for 
Treatment (MacCAT-T). They found that when the information is presented in a
574 Morris et al (1993), discussed in Arscott et al (1999-1 3681
575 Arscott eta l{1999:1372). h
576 Arscott et al (1999:1373).
etal. (1999) y'eseniea as part of the discussion in Gunn
578 Wong et al. (2000: 297).
579 Wong etal. (2000: 297).
580 Wong et al. (2000: 304).
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more simplified way, decisional abilities increase581. Encouragingly, 65% of the 
participants with learning disabilities were found to have decisional 
competence582. This contrasted with 100% of the healthy control group583. 
However, the learning disability group encountered particular problems in 
distinguishing between the risk involved in the procedure and the risks of 
refusing the treatment584. Whilst risk to the participant of refusal would not arise 
in the case of research without a therapeutic element, this failure of appreciation 
does not augur well for the development of decisional abilities within a research 
context.
Taken together, both studies suggest that the scope for developing decisional 
competence in individuals with mental retardation is limited, but not impossible. 
What transpires most clearly is the benefit of effective transmission of 
information. This need not be verbal communication, but constitute the most 
appropriate form for the particular participant. Thus, we can understand 
attempts to develop decisional competence in individuals with mental 
retardation as a paradigm case of ‘participant centred’ consent seeking. This 
ethos is a prerequisite to PTDCJ, but we need to be clearer about how it could 
be sustained in the research context. As illuminating as these above studies 
are, there remains a great need for empirical research into the decisional 
competence of individuals with mental retardation to consent to biomedical 
research.
Adults with depression
The relationship between depression and competence to consent in healthcare 
contexts has been more widely researched than mental retardation. As 
Reynolds has acknowledged, psychiatric research could find itself in need of 
justification without empirical research into the decisional competence of 
potential participants with a mental disorder585. Yet depression has not received 
the level of attention that schizophrenia and dementia has, arguably because it
581 Wong et al. (2000: 304).
582 Wong et al. (2000:302).
583 Wong et al. (2000: 302).
584 Wong et al. (2000: 303).
585 Reynolds (2002: 712).
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is not regarded as a condition which would engage doubts about decisional 
competence, at least not in milder forms586. Carl Elliott explains the reasons for 
this:
“Most accounts of competence focus on intellectual capacities and 
abilities to reason, and depression is primarily a disorder of mood. 
According to conventional thinking, depression is primarily about 
despair, guilt and a loss of motivation, while competence is about 
the ability to reason, to deliberate, to compare and to evaluate.
Often these latter abilities are ones that depression leaves intact."587
One of the challenges for empirical research into the decisional competence of 
individuals with depression is to shed light upon whether and to what extent the 
sufferer’s disordered mood impacts upon these intellectual abilities of 
competence. This bears upon whether we can say that a person with 
depression is "in equipoise” with respect to the decision whether or not to 
participate 588 589. The conclusions open to us may be somewhat tentative, 
however, as studies into the ability of depressed patients to consent to 
treatment outnumber those that pertain to their involvement in research, and a 
number of research-orientated studies focus on competence to consent to ECT, 
psychiatric and psychotherapeutic research rather than biomedical research per
Following a study published by Grisso and Appelbaum in the mid-1990s in 
which 76% of patients with major depression were found to perform adequately 
across all aspects of decision-making in relation to treatment590, Appelbaum et 
al sought to investigate the decisional abilities of depressed individuals in 
relation to research591. They used the MacCAT-CR to investigate the decisional 
competence of twenty-six women suffering from major depression to consent to 
a psychotherapeutic research study592. The authors principal aim was to 
investigate the relationship between the severity of the symptoms and 
decisional abilities over time593. They found that the women who were not
586 Elliott (1997:113).
587 Elliott (1997: 113).
588 Charland (1998b: 373 n. 4).
589 Such asthe studies reported in Roth ef a/(1982) and Appelbaum et ai 119991
590 Grisso and Appelbaum (1995: 171). era/'
591 Appelbaum étal. (1999).
592 Appelbaum et ai. (1999:1381).
593 Appelbaum étal. (1999:1381).
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receiving treatment in hospital and whose depression was judged to be at least 
moderate “performed quite well” when their decisional competence to consent 
to research was assessed594. Although a significant number of participants 
encountered difficulties on the appreciation measure595, only a handful of 
participants displayed deficiencies in their understanding, reasoning or 
appreciation that would, in the view of the authors, bring their decisional 
competence into doubt596.
This is a surprising discovery, and one that the authors recognise is counter­
intuitive597. That the depression was found not to affect decisional competence 
in the way it was expected requires corroboration by other studies in order for 
the findings to be understood as representative598. This is particularly important 
given the small research population from which the data was drawn 599. 
However, we can reasonably conclude from this study that whilst the 
experience of depression does tend to adversely affect the decisional 
competence of the individual concerned, it is not an absolute quality and instead 
varies in degree from a mild effect compatible with continuance of many 
decisional competences to a more severe effect which erodes these 
considerably.
Carl Elliott has taken a more sceptical view. He argues that there is a significant 
risk that the experience of severe depression will erode decisional competence 
to consent to research altogether600. Elliott does not found his argument on 
empirical research of his own, but draws upon insights gained from previous 
studies of competence to consent to treatment. Considering the interaction 
between the effect of the mood disorder upon the appreciation of risk, Elliott 
claims:
“[l]f a person is depressed, he or she may be aware that a protocol 
carries risks, but simply not care about those risks. This sort of 
intellectual impairment can be as important a part of patient competence
594 Appelbaum étal. (1999:1383).
595 Appelbaum et al. (1999:1383).
596 Appelbaum étal. (1999:1383).
597 Appelbaum étal. (1999:1383).
598 Appelbaum étal. (1999:1383).
599 Appelbaum et ai (1999: 1383).
600 Elliott (1997:113).
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as the more detached, intellectual understanding that most accounts of 
competence emphasize.”501
In support of this, Elliott refers to a study undertaken by Roth et al in which a 
depressed woman who was otherwise deemed to be competent to understand 
the electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) she was offered, commented on the 1 in 
3000 chance of death associated with procedure by saying "I hope I am the 
one."601 02 For Elliott, a failure to care about the risk involved, or to perceive the 
risk as a benefit, is tantamount to a failure of appreciation603. This is particularly 
relevant in research, since regard for one’s own well-being is a basic 
precondition of a competent assessment of research risks604. A choice arrived 
at in the absence of such self-regard lacks authenticity, as we cannot hold the 
decision-maker to account for it605. Elliott’s argument would have to apply not 
just to the particular choice expressed but also to any other choice that the 
decision allows, as the lack of accountability flows from the affective dysfunction 
rather than the level of risk presented by the choice.
The approach under PTDCJ differs slightly. We would require more detail about 
the nature of this woman’s wishes before reaching a judgment of decisional 
competence in this treatment scenario. If her wish for her life to end is 
reasoned, long-standing and not the main reason she was not consenting to the 
ECT, then we cannot rule out a judgement of decisional competence. However, 
if the wish is the main reason she is consenting, irrespective of its authenticity, 
then we might be inclined to understand it as an impediment to her appreciation 
of the ECT. Her wish is likely to be inauthentic if it fluctuates with the symptoms 
of her depression, abates with medication or is linked with the depression in 
some other way. In both cases, we should be inclined towards a judgment of 
decisional incompetence. By the same token, supposing the woman consented 
to take part in medical research because she wishes to increase her chance of 
death or serious injury, this would also constitute a manifest failure of 
appreciation. The expression of this wish in the context of research should 
incline one toward a judgment of decisional incompetence.
601 Elliott (1997:113).
602 Elliott (1997:114), discussing Roth efa/(1977: 282).
603 Elliott (1997:114). Elliott draws on Bursztajn ef al (1991) in support of this
604 Elliott (1997: 115).
605 Elliott (1997:115).
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Neither Appelbaum et al. nor Elliott specifically consider the role of supported 
decision-making in enhancing competence. A study that considered the impact 
of educative provisions on the decisional competence of depressed persons in 
relation to treatment therefore warrants discussion here. Lapid et al. examined 
the decisional competence of elderly depressed persons to consent to ECT606. 
Participants were allocated into groups based on age (above 65 years and 
below 65 years). No participant had been judged incompetent to give consent 
on a previous occasion607. The authors assessed the participants’ decisional 
competence twice; once at the start of the research and again after educative 
intervention had been provided. All participants were shown a videotape 
explaining the procedure, and following randomization, some participants 
received a thirty-minute session with a psychiatrist to discuss frequently raised 
concerns about the procedure608.
The authors found that the intervention of the psychiatrist increased 
understanding, reasoning and choice (understood as measure on the MacCAT- 
T)609. As a group, the depressed elderly persons were found to have sufficient 
decisional competence to consent for themselves, and had a higher level of 
decisional competence than the younger group, although the authors could not 
be certain whether this was connected with the level of severe depression being 
lower in the elderly group than in the younger group610. The authors 
emphasised that these findings illustrate the value of employing appropriate 
educative interventions in the process of seeking informed consent in other 
contexts611.
Ultimately, these findings support the assertion that depressed persons may 
have the ability for decisional competence to consent to research, but that this 
depends upon the nature and severity of the affective dysfunction and the effect 
on understanding and appreciation. As with mentally retarded adults, there is a 
greater need for empirical studies here, especially to ascertain how widespread
606 Lapid et al (2004).
607 Lapid et al (2004: 43).
608 Lapid et al (2004: 43).
609 Lapid étal (2004:46).
610 Lapid étal (2004:46).
611 Lapid et al (2004: 46).
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are the type of findings reported by Appelbaum et al, and to what extent they 
would arise in the context of biomedical rather than psychotherapeutic research.
One suggestion for further research into the decisional competence of 
depressed persons is to focus on preferences evinced by the depressed person 
before the onset of their condition (if known) and to contrast them with those 
they display since developing the condition612. This would offer insight into the 
authenticity of preferences, and inform a judgment of whether decisional 
competence is present or not. Such an approach appears promising. However, 
it still leaves open the question of whether we can distinguish between a case 
where the person has changed her preferences since the onset of depression 
for reasons that are competently held and a case where her preferences appear 
to have changed due to volitional impairments following from affective 
dysfunction.
When applying PTDCJ to distinguish between such cases, we should consider 
the extent to which the potential participant appears to value their well-being as 
an instrumental good, even if not as an end in itself613. Such a basic concern for 
well-being is a precondition for holding preferences about research, which 
meshes with Elliott’s argument. Judging the decisional competence of a 
depressed person to consent to research also requires us to consider carefully 
the volitional content of the preference. An apparent absence of volitional 
content should lead us to the view that decisional competence is absent, due to 
the more severe consequences for the agent’s rights of a false positive rather 
than a false negative judgment of competence when an agent’s ability to 
appreciate the circumstances of the decision is apparently lacking. Insofar as 
supportive decision-making practices allow a better insight into the volitional 
abilities of the depressed person, we have good reason to use them in the 
competence assessment process.
Adults with schizophrenia
612 Rudnick (2002: 153).
613 RM: 52, Gewirth (1982:118). See also the discussion in Beyleveld (1991: 23-24; 28-30; 177- 
181).
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Decisional competence in schizophrenia tends to be determined principally by 
psychiatric aspects of the condition, such as avolitional states and inappropriate 
affect, rather than those symptoms of schizophrenia that may suggest 
themselves as obvious candidates for decisional incompetence, such as 
hallucinations and delusions614. This means that certain determinants of 
decisional competence in schizophrenia will be shared more widely by other 
mental disorders615. However, studies into the decisional competence of 
schizophrenia suffers are more numerous than the other cognitively vulnerable 
groups we have so far considered. The reasons for this are not clear, although it 
may be a consequence of the importance of schizophrenia sufferers’ 
participation in research, combined with an increasing interest in ‘empirical 
ethics’616. In time, it is hoped this may extend to adults with depression and 
mental retardation.
Some commentators have sought to question the over-riding emphasis upon 
competence. Candilis has argued that the focus should not be on competence 
alone; instead empirical studies should consider the values which schizophrenia 
sufferers are bringing to bear on their decisions whether or not to participate in 
research617. However, this rests upon an erroneous separation of values and 
competence. If one includes a capacity to value within a definition of decisional 
competence (which PTDCJ presupposes), then it would seem that to consider 
values as a discrete line of inquiry from competence could serve to unhelpfully 
bifurcate research into these inter-related elements of decision-making.
There is some evidence to support the claim that sufferers of schizophrenia 
value the benefits of research into schizophrenia and believe it should continue 
to go ahead. In a study conducted by Roberts et at, the views of schizophrenia 
suffers were sought surrounding research participation618. The responses 
offered were enlightened and sophisticated. A majority agreed that participation 
was important for altruistic reasons and for the advancement of scientific
614 Moser ef a /(2002:1205).
615 Moser etal (2002:1206).
616 Dunn (2006). Dunn defines empirical ethic«* ac whom i
bear on the discussion of ethically problematic issues (ibid \ P ' 3 methodol°gies are brought to
617 Candilis (2003: 79). K h
618 Roberts et a! (2000).
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understanding into the condition619. There was also a sense in which it gave rise 
to hope that other sufferers may receive better treatment620. This endorses the 
view that a considerable number of schizophrenia sufferers can come to a 
decision about research participation based upon an appreciation of the 
research derived from stable set of values. However, Roberts et al claim that it 
may give rise to the risk of a “motivational vulnerability”, where schizophrenia 
sufferers take part in research that is not in their best interests as a patient621. It 
is not clear exactly what the authors mean by this. If a schizophrenia sufferer is 
judged to have decisional competence to consent within a particular research 
context, then it follows that she should have the psychological ability to evaluate 
the motivational pressures to which the context gives rise, and make a decision 
for herself based on her own value system.
The main empirical studies to have been published this decade have 
recognised the significance of supported decision-making practices in eliciting 
the decisional competence of schizophrenia suffers. The first of these to be 
reported was Carpenter et a l622, who assessed the decisional competence of 
thirty research subjects with schizophrenia and twenty-four healthy comparison 
subjects to consent to clinical research623. The authors measured the cognition 
of the participants with schizophrenia against those of the healthy volunteers, 
and measured the decisional competence of all using the MacCAT-CR624. The 
authors concluded that the schizophrenia sufferers did demonstrate significantly 
poorer performance in respect of decisional capacities relevant to consent to 
research625. However, this did not reflect a persistent inability to understand the 
information relevant to a research study:
“When offered additional opportunities to learn the necessary data, most 
subjects with scores below an a priori cut-off were able to bring their 
scores into the range of a comparison group of people without 
schizophrenia. This suggests that people with severe forms of 
schizophrenia may be able to give informed consent for research 
although a single session brief presentation of research procedures may 
not be sufficient. Rather, an informed consent process that engages
619 Roberts et al (2000: 71-72).
620 Roberts eta!(2000: 71).
621 Roberts ef al (2000: 73).
622 Carpenter et al. (2000).
623 Carpenter et al. (2000: 534).
624 Appelbaum and Grisso (2001).
625 Carpenter et al. (2000: 536).
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potential subjects over time and is sensitive to the negative impact of 
cognitive impairment may be essential for adequate informed consent.”626
Carpenter et at rightly emphasise the place of education in developing 
competence to consent to medical research. It cannot be over-emphasized that 
many individuals will require knowledge about the nature and purpose of the 
research presented in ways that take more time, effort and imagination than 
standard consent processes allow, and this is no more relevant than in cases 
where the potential participants have cognitive vulnerability of some kind. As we 
have already seen, decisional competence is a dynamic quality capable of 
development and, in the case of some cognitively vulnerable individuals, subject 
to volatility due to their mental state. This view has an influential precedent in 
contemporary psychiatric literature, but one that exists within the context of 
competence to consent to treatment rather than to research627.
Palmer and Jeste reported an important study in a recent paper628. They 
surveyed two groups of schizophrenia sufferers, those above seventy years of 
age and those aged between forty and seventy who had been diagnosed with 
schizophrenia under the DSM-IV classification without an associated diagnosis 
of dementia629. All participants were taking antipsychotic medication at the time 
of the study. The authors used a slightly modified version of the MacCAT-CR to 
ascertain each participant’s decisional competence630. In addition, the authors 
employed a series of neuropsychological tests, which were designed to 
measure verbal and perceptual skills, along with working memory, cognitive 
processing speed and verbal and visual learning abilities631.
The authors found that the most significant determinant of decisional 
competence in both groups was performance on the neuropsychological 
tests632. Severity of general psychopathology was seen as a variable which 
could undermine the understanding element of decisional capacity, rather than
626 Carpenter et ai (2000: 536).
627 Appelbaum and Roth (1981).
628 Paimer and Jeste (2006).
629 Palmer and Jeste (2006: 99).
630 Palmer and Jeste (2006: 100).
631 Palmer and Jeste (2006:101).
632 Palmer and Jeste (2006:100).
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depressive symptoms633. Most participants in the study had their decisional 
competence assessed as outpatients and, like Appelbaum et al above, the 
authors acknowledge that the results may have been different if the research 
had involved more acute inpatients634. Again, the authors found that decisional 
competence improved with reiterative disclosure. This led the authors to 
conclude:
“The presence of schizophrenia (or other psychiatric diagnosis) 
alone is an inappropriate basis for determining decisional incapacity 
. . .some of the impaired understanding after an initial disclosure 
should not be viewed as a deficit in consent capacity, but rather as a 
deficit in the commonly employed consent process.’’635
These findings highlight the relevance of using supported decision-making 
techniques in research with older schizophrenia sufferers. This is particularly 
important, given that the ability to comprehend consent forms is a skill that often 
declines in old age636. Elsewhere, Jeste et al claim, “capacity should not 
necessarily be viewed as an unmodifiable trait, even when those patients 
initially seem to lack adequate capacity”637. In support of this claim, they refer to 
a study conducted by most of the authors in 2001, reported in the American 
Journal of Psychiatry638. This study considered the effects of a randomized 
process to compare the effects of “routine” and “enhanced” consent with two 
groups of participants aged between forty and eighty years of age. One group 
were outpatients suffering from chronic schizophrenia and related psychosis; 
the other was a healthy control group639.
The principal difference between the styles of consent seeking was manifest in 
the form of the presentation and the time devoted to it. “Routine" consent simply 
involved a researcher who read out a written consent form with occasional 
pauses for questions and opportunities for the participant to seek clarification. 
By contrast, “enhanced” consent involved a Microsoft PowerPoint presentation 
structured into bullet points featuring summary slides relating to core
633 Palmer and Jeste (2006:102-103).
634 Palmer and Jeste (2006:104).
635 Palmer and Jeste (2006:104-105).
636 Jeste eta!(2003: 69).
637 Jeste et a! (2003: 72).
638 Dunn eta!(2001).
639 Dunn et a! (2001:1911); Jeste et a/ (2003: 72).
information about the proposed research study640. The participants answered a 
quiz following the consent process which tested their understanding of key 
points. This became easier were they to fail to answer questions correctly. The 
participants had up to three chances, the second and third of which the 
participant was permitted to refer to the information on the original consent 
form641.
The results were illuminating. Scores on the first round of the test were 
considerably greater for schizophrenia sufferers who had been allocated to the 
enhanced consent group as opposed to the routine consent group642. This 
persisted when analysing the results of the second round of the quiz for those 
participants who took it. Most striking is that schizophrenia sufferers who 
experienced the enhanced consent procedure performed at an equivalent level 
on the first round of the test as healthy volunteers who were allocated to the 
routine consent arm of the study643. As the authors acknowledge, these results 
indicate the value of supported decision-making practices in eliciting the 
decisional competence of mentally disordered participants. Moreover, these 
findings are not isolated. Wirshing et al discovered similar results in a study a 
few years earlier with repeated use of an informed consent questionnaire with 
schizophrenia sufferers644.
Another recently published study has sought to analyse the effects of supported 
decision-making with schizophrenia sufferers. Moser et al conducted a study to 
ascertain whether adding less than 30 minutes to the consent-seeking process 
could enhance the decisional competence of schizophrenia sufferers for 
inpatient and outpatient research645. The authors invited sixty participants to 
become involved in a hypothetical study designed to trial a drug to promote 
cognitive lucidity. Of these, thirty were diagnosed schizophrenia sufferers and 
thirty were healthy volunteers646. The authors designed a series of computer 
presentation slides with one main point per slide, which the participants with
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640 Dunn eta! (2001:1912); Jeste et al (2003:72).
641 Dunn et al (2001; 1912); Jeste ef al (2003: 72).
642 Dunn et al (2001:1912); Jeste et al (2003: 72).
643 Dunn et at (2001:1912-13); Jeste et al (2003: 72).
644 Wirshing et al (1998).
645 Moser et al (2006).
646 Moser et al (2006:117).
schizophrenia viewed whilst one of the authors read the main point aloud647. 
The authors assessed the participants’ understanding using the MacCAT-CR 
before and after the intervention.
Prior to the intervention, there was a pronounced difference between the 
schizophrenia participants and the healthy control group, particularly in relation 
to understanding and appreciation 648. However the authors reported that 
individuals suffering from schizophrenia demonstrated “relatively strong” 
decisional competence even without supportive intervention, although this was 
not as high as the control group649, Following the intervention, the schizophrenia 
sufferers were “not significantly different from the healthy comparison group in 
any aspect of decisional capacity”, namely understanding, appreciation, 
reasoning and expressing a choice.650 As the hypothetical research study 
presented to the schizophrenia sufferers was more complex than those 
presented in previous research studies, the results of the study underscore 
more clearly the notion that supportive interventions can help sufferers to 
understand sophisticated procedures such as randomization, placebo-control or 
double-blindness651. Moser et afs findings show that schizophrenia sufferers’ 
understanding can be improved through appropriate interventions and illustrates 
that the baseline level of cognitive impairment among schizophrenia sufferers 
may not be as great as one would think.
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Overall, these studies constitute a convincing argument why we should at least 
consider schizophrenia sufferers to have a developable decisional competence 
to offer consent to medical research, provided that disclosure of relevant 
information is provided in a form that is conducive for understanding and 
appreciation. Of course, there remains a risk that participation authorised on the 
basis of first-person consent could be ‘engineered’ through processes that pitch 
the requirement for understanding and appreciation too low. But this represents 
an argument for greater scrutiny of supported decision-making practices by 
ethical review bodies, such as IRBs and RECs, rather than an argument against 
supported decision-making itself. Where we have a cognitively vulnerable group
647 Moser et al(2006:117).
648 Moser et al (2006:118).
649 Moser e fa /(2006:118).
650 Moser eta! (2006:116).
651 Moser et a! (2006:119).
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such as schizophrenia sufferers whose decisional competence to consent to 
research could be determined altogether by the type of consent process used, 
there is an imperative under PTDCJ to implement supportive decision-making 
practices that are conducive to preserving decisional competence as far as 
possible.
Adults with Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias
Changes in the way that dementia is perceived, both philosophically and 
clinically, has informed a view that dementia sufferers can and should take a 
more active role in research relating to their condition652. This is associated with 
wider discourses of empowerment in dementia653. On this view, the question of 
the decisional competence of dementia sufferers is left open, to be judged in 
relation to individual sufferers and in relation to the context of particular types of 
research. This progressive view is not universally shared, however - some 
commentators appear to start from the premise that dementia sufferers lack 
decisional competence altogether, and focus instead on the role of surrogate 
decision-making654.
This does not imply that surrogate decision-making is never an appropriate first 
response to dementia sufferers. A principal effect of dementia is impairment of 
the comprehension abilities required for decision-making655, and a recent 
longitudinal study has shown that this deteriorates sharply over two years from 
the initial stage656. Most persons with advanced dementia will be incapable of 
making decisions about research participation for themselves along with 
similarly sophisticated medical scenarios 657. There is also evidence that 
relatively mild Alzheimer’s disease can reduce decisional competence 
considerably in some cases658. However, the onset of decisional incompetence
652 Bartlett and Martin (2002: 50).
653 See Kitwood (1997) for a well-argued account.
654 Yarborough (2002), for example, appears to do this
655 Buckles et al. (2003:1662).
656 Huthwaite et al (2006).
657 Kim et al (2002a: 159) According to the studies which Kim eta  I considered in their (iterati ir» 
review, the proportion of dementia sufferers found to be decisionsllv inm rrm Jl.il !"  " j rature 
44% to 69% {ibid.). These studies were conducted laraelv in rointinn ♦ mpet6n ran9e<t from 
to medical treatment, however, and not research 9 Y tl0n *° COmpetence consent
658 Kim et al (2001: 716).
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in dementia is usually not a sudden but a gradual process in which the sufferer 
loses the ability to make particular decisions whilst retaining the ability to make 
others659. It is not fanciful to suppose, therefore, that some sufferers in the early 
stages of the condition may retain the decisional abilities to decide for 
themselves about research participation.
As is the case with three of the other four cognitively vulnerable groups 
considered in this thesis, insufficient empirical research has been conducted 
into the competence of persons with Alzheimer’s disease or other dementias to 
consent to research660, but over the last few years more studies have begun to 
emerge661. In a literature review of efforts to assess decision-making ability in 
cognitive impaired (but not decisionally incompetent) elderly individuals, Kim et 
al examined neuropsychological correlates of decisional impairment in 
Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias662. Following the work of Marson et 
al,663, they suggest that tests of conceptualisation, word fluency and analysis of 
error behaviours can illuminate performance in executive functioning and assist 
in the identification of decisional abilities664. Kim et al support the idea of a 
structured competence assessment test and entertain the possibility of a 
“consensus based criterion threshold” for measuring competence in relation to 
specific research studies665, although this would require agreement between 
clinicians and psychiatrists as to how to pitch the threshold, which may prove 
difficult to reach.
The authors claim that there is limited data to support the idea that educative 
interventions may improve scores on competence assessment procedures, but 
that the extent to which a dementia sufferer benefits will depend upon the 
severity of their cognitive impairment666. They conclude that supported decision­
making may be possible until such time when severe impairment to executive 
functioning occurs 667 . This dovetails with Marson’s findings that the
659
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Marson ef al (1994; 1997).
Kim etal (2002b: 799).
Kim etal (2002a: 151).
Kim et al (2002a: 159).
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Kim e ta l(2002a: 159).
Kimet al (2002a: 161).
Kim etal (2002a: 162-163).
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pathogenesis of mild and moderate Alzheimer’s disease leaves the 
communicative aspect of competence preserved668. Kim et al note:
“by enhancing short-term memory (or perhaps bypassing the deficit 
by use of written memory aids in the consent process) in persons 
with mild dementia . . .  it may be possible to support the autonomy 
of those who may be seen as incapable by clinician-evaluators 
overly focused on the patients’ memory deficits. The concept of 
comprehension is larger than mere free recall. In normal elderly 
subjects, the assessment of comprehension that relies on free recall 
underestimates the degree of actual comprehension. Thus, we may 
need to train competency evaluators to appreciate, and to help the 
patients make best use of, the intact strengths of those suffering 
from dementia.”669
The espousal of supported decision-making is encouraging and represents an 
approach consistent with PTDCJ. However, it would be helpful to have more 
information on the experience of supported decision-making in real biomedical 
research contexts. One of the limitations of the research that Kim et al 
examined is that most of the studies concerned hypothetical rather than actual 
decision-making scenarios670. Another limitation, from the perspective of gaining 
an insight into competence to consent to biomedical research, is that only a 
small proportion of the studies consulted (4 out of 32) considered decisional 
competence in this context. Most studies considered competence in relation to 
some other decision-making scenario, such as consent to treatment or 
competence to create an advance directive671. This indicates the need for 
further empirical work to validate existing findings in the area of competence to 
consent to biomedical research.
Other studies have investigated the extent to which Alzheimer’s disease 
undermines comprehension of consent documents. Buckles et al. conducted a 
study in which 250 dementia sufferers with very mild, mild or moderate 
dementia were given a questionnaire to test their understanding of a proposed 
minimal-risk research study, about which their consent was being sought672. 
Statements such as “Information from this research study will help people who 
have memory problems” and “You are here for a birthday party” had to be
668 Marson (2001: 281).
669 Kim ef al (2002a: 160).
670 Kim et al (2002a: 163).
671 Kim ef al (2002a: 154).
672 Buckles e ta l(2003).
designated true or false673. The authors also surveyed a control group of 165 
healthy volunteers and adjusted for sufferers’ educational attainment674.
All respondents in the healthy control group and very mildly demented category 
offered correct answers for at least eight out of the ten questions, whilst 92% of 
the sufferers with mild dementia were able to do this675. This contrasted with the 
group of moderate dementia sufferers, of whom 67% scored eight out of ten or 
above676. The authors recommended that the time and effort invested in 
presenting information could improve understanding677, especially by “in depth 
interaction and repetition”678. However, the authors conceded that as the study 
focused on comprehension, it could not provide an insight as to how dementia 
affects appreciation, choice and reasoning, nor how comprehension might be 
impeded in a higher risk research study679.
In order to gain insight into the consequences of using psychiatric judgment and 
normative judgment about competence, Kim et at. measured the decisional 
competence of 37 individuals with mild to moderate Alzheimer’s disease and 15 
healthy comparison subjects of a similar age to offer consent to a fictitious 
biomedical research project680. The psychiatric judgment (delivered by three 
psychiatrists) was informed by an assessment of competence to consent using 
the MacCAT-CR. The psychiatrists assessed the decisional competence of both 
the Alzheimer’s disease and comparison group. Whilst the members of the 
comparison group achieved highly on the competence assessment measure, 
the majority of the group with Alzheimer’s disease demonstrated considerable 
decision-making impairment on at least one aspect of decision-making ability 
(62% on the three-psychiatrist criterion, 84% on the normative criterion)681. Of 
the 37 Alzheimer's disease participants involved, the authors judged ten 
decisionally competent to take part in the hypothetical clinical trial682. Whilst the 
primary purpose of this study was to compare the assessment of competence
673 Buckles et at (2003:1664).
674 Buckles et at (2003:1663).
675 Buckles et al (2003:1662).
676 Buckles et al (2003:1664).
677 Buckles et a /(2003:1665-1666).
678 Buckles et a /(2003:1665).
679 Buckles et al (2003:1666).
680 Kim etal. (2001).
681 Kim etal. (2001:715).
682 Kim etal. (2001:715).
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using these two criteria, it nonetheless offers a revealing insight into the 
decisional abilities of people with mild to moderate dementia.
The following year, Kim et al published a study into the research participation 
preferences of Alzheimer’s sufferers683. The objective of this was twofold. First, 
the authors intended to compare the willingness of Alzheimer’s sufferers to 
participate in research protocols when compared with healthy elderly 
volunteers. Second, the authors wished to examine how degrees of decisional 
impairment in Alzheimer’s sufferers affect their willingness to participate684. The 
authors selected a group of 34 sufferers with mild to moderate Alzheimer’s 
disease and compared them with a control group of 14 healthy elderly 
volunteers685. The decisional competence of the participants was sought in 
relation to four hypothetical research vignettes ranging from the mundane 
(withdrawal of blood) to the serious (brain surgery)686.
The authors measured decisional competence according to the MMSE and the 
MacCAT-CR. The results of the study showed that, for three out of the four 
research protocols, there was no difference between the willingness of the 
Alzheimer’s sufferers to participate and those of the control group of healthy 
volunteers687. Common to both groups was an inverse relationship between risk 
and willingness to participate688. The disparity between the two groups occurred 
in the context of the drugs trial, where the non-Alzheimer’s sufferers showed 
less of a risk aversion to participation689. This corresponds to the authors’ 
finding that deteriorating cognitive function induced by Alzheimer’s disease 
appears to increase susceptibility to risk690.
We should not necessarily understand these results as an indicator of irrational 
deliberation amongst Alzheimer's sufferers, however. Although a sense of 
desperation which sometimes accompanies the initial stages of dementia is 
likely to erode in the later stages, a drive for self-preservation (e.g. not to have
683 Kim et al (2002b).
684 Kim et al (2002b: 797).
685 Kim et al (2002b: 797).
686 Kim et at (2002b: 798).
687 Kim et a! (2002b: 799).
688 Kim e ta !(2002b: 799).
689 Kim ef at (2002b: 799).
690 Kim et al (2002b: 799).
one’s bodily integrity interfered with) survives serious dementia691. In this sense, 
there is a clear affinity between these findings and Jaworska’s arguments about 
minimal valuing692. Severe Alzheimer’s patients can still value aspects of what 
is at stake by research participation, even if they cannot understand the full 
implications of the risks or when they may be worth taking.
Not all commentators have implicitly accepted the premise that competence is 
vital for first-person consent to biomedical research with individuals suffering 
from dementia. David Guinn suggests that the emphasis on ascertaining 
competence in potential participants with dementia may be over-stated693. 
Instead, he proposes an ‘affirmational’ model of research with dementia suffers 
which would involve collaboration between the dementia sufferer and her legally 
authorized representative (LAR)694. This derives from a notion of the research 
participant as “relational beings’’695 or an “individual-in-relationship"696, which 
bears similarities with Hughes’s concept of ‘situated-embodied agency’697. The 
LAR derives their moral authority from being able to identify and further the 
dementia sufferer’s values. Here, establishing whether a competent consent 
has been provided is less important than ensuring assent, as the risks that 
attach to a ‘false positive’ determination of competence would supposedly 
diminish due to the consent of the LAR, whose intimate knowledge of the 
dementia sufferer’s values would in turn reduce the moral significance of doubt 
over the presence of decisional competence698.
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Guinn’s emphasis upon assisting the dementia sufferer’s decision-making 
abilities through the involvement of the LAR is welcome. However, he construes 
the authority of the LAR too strongly. As long as there remains a possibility that 
an individual possesses decisional competence, problems arise with the notion 
that someone with authority to decide for the individual could actually empower 
her in doing so. Until the possibility of decisional competence has dissipated,
691 Kim e ta /(2002b: 801).
692 Jaworska (1999, 2006), discussed in Chapter Five
693 Guinn (2002).
694 Guinn envisages this ideally as the dementia sufferer’«! nartnor o , .
in' im ate k n ° W'ed 9e ° ' ,h e  S l,b ie c ,s  “ she s '° r ' £ S » £ « ! a g ) .
696 Guinn (2002: 236).
697 Hughes (2001), discussed in Chapter Five
698 Guinn (2002: 241).
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she should be encouraged to speak for herself. There is a difference between 
providing assistance in decision-making for those who do not have the means 
to make such decisions unaided (which is what the PGC requires) and 
displacing the primacy of the person in the decisional process about whom the 
decision will affect. If we apply PTDCJ, then we should only involve an LAR 
when the available evidence suggests that competence is unlikely or where to 
presume competence would lead to the individual causing harm to themselves 
or others. The ‘trigger point’ for involvement of the LAR on Guinn’s account 
would seem to occur much too early on.
In summary, Marson is right that more research needs to be undertaken with 
elderly persons not suffering from Alzheimer’s disease in order that we can 
develop a richer appreciation of the effects of different types of neuro­
degeneration on decision-making 699. The effects of prior participation in 
research have already been shown to strengthen the decision-making abilities 
of dementia sufferers700 and ways to simulate this experience (e.g. through an 
interactive DVD presentation) might prove effective. In any event, it may be that 
elderly persons engage with decision-making processes differently from 
younger adults701.
Although there is clearly still work to do, the evidence presented here cannot 
support a complete prohibition on seeking first person consent from Alzheimer’s 
sufferers for participation in biomedical research. Given the wide variation of 
decisional competence between such individuals, it would be more appropriate 
to proceed upon a case-by-case basis, which recognises that Alzheimer’s 
patients can only be judged to have lost particular decisional competences 
when they can no longer display them. This is consistent with PTDCJ in that we 
should look only to the decisional abilities of the individual in reaching a 
judgment of their competence to consent, and never allow the utility of the 
research to have a subliminal influence on the conclusions we reach.
699 Marson (2001:281).
700 Rikkert et al (1997:274).
701 Gatz (2006).
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Summary
From the evidence presented in this chapter, it is clear that there is no group 
about whom we can say that all members unequivocally lack the abilities to 
develop decisional competence to consent to research, as we could about very 
young children or the comatose. To a greater or lesser degree, all groups have 
displayed the potential for development of decisional competences. When 
applying the principle of PTDCJ, the level of certainty which a judgment of 
competence requires is determined by the impact of an ascription of decisional 
competence or incompetence on the agent’s freedom and well-being or that of 
others. This is informed by the context of the decisional abilities we can 
reasonably expect someone in her position to display (if a presumptive 
judgment) or by a demonstration of decisional abilities (if a case-by-case 
judgment)702. In this sense, the level of certainty PTDCJ requires differs from 
the standard proposed by Adamis et al, who argue that the certainty of a 
judgment of competence is proportional to the foreseeable risks involved in the 
activity703. Under PTDCJ, the certainty of the judgment is not proportional to the 
risks as such, but proportional to the impact upon the generic rights of the 
decision maker and, where relevant, those of other agents.
When making a judgment of decisional competence under PTDCJ, the 
empirical evidence for decisional competence can be broadly categorized into 
three groups: compelling: uncompelling and inconclusive. From the evidence 
presented in this chapter, the groups who may fall into the ‘compelling’ category 
include mild to moderate schizophrenia sufferers, older adolescents and adults 
with mild mental retardation. The groups who may fall into the second category 
include adults with severe dementia, major depression and profound mental 
retardation. The third category is reserved for those individuals for whom the 
existing empirical research has indicated little about their decisional 
competence, such as younger adolescents. The factors that place cognitively 
vulnerable individuals within these three categories include psychological 
maturity, ability to generate preferences in relation to specific decisional
702 Judgments of decisional competence with cognitively vulnerable groups are, as we have 
seen, most likely to proceed from a case-by-case-assessment.
703 Adamis et al (2005:138).
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contexts, level of minimally adequate cognitive functioning (including emotional 
integrity) and the liability of decisional competence to fluctuation of over time.
However, the limitations of the existing research attenuate the force of the 
conclusions we can draw. Notwithstanding the publication of new studies (most 
of which have emerged since the mid-1990s, with the exception of those 
relating to older children and adolescents), there remains a considerable need 
for more evidence on the decisional competence of cognitively vulnerable 
groups to consent to the specific context of biomedical research and methods to 
support their decision making. We should also note two further shortcomings. 
First is the absence of studies on supported decision-making with children, 
which is disappointing. Second, many of the empirical studies discussed do not 
undertake follow up judgments of decisional competence to establish whether 
the grounds for making such judgments change in the medium to long term. We 
require more longitudinal studies, to ascertain in whom, how and why decisional 
competence fluctuates over time704.
Judgments of decision-making competence are, as we recognised at the 
beginning of the chapter, a synthesis of normative and empirical considerations. 
To make judgments of competence without extensive empirical knowledge 
reflects a significant deficit in our understanding of what it means to decide 
competently705. It is probable that poorly designed consent-seeking procedures 
in part explain the shortcomings in our knowledge of the decisional competence 
of cognitively vulnerable groups706. Even as long as twenty-five years ago, Roth 
et al voiced scepticism about the increasing length and complexity of consent 
forms, claiming that particularly difficult forms “may obstruct rather than improve 
the process of obtaining informed consent"707. A failure to reflect on how to 
remedy this efficaciously could give rise to ill-conceived attempts to support the 
decision-making of cognitively vulnerable participants or pitching too low the
704 Involving participants with fluctuating decisional competence in research would require 
involving an LAR or other surrogate decision-maker during periods of incompetence. The 
prospects for applying supported decision-making to advise individuals with fluctuating 
decisional competence on the consequences of research participation during a time where 
decision-making competence is apparently present are encouraging, although the issues of 
balancing first-person consent with surrogate consent raise issues which lie outside of the 
scope of this thesis. On this, see further Stroup and Appelbaum (2003)
705 Marson (2001:280).
706 Dunn and Jeste (2001:604-605).
707 Roth etal. (1982:48).
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level at which they need to demonstrate those decisional abilities required for a 
judgment of competence to be made.
To be successful, supported decision-making must be tailored to the particular 
needs of the potential participant, in the sense that it should be responsive to 
the nature and effect of her own cognitive vulnerabilities. Equally important is 
that supported decision-making practices recognise an appropriate level at 
which decisional competence should be demonstrated in particular contexts. 
This countervails against the possibility of inadvertently lowering the standard of 
decision-making competence required through using such methods. From the 
evidence presented in this chapter, the first priority of supported decision­
making should be in maximizing understanding and appreciation, two factors 
that are often lacking in cognitively vulnerable participants. Provided we use this 
insight as a point of departure, we should not be discouraged from using 
imagination and creativity to devise suitable approaches. The methods 
discussed in this chapter already show evidence of this.
It is unlikely that there will emerge a panacean method for improving 
understanding in decisional competence708. Nevertheless, a common factor in 
the most effective forms of supported decision-making surveyed Involve a 
significant element of human interaction, such as educators or counsellors 
spending more time with potential participants to answer their questions, to offer 
additional explanations and to provide reassurance. Even where technological 
aids are used (such as in the PowerPoint example), the human element is 
pivotal in their success. This would suggest that mere attempts to make an 
existing consent form easier to read or to give potential participants more time 
to digest information on their own will not be enough.
In conclusion, Guinn is right that individuals are relational beings, but their 
embeddedness within particular personal and social relationships does not 
displace the moral force of ensuring that as far as possible, they are permitted 
to make decisions for themselves about matters which affect their own physical 
and psychological well-being. Supported decision-making obviates the criticism 
that in seeking to preserve the autonomy of cognitively vulnerable persons, we
708 Dunn and Jeste (2001: 596).
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are abandoning them to an autonomy that they do not possess. It should not be 
forgotten that a judgment of decisional incompetence not only denies an 
individual the authority to be the principal determinant of the outcome of a 
particular decision, it also can have serious psychological consequences for the 
individual in her broader life, affecting the way she perceives herself and how 
others respond to her709. We should only arrive at a judgment of decisional 
incompetence after the fullest possible assessment of competence involving a 
sustained and appropriate form of supported decision-making to attempt to elicit 
any latent decision-making abilities that the person may have.
Scrutinizing extant empirical studies has illuminated our understanding of the 
decisional competences of cognitively vulnerable groups and methods to 
support their decision-making abilities. In taking stock of the insights discussed 
this chapter, we have drawn conclusions that relate both to the empirical 
evidence required for judgments of competence under PTDCJ and how 
practices of supported decision-making can be made to best fulfil their purpose. 
We now have a basis on which to consider how judgments of decisional 
competence to consent to biomedical research are articulated in a regulatory 
and legal context, and to investigate whether any parity exists between PTDCJ, 
codes of ethics and legal rules.
709 Winnick(1995: 8).
Cognitive vulnerability and consent to biomedical research in England and Wales 196
Chapter Seven
Cognitive vulnerability and 
consent to biomedical research in 
England and Wales
Until recently, the status of FPCLC consent to medical research in England and 
Wales was in considerable disarray. The absence of a legislative measure 
combined with ambiguous ethical guidelines and confusing terminology created 
a situation fraught with uncertainty. To a considerable extent, this confusion 
persists despite efforts to systematize the law. Whilst competence and capacity 
are two of the most widely used concepts in relation to English medical law, 
they are also two of the least understood and most poorly employed. In part, 
this has arisen due to inadequate attention paid to assessments and judgments 
of decisional competence.
This confusion is starkly apparent amongst medical practitioners. In a survey 
published in 2002 regarding knowledge of consent and capacity in the medical 
profession710, only a small proportion were aware of the legal position relation to 
consent and research. 2 out of 16 junior doctors (13%), 3 out of 10 non-career- 
grade doctors (30%), 7 out of 19 specialist registrars (37%), 5 out of 15 
consultants (33%) and 4 out 35 general practitioners (11%) gave correct 
answers711. For every grade, this was lower than the figures for consent to 
treatment. These alarming figures represent a dearth of knowledge on behalf of 
the medical profession about the current law. As such, it is difficult to imagine 
that these practitioners would be in a position to apply the existing law 
accurately, let alone evaluate its shortcomings.
710 Jackson and Warner (2002).
711 Jackson and Warner (2002:602).
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The purpose of this chapter is to survey the legal position in England and Wales 
and selected ethical guidelines issued by professional bodies in the UK. It will 
also consider the significance of European regulation in generating norms of 
decisional competence judgment that have influenced the English legal position 
or may do so in time. Throughout, we will assess the prospects for compatibility 
between the regulation position and PTDCJ. In particular, we will consider the 
differences that exist between ‘mental capacity’ and ‘legal capacity', the current 
legal status of decisional competence to consent to medical research in 
England and Wales and ethical guidance on decisional competence to consent 
to medical research. As our focus is on FPCLC, we will not consider the position 
of decisionally incompetent individuals (frequently known as ‘mentally 
incapacitated’ or ‘mentally incompetent’ individuals) as they will in all probability 
lack FPCLC.
Three approaches to determining FPCLC
It is helpful to begin by drawing a distinction. A legal judgment of FPCLC can be 
made upon three possible grounds - on a functional, outcome or status based 
test712. Functional tests involve an assessment of the task or decisional 
competence of an individual in respect of a particular task or decision. A 
functional test of capacity involves ascertaining the task or decisional abilities of 
an individual in terms of the nature, purpose and effect of the activity in question 
at the time the assessment is made. Functional tests of capacity therefore 
establish a clear link between decisional competence and FPCLC, so that the 
latter is typically explained mostly, if not wholly, in terms of the former.
Functional tests are particularly useful where an individual is associated with a 
cognitively vulnerable group who may not usually be considered to have task or 
decisional competence in respect of that activity. This is because such tests 
have the advantage of recognising both specific contexts in which the individual 
can be judged to have FPCLC and areas where she can be judged incompetent 
in this regard. Functional tests of capacity are analogous to demonstrable task 
or decisional competences given the demonstration of ability at the task or
712 See Freedman (1981) for a theoretical discussion and Law Commission of England and 
Wales (1993, Part II, pp. 10-24) for a discussion in relation to English law.
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decision needed in order to convince the assessor of the presence of the ability 
and the specificity of the test to the task or decision involved.
Outcome tests of FPLC are concerned with the content of the choice that the 
individual reaches. They can therefore only be utilized in decisional contexts. 
According to this test, a decision that is inconsistent with accepted values, 
clinical advice or with the judgment of the assessor represents sufficient 
grounds for declaring the individual incompetent in that respect. Outcome tests 
of capacity are closely related to asymmetrical or risk-relative models of 
competence examined in Chapter One. If applied, outcome tests potentially give 
rise to a situation whereby an individual is considered to have FPCLC if she 
chooses one way, but lacks FPCLC if she chooses another within the same 
decisional scenario. This approach to determining FPCLC is premised on 
values which tend towards paternalism rather than the promotion of individual 
autonomy and in extreme cases engineer conformity to received opinion. The 
nature of such a test in the context of determining consent to participation in 
biomedical research could be open to exploitative misuse, as it is possible that 
the values of the competence assessor could surreptitiously determine the 
existence of FPCLC, disguised as an attempt to support decision-making.
Status tests confer FPCLC upon the grounds of the possession of a certain 
characteristic, such as age, achieved universally. It excludes all individuals who 
do not fall within this group as lacking this capacity. A status approach grounds 
the enfranchisement of individuals once they reach the age of eighteen years, 
and determines other decisional competences, such as contractual capacity 
and consent to sexual intercourse. Status approaches are less appropriate in 
healthcare contexts where the moral imperative of giving effect to decisional 
competence is high and the cost of assessing competence on a case-by-case 
basis is comparatively low. They also can give rise to, as the Law Commission 
noted, the presumption of an absence of FPLC in all areas, where this is not the 
case713. However, status approaches may be necessary where adopting a 
functional approach would be administratively unworkable (such as a functional 
test for adolescents to attain the right to vote). In this sense, status approaches
713 Law Commission of England and Wales (1995, para. 3.3).
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are analogous to presumed competences insofar as they require a universally 
attainable quality and the absence of a test of individual capability.
A functional test to determine FPLC is most consistent with PDMCJ. This is 
because it ensures that the grounds upon which competence is judged are 
specific to the nature of the decision at hand, and do not account for the 
possession or absence of other task or decisional competences or instances of 
FPCLC that are irrelevant to the abilities being assessed. Status approaches 
tend to frustrate a PDMCJ approach to FPLC as they rely upon blanket 
presumptions of decisional competence, unless the adoption of a status test is 
the only way FPCLC can be ascribed without undermining more important rights 
of other agents. Outcome tests accord an unwise amount of discretion to those 
responsible for assessing competence in ways that could allow inappropriate 
factors such as the values and wishes of the competence assessor to influence 
a determination of FPCLC.
The meaning of FPCLC consent in England and Wales
English law has originally formulated standards of FPCLC in relation to medical 
treatment rather than research. This is the case in the context of adults and 
children. These standards warrant consideration, as they inform the basis of the 
standard FPCLC to consent to research, and would provide a legal background 
to any attempt in English law to develop specific principles in relation to making 
judgments of decisional competence.
Adults
Following the judgment of Lord Donaldson in Re T714, every adult in English law 
is presumed to have FPCLC consent to treatment, but this is a presumption that 
can be rebutted if the existence of capacity is brought into doubt715. The level of 
understanding required for a legally valid consent to treatment must be 
commensurate with the gravity of the decision to be taken, with more serious
714 Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649.
715 Ibid., Lord Donaldson MR at p. 661.
decisions requiring greater capacity716. This appears on the face of it to be an 
example of risk-relative competence. However, it is compatible with a decision- 
relative theory of competence, as the decisional abilities required are related to 
the complexity of the decision to be taken, not simply the choice made, and 
‘seriousness’ is a measure of this complexity, rather than merely a measure of 
the risk.
The most authoritative English case law definition of FPCLC in adults is 
provided in Re C (adult: refusal of medical treatment), a case in which a 
schizophrenic patient in a psychiatric hospital refused consent for an operation 
to amputate his gangrenous leg717. Thorpe J held that in order to have FPCLC, 
to consent, the patient must understand “the nature, purpose and effect”718 of 
the procedure. This involves the ability to comprehend and retain information 
about treatment, to believe this information and to weigh the information in order 
to evince a choice719 720. When we evaluate this test against non-legal criteria of 
decision-making competence, it yields fundamental similarities with the 
conceptual definition of decision-relative decisional competence examined in 
Chapter One.
More importantly, Re C firmly establishes that the quality of internal reasoning 
expressed by the decision-maker should solely determine FPCLC in adults, and 
not the view of the competence assessor about the reasonableness of the 
choice or the rationality of the reasoning process. This is again close to the 
model of decision-relative competence outlined in Chapter One, where the 
consistency of the decision-maker’s reasoning in terms of her own established 
values is interpreted as a indicator of decisional competence rather than how 
well the value judgments expressed in that reasoning process correspond with 
those health care professionals believe the patient ought to hold. This principle 
has been affirmed in England and Wales subsequently, in Re MB (an adult: 
medical treatment) 720 , which concerned a pregnant woman refusing 
venepuncture for a caesarean section, and perhaps most notably in Re B (adult:
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716 Re MB (an adult: medical treatment) (1997) 38 BMLR 175 (CA).
717 [1994] 1 All ER 819.
718 Ibid, per Thorpe J at p. 824.
719 Ibid, per Thorpe J at p. 824.
720 (1997) 38 BMLR 175 (CA).
refusal of medical treatment)721, where a quadriplegic adult’s refusal of life- 
sustaining treatment was granted.
Re C symbolizes a clear recognition of the acceptance of a functional test 
towards determining FPCLC in English law, as opposed to a status test. 
Accordingly, the test turns upon the decisional abilities of the individual and not 
upon any concomitant mental disorder or retardation, provided that the 
existence of the disorder or retardation does not affect the integrity of the 
decision-making. The existence of these important parallels between standards 
of decisional competence and tests of FPCLC in adults indicates how in English 
law, ‘competence’ is frequently understood as a synonym for ‘capacity’. Indeed, 
it is true to say of the Re C test that it defines FPCLC wholly in terms of 
decisional competence.
The burden of proof in any dispute about FPCLC is placed upon those who are 
alleging that someone lacks FPCLC, or alternatively that someone who 
previously was judged to lack FPCLC now possesses FPCLC722. This meshes 
with the position under PTDCJ, as the basis for a judgment under precaution 
has to be that whatever is being alleged can be given a compelling explanation 
under conditions of uncertainty723, and that the consequences for the generic 
rights of the individual(s) concerned in believing one way are less harmful than 
the consequences in believing another. The standard of proof that a judgment 
of FPCLC requires is the civil law standard of the balance of probabilities rather 
than the higher criminal law standard of beyond all reasonable doubt724. Given 
the administrative difficulties that may follow from operationalizing a standard of 
beyond all reasonable doubt (that could, as we saw in Chapter Five, 
compromise the state’s ability to fulfil its obligations to other agents), a balance 
of proof on the civil law standard appears appropriate from the perspective of 
PTDCJ.
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721 [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam).
722 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s. 1(2). See also the Mental Capacity Act 2005 Draft Code of 
Practice, para. 3.4, p. 23 and the British Medical Association and the Law Society (2004: 28).
723 Remembering, of course, that we can never know anything with certainty other than that we 
ourselves are an agent.
724 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s. 2(4). See also the Mental Capacity Act 2005 Draft Code of 
Practice, para. 3.4, p. 23 and the British Medical Association and the Law Society (2004: 29- 
30).
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Tan and McMillan argue that there is a disparity between the standard of legal 
capacity articulated in the Re C test and that which is embodied in the BMA and 
Law Society's guidance document, Assessment of Mental Capacity, the second 
edition of which was published in 2004725. This arises because the guidance 
couches FPCLC in terms of understanding and retention of information 
(concentrating on the first strand of the Re C test), while failing to elaborate on 
believing and weighing the information (the second and third elements of the Re 
C test)726. The BMA and the Law Society also appear to add to the Re C test by 
including the freedom to make a choice, which is usually part of the definition of 
consent rather than competence or capacity727.
Tan and McMillan directed their criticism towards the first edition of the 
guidance, published in 1995. Although the second edition now includes 
reference to weighing the information in reaching a choice, and freedom of 
choice is now related explicitly to the validity of the consent, there is still no 
reference to believing the information728. It remains an important omission, 
since believing the information presented is as central to making a judgment of 
decisional competence as understanding the information -  even if the decision­
maker subsequently goes on to reject the importance of the information. 
Moreover, it is likely that healthcare professionals, one of the target audiences 
of the guidance, will come to interpret the Re C test in the more restrictive terms 
in which the BMA and the Law Society have construed it729.
The connection between FPCLC and decisional competence is strengthened 
the recent introduction of ‘mental capacity’ as a statutory legal concept by the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 (hereafter MCA 2005)730. Until recently, attempts 
have been made to maintain the separation of the concepts of legal and mental 
capacity731. Since then, there has been a retreat from this position to the point 
where the new statutory definition of legal capacity in English law is framed in 
terms of mental capacity. The Act provides a clear presumption in favour of
725 Tan and McMillan (2004); British Medical Association and the Law Society (2004).
726 Tan and McMillan (2004:428).
727 Tan and McMillan (2004: 427-428).
728 British Medical Association and the Law Society (2004:120).
729 Tan and McMillan (2004: 428).
730 The MCA 2005 received Royal Assent on 7 April 2005 and is due to come into force in April 
2007.
731 Law Commission of England and Wales (1991:19).
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decisional competence732 and applies to individuals above the age of 16 years, 
s. 2(1-2) of the MCA 2005 provides:
s. 2 People who lack capacity
(1) For the purposes of this Act, a person lacks capacity in relation to a 
matter if at the material time he is unable to make a decision for himself 
in relation to the matter because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in 
the functioning of, the mind or brain.
(2) It does not matter whether the impairment or disturbance is 
permanent or temporary.
Inability to make a decision is defined in s. 3(1)(a-d) of the Act as an inability to 
understand, retain, use and weigh the information relevant to the decision and 
an inability to communicate the decision 733. This tracks very closely the 
definition of decisional competence to consent discussed in Chapter One. By 
implication, mental incapacity in English law must be defined as the absence of 
those abilities. This posits a prima facie conceptual link between decisional 
competence and mental capacity and by extension to FPCLC as mental 
capacity provides the criteria for having FPCLC.
The Explanatory Notes to the MCA 2005 stipulate that the Act’s definition of 
capacity “focuses on the particular time when a decision has to be made and on 
the particular matter to which the decision relates, not on any theoretical ability 
to make decisions generally”734. In other words, a person’s inability to manage 
their financial affairs, for example, should not influence judgments about their 
decisional competence in relation to consent to medical treatment. It follows 
from this that FPCLC strongly pertains to the ability of the individual to make a 
decision for him or herself that is decision-relative, and therefore constitutes a 
legal instantiation of decision-relative competence. Thus, FPCLC would appear 
to approximate to a statutory definition of mental capacity that is itself informed 
by decision-relative notions of decisional competence.
732 MCA 2005, s. 1(2)
733 A similar definition of capacity has been issued previously by the Department of Health in 
their Good Practice in Consent Implementation Guide: “A patient will lack capacity to consent to 
a particular intervention if he or she is . . .  unable to comprehend or retain information material 
to the decision, especially as to the consequences of having, or not having, the intervention in 
question, and/or.. .unable to use and weigh this information in the decision-making process.” 
(2001:46)
734 Department of Constitutional Affairs and Department of Health (2005:4).
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The MCA 2005 goes on to make provisions in relation to research with 
individuals who lack mental capacity that do not involve clinical trials, although 
these do not give rise to a separate test of FPCLC consent735. FPCLC to 
consent to medical research is therefore determined by the provisions of s. 3. 
Similarly, the Human Tissue Act 2004 makes provisions for “appropriate 
consent” but construes capacity in terms of its meaning under the MCA 2005736. 
We can gather from this that in terms of FPCLC to research, the test of capacity 
elaborated in s. 3 of the MCA 2005 along with the case law discussed above 
will remain the principal reference point.
The Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004 (hereafter ‘the 
Clinical Trial Regulations’) is a piece of delegated legislation (made under the 
authority of the relevant Secretary of State) which implements Directive 
2001/20/EC into English law737. Schedule 1 Parts 1-5 of the Clinical Trial 
Regulations outline legal protections for adults, incapacitated adults and 
children involved in clinical trials. As is the case with the MCA 2005, “adult” is 
defined as an individual above the age of 16 years738. Again, there is no explicit 
discussion of the principles underpinning decisional competence or FPCLC and 
no guidance on what approach should be taken if decisional competence is 
questionable or how to support decisional competence. However, the EU 
Directive, which was responsible for the British Government enacting the 
Clinical Trials Regulations, makes elliptical reference to FPCLC by presuming 
its absence in certain cognitively vulnerable participants. Paragraph 4 of 
Directive 2001/20/EC (hereafter the ‘Clinical Trials Directive’) discusses the 
participation of the mentally impaired:
“In cases of . . . person with dementia, psychiatric patients etc., 
inclusion in clinical trials in such cases should be on an even more 
restrictive basis. Medicinal products for trial may be administered to all 
such individuals only when there are grounds for assuming that the 
direct benefit to the patient outweighs the risks. Moreover, in such 
cases, the written consent of the patient’s legal representative, given
735 MCA 2005, s. 30-34.
736 Human Tissue Act 2004, s. 1-3 and Explanatory Notes, Part 1, Section 6.
SI 2004/1031, s. 28-31 and Schedule 1 . There is no general exclusion of tissue-based 
research in either the MCA 2005 or the Clinical Trial Regulations; however the Human Tissue 
Act 2004 more comprehensively regulates the removal, storage and use of human tissue 
samples.
738 Clinical Trials Regulations 2004, s. 2(1).
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in cooperation with the treating doctor, is necessary before 
participation in any such clinical trial”739
The reference to the written consent of the participant’s legal representative 
appears to assume that all such participants would lack FPCLC and instead be 
entered though provisions for proxy consent740. This assumption links decisional 
incompetence to the presence of a mental disorder and returns us to the status 
based tests outlined above. This is a retrograde step, especially at a time when 
the general tenor of English case law and the MCA 2005 represents a 
significant departure from this trend.
Competence is used frequently as a synonym for FPCLC by judges and 
academic commentators in England741. Given the affinity between decisional 
competence and FPCLC, underscored through the advent of the MCA 2005, 
this is not surprising. Competence, however, is not a legal concept in English 
law742. This means that in current English law, FPCLC can be defined in terms 
of task competence but this need not necessarily be the case. It follows that it 
cannot be known with absolute certainty whether competence is being used to 
express a non-legal judgment about the decisional competence of the 
individual, or as a substitute for FPCLC. This militates against clarity and 
consistency in legal reasoning.
To illustrate this, consider for example, the use of competence in the following 
excerpt of the ruling of Butler-Sloss LJ in Re MB 743: “The graver the 
consequences of the decision, the commensurately greater the level of 
competence [emphasis added] is required to take the decision.”744 This claim, 
considered alone, is perfectly reasonable. However, in the next paragraph, 
Butler-Sloss LJ expounds the criteria for an individual to lack capacity745. It is
739 Directive 2001/20/EC, OJ L 121,1.5.2001, p. 35.
740 Additionally, the emphasis placed upon “direct benefit to the patient” means the Directive 
would permit only therapeutic research upon those subjects incapable of consenting.
741 See, for example, Brazier (1991: 34-51), Kennedy and Grubb. (2000, Chapter 5) and Mason 
and Laurie (2006: Chapter 10).
742 This is antithetical to the position in the US, where ‘capacity’ denotes mental capacity only, 
and competence is a legal concept. See Berg etal. (1996: 345-396).
743 (1997) 38 BMLR 175 (CA).
744 Butler-Sloss LJ. at p. 198.
745 “A person lacks capacity if some impairment or disturbance of mental functioning renders the 
person unable to make a decision whether to consent to, or to refuse, treatment. That inability to 
make a decision will occur when: (a) the patient is unable to comprehend and retain the 
information which is material to the decision, especially as to the likely consequences of having,
Cognitive vulnerability and consent to biomedical research in England and Wales 206
unclear from this whether the use of ‘competence’ is a reference to the 
psychological decisional abilities of MB, and the use of ‘capacity’ a reference to 
the legal factors that would render any individual to be without FPCLC to 
treatment.
A judge may, of course, disclaim any such difference between the two terms 
and rely upon the resemblance between non-legal criteria for decisional 
competence and FPCLC outlined above. However, closer analysis of the 
reasoning here suggests Butler-Sloss LJ is referring to the FPCLC of MB 
throughout, but substituting capacity for competence at various intervals on the 
understanding that competence is necessarily the same as FPCLC, with no 
obvious rationale for doing so. The consequence is that Butler-Sloss LJ is 
invoking a psychological and philosophical principle when she is actually 
applying a legal concept.
Why is this problematic? One may reasonably object that this is not 
unprecedented and that it may well be desirable for a judge to approach the 
issue of FPCLC by having regard to a theory of decisional competence. But this 
is not what Butler-Sloss LJ is seeking to do. She is not presenting an argument 
in the judgment as to why FPCLC should be defined in terms of decisional 
competence but is instead articulating the legal principle (i.e. FPCLC), which is 
then applied to the facts of the case. Moreover, to articulate FPCLC in terms of 
a generic notion of legal capacity (which Butler-Sloss LJ does) is to fail to 
distinguish the three different forms of legal capacity that exist, only one of 
which (FPCLC) can correlate to decisional competence.
Children
The common law position in relation to the FPCLC of children under 16 to 
consent to medical treatment, set out in the landmark case of Gillick746, has 
become a quintessential part of English medical law. Although the principle has
or not having, the treatment in question; (b) the patient is unable to use the information and 
weigh it in the balance as part of the process of arriving at the decision”. Ibid, Butler-Sloss LJ.
746 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1984] 2 All ER 449.
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been subjected to controversial judicial qualification in the intervening years747, 
the basis of the ruling still stands - a child under the age of 16 has FPCLC to 
consent to medical treatment “if and when the child achieves a sufficient 
understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what is 
proposed”748. The ruling has become known as the test of Gillick competence. 
The concept of Gillick competence is therefore not a measurement of ostensible 
agency, but an attempt to articulate a standard of decisional competence749, s. 
43(8) of the Children Act 1989 reflects and extends the Gillick principle in 
statutory form by permitting a child to refuse a medical or psychiatric 
examination as part of a child assessment order provided she is of “sufficient 
understanding” 750.
Gillick represents a departure from the status-based approach to ascertaining 
FPCLC in favour of the functional approach. The judgment in Gillick delivered 
by Lord Scarman implicitly reveals a willingness to allow standards of FPCLC in 
relation to children to be influenced by the same kind of understandings of the 
decisional abilities of children that we considered in Chapter Five and Six. Thus, 
it would not be implausible to say that FPCLC to consent to treatment in relation 
to children, where it can be bestowed, is also partly informed by a decision- 
relative account of decisional competence. However, this rejection of the status 
test is only partial. Despite its espousal of the autonomy of mature minors, 
Gillick nonetheless represents a risk-relative standard of competence and an 
outcome test of FPCLC as it still permits the consent of a parent or the decision 
of the courts to override any refusal of treatment given by the child. The tension 
between a risk-relative theory of competence and the semantic nature of a 
decision has also been recognised by the English courts751.
747 In particular, see Re R. (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1992] Fam. 11 and Re 
W (a minor: medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 627.
748 [1984] 2 All ER 449 at p. 457.
749 Beyleveld and Brownsword share this view (2001:133, n. 24).
750 s. 44(7) reiterates the principle, which deals with orders for emergency protection of children 
and in Schedule 3, which deals with supervision orders. In the former case, the child may refuse 
to submit to a psychiatric examination or other assessment if she possesses “sufficient 
understanding”. In the latter case, a supervision order is not required if the child has “sufficient 
understanding” to consent to co-operation. We should note however, that this scope for FPCLC 
for refusal is circumscribed by the conditions set out in the legislation and does not extend to 
normal treatment situations, where FPCLC is ascribed to mature children for consent and not 
refusal.
751 As acknowledged by Lord Balcombe in Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court's 
Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam. 64 at p. 88.
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In Re R, Lord Donaldson considered that the parental right to consent to 
treatment that Gillick repudiated was to determine the treatment of a mature 
minor, but that a parental consent could still be valid in the light of the child's 
refusal, where it was in the best interests of the child to have that treatment752. 
The decision in Re R also precludes fluctuating competence. The court ruled 
that a determination of FPCLC to consent should be made only after having 
regard to the general condition of the young person, rather than as a result of 
an competence assessment at a moment in time when she was competent. 
This is because any judgment of decisional competence that may follow would 
be unrepresentative of her usual level of decisional incompetence753. This is 
compatible with PTDCJ in so far as it requires that a test of decisional 
competence reflect whether the decisional competence in question is a standing 
feature of the individual, but is incompatible given that it is applied with regard to 
a risk-relative theory of competence.
The position of FPCLC in respect of 16-17 year-olds to consent to treatment is 
found in s. 8(1) of the Family Law Reform Act 1969. The section provides that 
consent to surgical, medical or dental treatment on behalf of the minor should 
be given effect and supplementary consent need not be sought from the minor’s 
parents754. This statutory presumption of FPCLC is indicative of a legal 
presumption of decisional competence, but one which is subject to the 
qualification that it is still possible for someone with parental authority or the 
court to override refusal755. When the MCA 2005 comes into force in 2007, 
however, the test of capacity set out in s. 3 will apply to young people above the 
age of 16 to consent to treatment and research. Moreover, as we acknowledged 
earlier, an adult for the purposes of the Clinical Trials Regulations is defined as 
someone aged 16 and above. This may create a tension with the existing case
752 Re R. (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1992] Fam. 11.
753 Referring to the facts of the case, Lord Donaldson said: “Even if she [R] was capable on a 
good day of a sufficient degree of understanding to meet the Gillick criteria, her mental disability 
. . .  was such that on other days she was not only ‘Gillick incompetent’, but actually 
sectionable”. Assuming that Donaldson is correct about this, then R should be considered a 
societally incompetent agent, for whom the treatment is necessary in order to protect her from 
causing unintended harm to herself or others. Ibid at p. 26.
754 s. 8(2) states: “The consent of a minor who has attained the age of sixteen years to any 
surgical, medical or dental treatment which, in the absence of consent, would constitute a 
trespass to the person, shall be as effective as it would be if he were of full age; and where a 
minor has by virtue of this section given effective consent to any treatment it shall not be 
necessary to obtain any consent for it from his parent or guardian.”
755 Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court's Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam. 64.
law, as s. 2(3) of the Act states that age cannot be determinative of capacity756. 
It also gives rise to a bizarre current situation whereby a 16 year-old cannot 
refuse treatment on her own behalf but can consent to research757.
In one sense, s. 8(1) is an extension of risk-relative Gillick competence. 
However, there is an important difference. Where Gillick can be described more 
accurately as a partial instantiation of a demonstrable risk-relative competence 
(insofar as the competence must be proved to the satisfaction of the assessor), 
both the FPCLC of 16-17 year olds to consent to treatment and FPCLC of 
adults for the same are instances of a presumed decisional competence. In 
both cases, this is defeasible when the individual in question is found through 
subsequent examination to lack the cognitive requirements for decisional 
competence in that regard. The difference between the FPCLC of adults and 
the FPCLC of 16-17 years olds is that the former do not also have a rebuttable 
presumption to refuse. Therefore, the theory of decisional competence that 
informs the position in relation to 16 and 17 years olds is as asymmetrical as in 
Gillick.
This view was endorsed subsequently in respect of 16-17 year olds in Re W (a 
minor) (medical treatment: court’s jurisdiction)758, where it was held that the 
court could exercise extensive powers of wardship to act in the best interests of 
the young person. Lord Donaldson held unequivocally that it is not possible for 
the refusal of any person under the age of 18 to override the consent of 
someone with parental authority or the court759. Similarly, Lord Balcombe 
looked at the wording of s. 8(3) of the Act and concluded that it was not possible 
to construct an interpretation to provide for an absolute right of refusal760. 
However, Lord Donaldson intriguingly supposed a difference between medical 
law and medical ethics, which he took to mean that an abortion performed on a
756 Pattinson (2006:159) also makes this observation.
757 It is worth noting that the position of 16-17 year olds to make treatment decisions is more 
akin to a decision-relative approach in Scotland than it is in England and Wales. Given that s. 
8(1) of the Family Law Reform Act 1969 only applies to England and Wales, the only relevant 
legislation is the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991. This allows all young people over
the age of 16 both to consent to and to refuse medical treatment and research, without parental 
or court interference. In cases of mental incapacity, however, the rules in respect of best 
interests and proxy consent set out in the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 (the sibling 
legislation of the MCA 2005 in Scotland) will apply.
759 [1993] Fam. 64.
759 Ibid, at p. 84.
760 Ibid at p. 86.
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16 or 17 year old without her consent but with the consent of the parents would 
be unlikely to go ahead, unless it was in the young person’s best interests761. 
This suggests that positive law is not the only factor which judges are prepared 
to consider when a tension arises between FPCLC and decisional competence.
Of course, given our earlier recognition that first-person legal capacity need not 
be construed in terms of decisional competence, it is theoretically possible to 
frame a test of FPCLC in asymmetrical terms without incurring internal 
incoherence. There is nothing inherent in the definition of legal capacity that 
requires FPCLC to attach to all possible options in a given decision making 
context. This approach is more plausible given that, currently, FPCLC is not 
necessarily connected to decision-making competence. However, this is a much 
less plausible explanation for Gillick, because of the ubiquitous association of 
the word ‘competence’ by the judiciary as well as in academic debate with the 
Gillick standard. Therefore, if one takes the view I argued for in Chapter One 
which claims risk-relative decisional competence are incoherent, then Gillick 
competence and s. 8(1) of the Family Law Reform Act 1969 are not strictly tests 
of decisional competence at all but instead consent-relative ascriptions of 
FPCLC which follow an outcome test approach. It follows that Gillick is a test of 
FPCLC explicitly invoking notions of decisional competence, whose 
philosophical foundations defy the nature of decision-making. It would have 
been more appropriate, therefore, had the Gillick test been named ‘Gillick 
capacity’.
Problems surrounding the use of capacity
One might object that the British Government’s choice to frame legal capacity in 
terms of mental capacity/incapacity through the MCA 2005 is confusing. This is 
underscored if one recalls the traditional division whereby legal capacity was 
restricted to legal discourse and mental capacity used in medicine and 
psychology762. However, if we recall the appreciable extent to which FPCLC is 
defined in terms of decisional competence in English law, then using mental 
capacity as a synonym for competence might be construed as simply describing
761 Ibid, at p. 79.
762 Law Commission of England and Wales (1991:19).
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the same relationship by using different terminology763. Understood in these 
terms, this is merely an innocuous substitution.
This would be a hasty conclusion to reach. Let us first consider the prospects of 
mental capacity as a ‘new legal concept’. Clearly, from the nomenclature of the 
Act, mental capacity is used in preference to legal capacity. This may have 
been as a result of a deliberate political choice to emphasise that the Act is 
seeking to legislate for the position of those who are commonly referred to 
outside of legal circles as lacking mental capacity. It is clear from the Act that all 
persons without mental capacity will not have FPCLC under the Act and that 
some of these persons with mental incapacity, by virtue of having created an 
LPA before the onset of their incompetence, will have legal capacity exercised 
on their behalf through their surrogate (the second sense of legal capacity 
elaborated in Chapter One)764.
However, this is not the same as claiming that all persons without FPCLC will 
also lack mental capacity, on which the Act is silent. As mental capacity is 
defined in terms of criteria for decisional competence set out in s. 2 and 3 of the 
Act, it is highly foreseeable that there will be groups of individuals who would 
meet this standard of mental capacity, but who, due to countervailing legal 
principles in statute and the common law, do not have the relevant FPCLC to 
come within its ambit. Examples would be decisionally competent fourteen or 
fifteen year olds who wish to consent to medical research on their own behalf or 
sixteen and seventeen year olds who wish to refuse medical treatment without 
the risk of that refusal being overruled by parent/guardian or by the courts765.
763 This convergence of terminology has had a long history in the proposals for law reform that 
led up to the passing of the Act (Law Commission, 1993,1995; Lord Chancellor’s Department, 
1997,1999; Department of Constitutional Affairs, 2003).
764 ‘LPA’ refers to Lasting Power of Attorney, an expanded class of legally authorised surrogate 
decision-makers created by the MCA 2005 (replacing the old ‘enduring power of attorney’). 
Once implemented in English Law, s. 11 (7)(c) of the Act will allow an LPA to give or refuse 
consent to the continuation or carrying out of treatment by a person providing health care for a 
decisionally incompetent individual. In respect of medical research, Schedule 1 Part 5 of The 
Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004 already allows for a legal 
representative to consent to research participation on behalf of a mentally incompetent 
individual where the research is being conducted into a ‘life-threatening or debilitating condition 
from which the subject suffers’ (Part 5, s. 11).
765 Levine (1986: 261) identifies this distinction by employing the terms 'de jure’ and ‘de facto’ 
incompetence, where ‘de jure’ incompetence is an absence of FPCLC to decide (even though 
the person may in fact have decisional competence) and ‘de facto’ incompetence is an absence 
of decisional competence, which will usually be accompanied by an absence of FPCLC.
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Thus, the presumption in favour of mental capacity set out in s. 1(2) of the MCA 
2005 does not cover all individuals who are capable of making decisions and 
will be circumscribed by other legal principles. Moreover, as the British Medical 
Association and the Law Society have observed, mental capacity can mean 
something different to each profession involved in assessing it766. There is, 
then, the potential for mental capacity and legal capacity to be in practice 
informed by different standards, even though the Act suggests otherwise.
Towards supported decision-making?
In the Joint Committee Report on the Draft Mental Incapacity Bill (the precursor 
to the MCA 2005), the Making Decisions Alliance (a lobbying organisation which 
represents a variety of support groups) pointed out that the then Draft Mental 
Incapacity Bill perceives decisional competence as either fully present or fully 
absent. It would be preferable, they insisted, that steps should be taken to 
ensure that decision-making is supported through accessible information and 
communication767. This parallels the argument I have made earlier in this thesis.
There is a requirement in s. 1 (3) of the MCA 2005 that an individual should not 
be treated as incapable of making a decision “unless all practicable steps to 
enable him to do so have been taken without success”. Similarly, the Human 
Tissue Act 2004 makes provisions relating to “appropriate consent” for the 
removal and storage of tissue from adults and children who have capacity, 
although nowhere in the Act is there reference to steps that must be followed to 
preserve or enhance capacity. No case law has considered the question of what 
constitutes ‘practicable steps’ due to the Act not yet being in force. However, 
the wording of the explanatory Draft Code of Practice provides some 
enlightenment, suggesting as examples of ‘help and support’ in relation to 
preserving capacity, “using specific communication strategies, providing 
information in an accessible form, or treating an underlying mental disorder to 
enable a person to regain capacity”768. Paragraphs 3:15-3:19 elaborate on 
these around the general ethos of enabling or helping someone to make their
766 British Medical Association and the Law Society (2004: 4).
767 Joint Committee on the Draft Mental Incapacity Bill (2003: 24, para. 73).
768 Department of Constitutional Affairs (2006), para. 2.10
own decisions. The core objectives of supported decision-making could fall 
within a broad interpretation of any of these three examples of help and support.
By way of comparison, s. 1(6) of the equivalent Scottish provision, the Adults 
With Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 stipulates that “a person shall not fall within 
this definition [the definition of incapability of making a decision] by reason only 
of a lack or deficiency in a faculty of communication if that lack or deficiency can 
be made good by human or mechanical aid (whether of an interpretative nature 
or otherwise).” s. 1(6) does not suggest that the Scottish legislation is 
necessarily premised on concept of supported decision-making. However, the 
wording of this section certainly suggests that supportive interventions are of 
utmost importance when a determination of mental capacity is at stake. Indeed, 
the emphasis placed upon remedying shortcomings of communication by an 
unspecified range of interpretative devices appears to increase the possibility of 
its implementation. If a permissive interpretation of the duties upon physicians 
and researchers is adopted in relation to the MCA 2005 -  and the Scottish 
legislation may prove a persuasive referent for the English courts - then there is 
greater potential for a legal accommodation of supported decision-making in 
English law.
It is important to emphasise that the MCA 2005 could not accommodate 
supported decision-making by way of the role of the Independent Mental 
Capacity Advocate769. The function of the Advocate is qualitatively different in 
two respects from the concept of supported decision-making. First, the 
Advocate pertains only to individuals who have already been found to be 
incompetent to make decisions of that particular type. It does not encompass 
individuals with questionable capacity who may still be able to make decisions 
of that type. The use of Advocates are restricted to scenarios where the person 
for whom the intervention is designed to benefit does not have a Lasting Power 
of Attorney or a Deputy appointed. Unlike the supported decision-making 
approach, then, the Advocate becomes operative only where an individual 
already has been found to lack decisional competence and where no other 
authorised surrogate exists.
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769 Set out in s. 35-41 of the MCA 2005.
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Second, the role of Mental Capacity Advocate is limited to certain specified 
scenarios: provision of serious treatment by an NHS body and provision of 
accommodation by an NHS body or by a local authority770. This adds weight to 
the terminological preference for ‘supported decision-making’ in favour of 
‘advocacy’, which has a distinct legal meaning as a result of the implementation 
of the MCA 2005. The former more easily accommodates the idea of provision 
of information and advice to an adult who is still competent, in spite of 
experiencing a mental disorder771.
The significance of European regulation of capacity
Recommendation No. R (99) 4 (1999) of the Committee of Ministers to Member 
States on Principles Concerning the Legal Protection of Incapable Adults772 
emphasises the preservation of decisional competence as the central value that 
should underpin any approach to dealing with individuals with mental 
impairment. It was devised by a group of specialists on Incapable Adults (CJ-S- 
Ml) set up by the Council of Europe in 1995773. As a Recommendation, it has no 
binding force within EU law, but it embodies nonetheless a clear articulation of 
decisional competence and its relationship with FPCLC:
“Principle 3 -  Maximum preservation o f capacity.
1. The legislative framework should, so far as possible, recognise 
that different degrees of incapacity may exist and that incapacity may 
vary from time to time. Accordingly, a measure of protection should 
not necessarily result automatically in a complete removal of legal 
capacity. However, a restriction of legal capacity should be possible 
where it is shown to be necessary for the protection of the person 
concerned.
2. In particular, a measure of protection should not automatically 
deprive the person concerned of the right to . . . consent or refuse
770 s. 37-39.
771 In the Consultation on the Independent Mental Capacity Advocate Service (UK Department 
of Health, 2005), the Government signalled their willingness to consider expanding the service 
to include individuals who are not suffering from mental incapacity for the purposes of the Act 
and intimated that the service could expand to include research (ibid: 38). However, the 
significant costs associated with expanding this service and the lack of enthusiasm for it in the 
consultation means that this has not been carried forward in the Department of Health’s 2006 
response to the consultation or in the draft version of The Mental Capacity Act 2005 
(Independent Mental Capacity Advocates) (Expansion of Role) Regulations 2006, currently 
before Parliament at the time of writing (October 2006).
772 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers (1999).
773 Jansen (2000: 333).
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consent to any intervention in the health field, or to make other 
decisions of a personal character at a time when his or her capacity 
permits him or her to do so.”774
These principles are close in nature and application to the MCA 2005 and to 
PTDCJ. Section 1 defines ‘incapacity’ as a task specific or decision-relative 
quality rather than as a lack of agency competence. This section also enhances 
definitional clarity by distinguishing mental capacity from legal capacity. This is 
welcome as it seeks to avoid the potential conflation that stems from the 
unqualified use of ‘capacity’. However, as there appears to be a strong 
connection between the decision-relative use of ‘capacity’ and ‘legal capacity’ 
(used in the sense of FPCLC), a lack of FPCLC can be taken to amount to a 
legal recognition of the absence of a task specific or decision-relative 
competence rather than as an inability to exercise any FPCLC at all.
From the perspective of PTDCJ, this is a justifiable interpretation of FPCLC, as 
it is only withheld in spheres of activity where decisional competence is not 
apparent. Furthermore, the measures of protection that are proposed are 
proportionate to the task and decisional inabilities that a person may possess. 
This is very similar to how we must treat societally incompetent agents. 
Although there may be grounds for additional protections (the words ‘not 
automatically’ suggesting there is some scope for depriving an individual of 
FPCLC if on the evidence, the individual lacks decisional competence in this 
respect), the overriding consideration is the respect for individual autonomy.
In section 2, there is an explicit recognition that the protection owed to an 
individual with an unrelated specific task or decisional incompetence need not 
render the individual incapable of being able to make decisions about medical 
intervention, providing that she does possess decisional competence in this 
respect. We do not need to speculate as to the meaning of “interventions in the 
health field”, as earlier in the Recommendation, the definition is framed to 
include both treatment and research775. The inclusion of the phrase "consent or 
refuse” substantiates our above claim that the use of ‘capacity’ in the 
Recommendation is clearly premised upon a decision-relative concept of
774 Part 2, Principle, 3, s. 1-2.
775 Principles - Part 1 -  Scope of application, para. 5.
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competence. It also provides support for the view that we should respect the 
competences of individuals at the time they are exhibited, even if at previous or 
subsequent times they are absent.
Later in the Recommendation, Principle 22 states that provided an adult is 
capable of giving informed consent even where an adult is the recipient of 
protective measures, the intervention may only be carried out with his or her 
consent776. But how can we know, under the Recommendation, whether or not 
an individual is indeed decisionally competent to give or withhold consent? 
Principle 12 stipulates, “[T]here should be adequate procedures for the 
investigation and assessment of the adult’s personal faculties”777, although no 
reference is made to the form or substance that the competence assessment 
would take or the standards to which it should have recourse. This devolves 
responsibility for devising or choosing a competence assessment measure to 
an unnamed third party and appears not to require consistency in approach. 
Without any elaboration of the test which may be used to assess competence, 
the Recommendation’s intention to preserve capacity as long as possible is 
compromised.
Other instruments offer a much reduced potential to further our understanding 
of the regulatory meaning of ‘capacity’. The two principal instruments that seek 
to regulate research on human subjects in the EU, the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine (ECHRB)778, along with its Additional Protocol 
on Biomedical Research 779 and the Clinical Trials Directive (Directive 
2001/20/EC)780, emphasise special protections owed toward the participation of 
adults who may be suffering from mental disorder and children. However, none 
discuss the issue of the assessment or preservation of decisional competence 
or FPCLC. Indeed, the phrasing of the ECHRB and the Clinical Trials 
Regulations suggests that they approach the issue of the participation of the 
mentally disordered in medical research not from the standpoint where capacity 
is assessed prior to surrogate decision-making measures but that surrogate
778 Part 5, Principle 22, s. 1.
777 Part 3, Principle 12, s. 1.
778 Council of Europe (1997). As of 1 October 2006, the UK still has not signed up to the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine.
779 Council of Europe (2005).
780 Directive 2001/20/EC, OJ L 121,1.5.2001.
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decision-making should be a given in medical research with mentally disordered 
individuals. Where brief reference is made to cases of doubtful competence in 
Article 14(3) of the Additional Protocol to the ECHRB on Biomedical Research, 
there is simply a statement that “arrangements shall be in place to verify 
whether or not the person has such capacity”. There is no attempt to expand 
upon what form these arrangements might take or to what criteria these 
arrangements must adhere.
On other occasions, we can witness internal incoherence within the same 
guidance on capacity. In the 2000 Council of Europe White Paper on the 
protection of the human rights and dignity of people suffering from mental 
disorder, especially those placed as involuntary patients in a psychiatric 
establishment781, it was suggested that the concept of mental capacity in 
Europe was inadequately articulated and needed development. Interestingly, 
the Council of Europe thought such mentally disordered persons should be 
protected from involvement in non-therapeutic clinical trials even if they consent 
to them781 82. It would appear that the White Paper saw scope for development of 
FPCLC more in terms of pursuing a restrictive line, in which paternalistic 
considerations could trump the moral authority of a decisionally competent 
consent. This is redolent of the status test of FPCLC outlined at the beginning of 
the chapter, which if used, would circumscribe the autonomy of decisionally 
competent patients, re-conceptualizing the best interests test as one which 
applies to competent cognitively vulnerable research participants as well as 
incompetent individuals. This would be incompatible with the approach taken 
under PTDCJ, as unless the research had not been subjected to ethical review 
or had failed such review (as measured by the PGC), decisional competence to 
consent should be a sufficient condition for participation.
The emphasis that the Convention and the Directive place upon research 
relating to a condition experienced by the individual concerned is clearly 
motivated by an intention not to exploit the vulnerability of the individuals 
concerned. Nonetheless, there is a pervasive deficiency with the unexplored
781 Council of Europe (2000).
782 p. 34 paragraph 32. This reiterates Article 5, paragraph 3 of Recommendation No. R 83(2) 
(1983) concerning the legal protection of persons suffering from mental disorder placed as 
involuntary patients without any discernible justification.
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division of research subjects into individuals capable and incapable of giving 
consent without first addressing the issue of capacity assessment. Equally, 
there is no reference to why preserving capacity should be valuable and how it 
should be undertaken in the context of medical research. Due to a silence on 
the issue of assessing and judging competence found in all these instruments 
surveyed, along with any meaningful reference to supported decision-making, 
the status of decisional competence to consent and its ability to inform 
ascriptions of FPCLC is frustrated.
Ethical guidance on decisional competence in biomedical 
research in the UK
The ethical guidelines that have emerged on the protection of human subjects 
in clinical research in the UK since the beginning of the 1990s have preceded 
legal discussion of these issues. Typically, there are three forms of ethical 
guidance in research, that which covers good practice in research generally, 
that which pertains to adults and that which pertains to children.
One of the first guidelines to be issued that is still in circulation is The Ethical 
Conduct of Research on the Mentally Incapacitated, a set of guidelines issued 
by the Medical Research Council (MRC) in 199 1 783. They conclude in 
paragraph 8.1 that, “Many people with mental impairment or disorder are able to 
consent to their inclusion in research provided care is taken to explain it to 
them”. Whilst now somewhat dated, the MRC’s recommendations are 
encouraging. They recognise the need to elicit the decisional competence of 
individuals with mental disorder and intimate that capacity should be preserved 
as far as possible, pre-empting the 1999 Council of Europe Recommendation. 
In this sense, they represent a progressive attitude towards the participation of 
mentally disordered adults in medical research. However, they do not expand 
upon how this might be done, nor how to preserve decisional competence in 
adults whose decisional competence is in decline (such as in dementia).
783 Medical Research Council (1991). These guidelines are in the process of being revised in 
order to reflect the legal developments brought about by the MCA 2005 and the Clinical Trials 
Regulations 2004.
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In 2001, the UK Department of Health published its guidance on informed 
consent to medical examinations or treatment784. This also includes discussion 
of consent to research. It stipulates:
“2.6. Care should also be taken not to underestimate the capacity of a patient 
with a learning disability to understand. Many people with learning disabilities 
have the capacity to consent if time is spent explaining to the individual the 
issues in simple language, using visual aids and signing if necessary785.
15. . . . when seeking consent from patients for research purposes . . . 
“particular care” should be taken to ensure that possible research subjects 
have the fullest possible information about the proposed study and sufficient 
time to absorb it. Patients should never feel pressurized to take part, and 
advice must be given that they can withdraw from the research project at any 
time, without their care being affected. If patients are being offered the 
opportunity to participate in a clinical trial, they should have clear information 
on the nature of the trial.”786
This guidance reflects a belief in the maximization of FPCLC to consent through 
the role of education and information provision. The specific reference to the 
assessment of decision-relative decisional competence supports PTDCJ and 
the tenor of the 1999 Recommendation, and shares affinities with the MCA 
2005. Furthermore, the emphasis placed upon learning disabilities or factors 
that may lead to temporary decisional incompetence as constituting no 
necessary impediment to FPCLC serves to entrench the relationship between 
the two. There is also a clear recognition that these principles should be applied 
with even greater care to research as to treatment. This reflects the common 
lack of personal benefit in the case of research, and the greater level of 
comprehension required in order to consent.
Specifically in relation to research, the General Medical Council in its 2001 draft 
guidance on the role and responsibilities of doctors in medical research787 
explicitly states, “most adults with mental illness or disorders are competent to 
decide whether or not to participate in research’’788. The final version of the 
guidance, published in 2002, goes on to refer to assessing decisional 
competence to consent with vulnerable adult research participants. According to
784 UK Department of Health (2001).
785 UK Department of Health (2001: 7).
786 UK Department of Health (2001: 19).
787 General Medical Council (2001). Curiously, this statement was not adopted in the final 
version of the guidance (General Medical Council (2002)), but there is nothing in the final 
version that would contradict this statement.
788 General Medical Council (2001, para. 30).
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para. 43, vulnerable adults include those experiencing mental disorder or 
intellectual disabilities, along with institutionalized adults and frail elderly 
persons. The GMC acknowledge that consent sought under the pressures from 
the health care professionals or institutions with which they have contact might 
compromise the validity of that consent. However, these adults can be 
“competent but vulnerable" and that to omit research with vulnerable groups 
simply because of the ethical issues to which it gives rise could constitute a 
form of discrimination789. They go on, in paras. 44 and 46 to recommend 
approaches to dealing with members of these groups sensitively:
44. Careful consideration should therefore be given to involving 
vulnerable adults in research, and particular attention should be given to 
the consent process, ensuring that they have sufficient information 
provided in a suitable format, and enough time to consider the issues. 
You should give consideration to their vulnerability and difficulties they 
may have in understanding or retaining information. You may need to 
encourage them to seek the help of a relative/close friend, support 
worker/advocate. You should proceed with the research only if you 
believe that the participant's consent is voluntary and based on an 
understanding of the information they have been given790.
46. Where participants have difficulty retaining information, or are only 
intermittently competent to make a decision, you should provide any 
assistance they might need to reach an informed decision. You should 
record any decision made while they were competent, including the key 
elements of the consultation. You should review any decision made whilst 
they were competent at appropriate intervals before the research starts, 
and at intervals during the study, to establish that their views are 
consistently held and can be relied on791.
This indicates that there are grounds for the inclusion of cognitively vulnerable 
adults by virtue of consistency in their decision-making, and assistance of their 
understanding (presumably in the form of greater explanation of the nature and 
purpose of the research, along the lines of the studies we examined in Chapter 
Six). This approach is at odds with the position of children under 16 who are 
“intermittently competent to make a decision”, given that as we saw earlier, they 
are not considered to possess decisional competence for sufficient length of 
time to be considered Gillick competent792.
789 General Medical Council (2002, para. 43).
790 General Medical Council (2002, para. 44).
791 General Medical Council (2002, para. 46).
792 Re R. (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1992] Fam. 11.
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This anomaly raises the issue of what could justify the participation of adults 
with fluctuating decisional competence to consent but not children. A plausible 
response is the need for a consistent set of values to underpin decision-making, 
emphasised in the competence theories of Beauchamp and Wicclair considered 
in Chapter One. Whereas adults with intermittent decisional competence are 
more probably in possession of these values, an older child or adolescent with 
fluctuating capacity is more probably not in possession of them. This is 
generally reflective of the evidence for task and decisional competences that 
typically differentiates adults and children, with the adult more probably having 
more task and decisional competences and to a greater degree, and the child 
probably having fewer task and decisional competences, and to a lesser 
degree.
The Medical Research Council issued guidance in 2004, entitled Medical 
Research Involving Children, which replaced its earlier guidance on the same 
issue793. It recommends:
“Seeking consent is not a single response but a process. The child 
should be provided with information appropriate to his or her increasing 
ability to make decisions about complex and serious issues. It is helpful 
for researchers to produce child-friendly information in a form 
appropriate for the relevant age groups -  this could make use of 
pictures or videos. More than one version may need to be produced if 
research covers a wide age range, such as eight-18 years”.794
These recommendations present potentially effective solutions with which to 
elicit her understanding. Unlike the previous guidance we have examined, they 
suggest examples as well as general strategies for achieving this. The MRC’s 
recommendation is predicated on a belief that young people can and should 
become involved in making decisions about themselves and thus meshes with a 
number of approaches that seek to encourage the child to develop her own 
autonomy, without simply abandoning her to it. Unlike the previous edition of the 
guidance, there is also an explicit recognition that the decisional abilities of 
children change vastly from early childhood to adolescence and that forms of 
supported decision-making need to be tailored to the needs of the age group. It
793 Medical Research Council (2004).
794 Medical Research Council (2004: 34).
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is hoped that the empowering and supportive model of developing decisional 
competence proposed here will find widespread acceptance.
Summary
Decisional competence has no legal status in English law. Although British 
judges and academic lawyers frequently invoke the term ‘competence’ in 
discussions of cases involving ‘capacity to consent’, it would appear to be no 
more than as a synonym for a poorly defined notion of legal capacity. It is poorly 
defined because there is no attempt to distinguish between the three types of 
legal capacity which we introduced in Chapter One. This has given rise to a 
conflation of competence and capacity in English Law, as we cannot ultimately 
know in what sense competence is being invoked by the unqualified term 
‘capacity’. This risks jeopardizing legal clarity and consistency.
The emergence of ‘mental capacity’ as a new legal concept does suggest a 
close link between a notion of FPCLC defined in terms of mental capacity 
(which the MCA 2005 embodies) and decisional competence. However, there is 
no necessary connection between the two. There remains a possibility for 
FPCLC and mental capacity to be assessed by different standards in spite of 
the correspondence between s.2(a-d) of the MCA 2005 and decision-relative 
decisional competence. This, along with the silence surrounding whether those 
persons without FPCLC should therefore be considered as not having mental 
capacity suggest that mental capacity cannot be read entirely as a synonym for 
decisional competence.
Whilst the definition of mental capacity in the Act maintains internal coherence, 
when applied to these broader questions raised by factors outside of the Act, 
questions arise about its external coherence. If one is seeking clarity and 
consistency in the law, it would have been wiser to have renamed mental 
capacity in the Act as FPCLC, which will minimize ambiguity and also admit 
more clearly and consistently of the distinction between FPCLC, delegable legal 
capacity and fiduciary legal capacity. Insofar as individuals could still have 
decisional competence to consent when they lack FPCLC to do so, FPCLC 
should be formulated so that there is a necessary conceptual relationship
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between the two. A second legal category, delegable legal capacity, should be 
created to accommodate surrogate decision-making, and the third, fiduciary 
legal capacity, to refer to decision making by parents or carers on the part of 
young children.
Legislating for decisional competence to consent to medical research is a first 
step towards clarity and consistency in the law. But this needs to be 
accompanied by a higher profile for supported decision-making than is currently 
accorded in the MCA 2005 to ensure that it is seen as a mandatory part of the 
consent seeking process in medical research, rather than a more nebulous form 
of ‘good practice’. In this chapter, we have witnessed the beginning of moves in 
this direction, within the MCA 2005 Draft Code of Practice, the 1999 Council of 
Europe Recommendation and in ethical guidance from the GMC and the MRC. 
Ultimately, however, success in meeting these aims depends also upon 
maintaining and cultivating attitudes of compassion, ethical integrity, fairness 
and diligence amongst those responsible for making judgments of competence 
and supporting decision-making in both the medical and legal fields. Legislating 
for this is much more problematic.
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Chapter Eight
Cognitive vulnerability and 
consent to biomedical research in 
the United States
That much bioethical literature on competence has emanated from the US 
makes the regulatory position worth studying. In this final chapter, we will 
consider to what extent there are, if at all, coherent standards of decisional 
competence to consent and FPCLC in the United States both at a federal and 
state level, and if so, whether they are consistent with PTDCJ. The chapter 
begins by establishing the meaning of competence and capacity in the United 
States in order to investigate whether FPCLC is synonymous with decisional 
competence, and the extent to which cognitive vulnerability militates against 
this. We will go on to consider how federal and state laws approach 
competence and identify selected policy proposals that have addressed the 
competence of cognitively vulnerable participants in medical research. Where 
relevant, we will consider the prospects for supported decision-making under 
existing laws and ethical guidelines.
The meaning of competence and capacity in the United States
In the United States, competence is primarily a legal construct. Capacity, 
instead, refers to a clinical judgment of a present or future level of decision­
making ability that has no necessary legal consequences795. Unlike informed 
consent, however, neither competence nor capacity possesses a statutory 
definition. Their practical meaning is therefore harder to establish796.
795 Berg et at. (1996: 348: n. 14).7 i lth0U9t!! Pio in Si0nH UbliC °,Utrage followin9 the Tuskegee and Willowbrook research studies in the 1950s and 1960s raised interest in the ethir«? nf * researcn
little attention has been devoted to competence and capacity. ent’ comParat,ve|y
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The US regulatory model is limited. Meslin argues, “[t]he prevailing model of 
informed consent in research involving human subjects . . . reflected in US 
guidelines and regulations, is best understood as one in which a competent, 
otherwise healthy adult is invited to participate in a clinical trial of new 
medication”797. Berg et algo further, arguing:
“presently there is a lack of both an authoritative framework for 
thinking about legal competence and clear standards for 
determining it. Cases and statutes generally lack sufficient analysis 
of competence and its different elements . . . Even where a statute 
articulates a standard of competence, it is often vague and provides 
little guidance for those who must apply it.”798.
The absence of an explicit standard of decisional competence suggests that the 
legislature and judiciary assume that anyone who consents to the satisfaction of 
the assessor will be thereby competent in this respect. However, without first 
establishing decisional competence, particularly where there are grounds for 
calling such competence into question, the moral and legal validity of any 
resulting consent is undermined. To provide relevant information to the potential 
participant in an environment free from coercion or undue influence will not 
compensate for undeveloped decisional competence.
That competence assessments made by medical practitioners are not legally 
binding underpins the legal marginalization of decisional competence in the 
United States. According to Berg and Appelbaum, “in most jurisdictions, only a 
court can decide whether a patient is incompetent’’799. This is extraordinary, 
given the role of the psychiatrist, physician or researcher is to usually make the 
primary determination of competence or incompetence, which in most cases will 
stand unless the individual about who the judgment is made appeals against 
this through the courts. Moreover, medical practitioners are usually better 
informed to measure competence to consent than judges, given their specialist 
training and direct contact with the potential participant.
Of course, the courts should occupy a role in assessing the procedural integrity 
of competence assessments, particularly if there is dispute about whether or not
797 Meslin (2001:151).
798 Berg etal. (1996: 348-349).
799 Berg and Appelbaum (1999:82, n. 1).
Cognitively vulnerability and consent to biomedical research in the United States 226
an individual has decisional competence to consent. However, if competence 
judgements are to be made upon criteria such as understanding, reasoning and 
appreciation that require psychological understanding by the potential 
participant, any substantive determination of competence must be influenced by 
the judgment of specialist medical practitioners, such as psychiatrists. While US 
law may claim competence as its own concern, it is clearly unwilling to give the 
competence determinations of healthcare professionals legal standing.
Federal law
In 1981, federal regulations were introduced in the United States establishing a 
national legal framework in respect of research on adult human subjects. These 
regulations comprise the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects 
(FPPHS)800, which were subsequently adopted by sixteen US federal agencies 
in 1991, and as such have come to be known as the 'Common Rule’.
Subpart A of the FPPHS is the primary source of research regulation in the 
United States. It applies to all research involving human subjects “conducted, 
supported or otherwise subject to regulation by any Federal Department or 
Agency”801 both inside and outside the United States and includes research 
conducted by Federal civilian employees or military personnel. The sections 
relevant to consent and capacity are given below.
“§46.116 General requirements for informed consent
Except as provided elsewhere in this policy, no investigator may 
involve a human being as a subject in research covered by this 
policy unless the investigator has obtained the legally effective 
informed consent of the subject or the subject's legally authorized 
representative [emphasis added]. An investigator shall seek such 
consent only under circumstances that provide the prospective 
subject or the representative sufficient opportunity to consider 
whether or not to participate and that minimize the possibility of 
coercion or undue influence. The information that is given to the 
subject or the representative shall be in language understandable to 
the subject or the representative.
800 Basic DHHS (Department of Health and Human Services) Policy for the Protection of Human 
Research Subjects, 45 Code of Federal Regulations Part 46: Revised June 23 2005; Effective 
June 23 2005.
801 §46.101, a.
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. . . ( d )  An IRB802 may approve a consent procedure which does not 
include, or which alters, some or all of the elements of informed 
consent set forth in this section, or waive the requirements to obtain 
informed consent provided the IRB finds and documents that:
(1 ) the research involves no more than minimal risk to the subjects:
(2 ) the waiver or alteration will not adversely affect the rights and 
welfare of the subjects;
(3 ) the research could not practicably be carried out without the 
waiver or alteration; and
(4) whenever appropriate, the subjects will be provided with 
additional pertinent information after participation.”803
The FPPHS clarifies the requirements for informed consent in meticulous detail. 
Inexplicably, there appears to be a prima facie presumption that any potential 
research subject will be ipso facto competent but nowhere does it specify the 
requirements for competence. §46.116 part (a) 1-8 and (b) 1-6 are framed in 
terms of what the researcher must do to discharge her legal duty to the potential 
participant, without considering that the potential participant herself will usually 
be disempowered due to lack of medical training, knowledge of the research 
process, and the common feeling of being overwhelmed by having to absorb a 
great deal of new information. Although there are numerous legal protections in 
this section, including the prohibition of terms of consent that waive the 
subject’s legal rights, these requirements appear to ignore the inherent 
vulnerability of research subjects. Nowhere is there recognition that a process 
of obtaining consent must prioritize support and counselling as highly as a 
specification of how much and what kind of information to disclose.
It is unclear as to why §46.116 negates the assessment of competence, which 
is a sine qua non of the informed consent process. Given that there are few 
cases in the US that address competence to consent to treatment, and none in 
respect of research804, this is a disappointing omission. Additionally, the wording 
of §46.116 (d) that permits the IRB to approve a consent procedure that alters 
or even waives entirely the requirement to obtain informed consent within the 
context of “public benefit or service programs" generates concern. The kinds of 
programs this section is referring to are not disclosed, which increases the
802 Institutional Review Board.
803 §46.116
804 Berg etal. (2001:266).
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amount of interpretative discretion this confers upon the state or local 
government officials805.
The ultimate impression gained from a critical analysis of the FPPHS is one of 
an intricate framework intended to respond to the concerns of IRBs and 
investigators by systematising what must be done to absolve them from civil 
liability in the event of a negligence or other tortious action. In other words, the 
securing of informed consent is a mere formality that does not recognise the 
inherent inequality in the relationship between the researcher and potential 
participant and the consequent vulnerability experienced by the latter. The fact 
that there is no reference to ascertaining or judging competence, or supporting 
decision-making, is particularly disappointing.
Federal legislation governing research with children was introduced in 1983. 
This has since been subsumed as Subpart D of the FPPHS.806 The definition of 
a child is a person who has not yet reached, “the legal age for consent to 
treatments or procedures involved in the research” in the jurisdiction where the 
research will be carried out807. The relevant sections are given below:
“§46.402 Definitions.
. . . (b) "Assent" means a child's affirmative agreement to
participate in research. Mere failure to object should not, absent 
affirmative agreement, be construed as assent.
§46.408 Requirements for permission by parents or guardians and 
for assent by children
(a) In addition to the determinations required under other applicable 
sections of this subpart, the IRB shall determine that adequate 
provisions are made for soliciting the assent of the children, when in 
the judgment of the IRB the children are capable of providing 
assent. In determining whether children are capable of assenting, 
the IRB shall take into account the ages, maturity, and psychological 
state of the children involved [emphasis added]. This judgment may 
be made for all children to be involved in research under a particular 
protocol, or for each child, as the IRB deems appropriate. If the IRB
805 It is perhaps worth nothing that since October 2000, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
requires education on the protection of human research participants for all investigators 
submitting NIH applications for grants or proposals for contracts or receiving awards for 
research involving human subjects. However, this may be insufficient to educate investigators 
on the issue of competence, unless consideration is also given to its ethical significance.
806 Additional DHHS Protections for Children Involved as Subjects In Research, Subpart D, 45 
CFR 46, (1983).
807 Ibid. §46.402.
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determines that the capability of some or all of the children is so 
limited that they cannot reasonably be consulted or that the 
intervention or procedure involved in the research holds out a 
prospect of direct benefit that is important to the health or well-being 
of the children and is available only in the context of the research, 
the assent of the children is not a necessary condition for 
proceeding with the research [emphasis added]. Even where the 
IRB determines that the subjects are capable of assenting, the IRB 
may still waive the assent requirement under circumstances in 
which consent may be waived in accord with §46.116 of Subpart A. 
(b) In addition to the determinations required under other applicable 
sections of this subpart, the IRB shall determine, in accordance with 
and to the extent that consent is required by §46.116 of Subpart A, 
that adequate provisions are made for soliciting the permission of 
each child's parents or guardian.”808
The definition and practice of assent is fine for all ethical and practical purposes 
when dealing with young children, but under the terms of Subpart D, is meant to 
apply to all individuals who have yet to attain legal majority. It is somewhat 
surprising that there appears to be no provision for case-by-case assessment of 
decisional competence here, or statutory sub-class of young people who are 
presumed to have FPCLC to consent to research. This indicates an inflexible 
shortcoming of the legal provision, which on the face of it, suggests that 
adolescents should be treated the same in law as young children.
§46.407, which pertains to non-therapeutic research, is problematic in so far as 
the assent of children and the permission of parents are required without any 
qualification on the appropriate limits of assent and permission (for instance 
until such a time as the child achieves a sufficient understanding and maturity to 
understand what the research procedure involves). As in Subpart A §46.117, 
Subpart D §46.408 also contains a provision for waiving the assent requirement 
altogether. The foreseeable circumstances in which this could be justified are 
broader than in research with adults, particularly with younger children, but 
there is little discussion of any correlative protection that could be implemented 
in order to ensure that their comparatively greater vulnerability was not 
exploited.
There is however an attempt to sketch a basis for an appropriate mechanism to 
substitute parental permission to research for neglected or abused children, but 
the relevant options available to the IRB are not delineated. One is left
808 Ibid. §46.402, §46.408.
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wondering whether these options specifically concern forms of surrogate 
decision-making or extend to counselling and advice on the part of social 
service professionals. Overall, there is little to commend the structure and 
content of Subpart D of the FPPHS, apart from the rather empty recognition that 
the existence of a statutory framework, although possessive of shortcomings, is 
better than none.
State law
There is some evidence to support the claim that the prevailing legal conception 
of competence, at state level at least, is decision-relative rather than risk- 
relative. In a seminal article, Roth et al observed of the legal position in the US 
that a person “could be considered competent for some legal purposes and 
incompetent for others at the same time. An individual is not judged 
incompetent merely because he or she is mentally ill”809. This assertion is 
endorsed in State of Tennessee Department of Human Services v Mary C. 
Northern81°, in which it was held:
“Capacity means mental ability to make a rational decision, which 
includes the ability to perceive, appreciate all relevant facts and to reach 
a rational judgment upon such facts. Capacity is not necessarily 
synonymous with sanity . . .  A person may have ‘capacity’ as to some 
matters and lack ‘capacity’ as to others.”811 812
It is interesting that in this case ‘capacity’ is used ambiguously. The court 
appears to have either substituted capacity as a synonym for FPCLC or 
expressed support for physician assessment of decisional competence on a 
decision-relative basis. This is confusing, since there is no way of determining 
that the court is making reference to a standard of legal competence or a non- 
legal standard of decisional competence. However, the heavy reliance shown 
by the court upon the New Jersey case of Re Quackenbush812 suggests that the 
standard discussed is more probably legal as well as medical. This case 
involved an elderly individual with fluctuating mental lucidity who refused 
treatment of his own gangrenous legs and was considered decisionally
809 Roth etal. (1977: 280).
810 (1978) 563 S.W. 2d 197 (Tenn Ct App).
811 Todd J, at p. 209.
812 (1978) 156 NJ Super 282, 383 A 2d 785 (Morris County Ct 1978).
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competent to refuse because he was capable of appreciating the nature and 
consequences of his decision. Although the court in Northern found against the 
respondent, reiteration of the emphasis placed in Re Quackenbush upon task- 
specific competences enduring even after the onset of mental impairment 
suggests that legal competence in the US tends towards decision-relativity.
The philosophical origins of competence and capacity in the US reaches back 
to Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospita l3, in which Cardozo J famously 
asserted, “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body’’813 14 815. This principle has now 
become legendary in symbolising the move away from medical paternalism and 
towards patient autonomy during the twentieth century. In the context of the 
time in which it was delivered, this principle was bold and innovative, rejecting 
the previously unquestioned authority of the medical profession. However, 
taken literally, this principle denies FPCLC to children adults with mental 
disorder and adults with mental retardation.
Subsequent case law throughout several US states has neither affirmed nor 
denied this application of the Schloendorff principle, but has refined the concept 
of competence in such a way as to make it unlikely that legal minority or mental 
impairment would alone be sufficient for a determination of legal incompetence. 
In Canterbury v Spence815 the court, after reaffirming the Schloendorff principle, 
held that consent is the “informed exercise of a choice” which requires 
“evaluation of the available options and the risks attached to them”, and that “all 
material relevant to the decision-making process” should be made available, 
according to what a ‘prudent patient’ would wish disclosed816. If the standard of 
the prudent patient is to be interpreted as that of the decisionally competent 
patient, then it follows that this standard comprises both evaluation and 
information comprehension as criteria of competence.
813 (1914) 211 NY 125.
814 (1914)211 NY 125, at p. 126.
815 464 F 2d 772 (DC, 1972).
816 A ‘prudent patient’ is one, according to the court, who would be likely to attach significance to 
the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed therapy. Ibid, at p. 
787.
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However, there are problems with this interpretation. The nomenclature of a 
prudent patient restricts the application of the principle in research settings 
outside of the therapeutic relationship (for example, where the patient is a 
volunteer). It is also probable that, in the absence of a judicial definition of 
competence, the standard of a ‘prudent patient’ is liable to highly subjective 
interpretation by both judges and healthcare professionals when assessing 
competence.
The cases of Re Maida Yetter817 81and Kaimowitz v Michigan Department of 
Mental Health818 both decided in the following year shed further light on two 
divergent legal understandings of competence in the US. Maida Yetter 
concerned a lucid schizophrenic committed to a psychiatric institution who 
refused potentially life-saving treatment. Assessing the context in which the 
refusal was issued, Williams J ruled, “it is clear that mere commitment to a state 
hospital for treatment of mental illness does not destroy a patient’s 
competency”819. This view is welcome from the perspective of PTDCJ as it 
emphasises that ongoing experience of mental illness and the environmental 
factors involved in treatment are not a sufficient basis on which to withhold a 
judgment of competence. However, it is not clear whether competence as 
invoked in the judgment is essentially decisional competence or FPCLC820.
The Michigan case of Kaimowitz rejected this belief in the enduring possibility of 
decisional competence to consent during psychiatric detention. Commenting on 
the requirement of the Nuremberg Code, the court held that it is:
“ . . . impossible for an involuntarily detained mental patient to be 
free of ulterior forms of restraint or coercion when his very release 
from the institution may depend upon his co-operating with the 
institutional authorities and giving his consent to experimental 
surgery.”821
817 (1973) 96 D & C 2 d 619 (CP Northampton County PA).
818 (1973) 42 USLW 2063 (Mich Cir Ct).
819 Ibid. Williams J., p. 2087.
820 Mere committal to a psychiatric institution would not compromise agency competence, 
although the inherent limitations of the institution would impose limitations upon the ways in 
which task and decisional competences could be expressed. Certain task and decisional 
competences may therefore deteriorate or lie dormant because of institutionalisation. This could 
feasibly include the decisional competence to consent to research.
821 (1973) 42 USLW 2063 (Mich Cir Ct) at p. 2082.
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Both these rulings rest upon the situational context of competence, in particular 
in relation to the institutional environment of a mental asylum, and whether it is 
has a benign or coercive impact upon decisional competence to consent. 
Whereas in Maida Yetter, the court did not consider the institutional 
environment to erode decision-making competence, in Kaimowitz, the intrinsic 
inequality in the relationship between doctor and patient was sufficient to vitiate 
the provision of free and informed consent.
The reasoning behind these judgments can be explained by reference to a 
decision-relative account of decisional competence, given the differing levels of 
competence that the procedures in the two cases require. In Maida Yetter, the 
issue concerned competence to consent to surgical biopsy recommended due 
to suspected breast cancer, which constitutes treatment. However, in 
Kaimowitz, the issue concerned competence to consent to experimental 
psychosurgery, which, in spite of possible therapeutic benefits, constitutes 
research. Because the standard of competence required in cases of research is 
often greater than in cases of treatment, it is a defensible presumption that an 
institutionalised patient is competent to consent to fewer types of medical 
research than she is to types of treatment. This is due to both the higher level of 
understanding, reasoning and appreciation required in research and also the 
potential for the consent process in research in institutional settings being 
subject to covert forms of manipulation or deception822.
Kennedy and Grubb criticize the decision in Kaimowitz as over-protective823. 
This has some justification. It should not be due to a presumption that an 
institutionalised patient is ipso facto decisionally incompetent or lacks FPCLC to 
offer consent to research. Rather, the presence of decisional competence or 
incompetence to consent to research should first be evaluated in terms of the 
personal characteristics of the patient (i.e. whether he or she is confident and 
assertive or withdrawn and submissive within the institutional setting) and the
822 This chimes with the work of sociologists, especially Erving Goffman who have studied the 
nature of ‘total institutions’, such as hospitals, schools and prisons. See, in particular, his 
Asylums (1961): “The point is not that the hospital is a hateful place for patients, but that for the 
patient to express hatred of it is to give evidence that his place in it is justified and he is not yet 
ready to leave it.” (ibid: 355).
823 Kennedy and Grubb (2000: 764).
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extent to which the institution allows and encourages patients to make their own 
choices more generally.
Certain states have developed their own staged tests of decisional competence 
as a means to inform ascriptions of FPCLC. In the New Jersey case of Re 
SchillerB2A, the court ruled that the standard of competence brought to bear 
upon patients in the context of medical treatment should be that of 
understanding the condition, nature and effects of the proposed treatment, and 
its attendant risks. This four-stage test has parallels with the Gillick standard of 
capacity to consent, except here the test is elaborated in relation to adults. In 
order for this test to be applied to research, an understanding of the condition 
would need to be substituted with an understanding of the aims and objectives 
of the research procedure. The inclusion of risk appreciation as a criterion of 
competence need not lead to an asymmetrical application of competence, 
provided that appreciation of risk is accounted for at the level of ascertaining 
decisional ability rather than in relation to the choice reached.
In Re Virgil D824 25, the court interpreted the Wisconsin statutory standard for 
incompetence826 to mean understanding the advantages and disadvantages of 
accepting medication or treatment, and the alternatives to the particular 
medication or treatment offered. The court held that to construe the standard in 
these terms did not require the patient to appreciate the nature of her mental 
illness where administration of psychotropic drugs is at issue, and that denial of 
one’s illness is irrelevant to the determination of competence. This is certainly a 
more a progressive judgment, and has close parallels with the Re C test and 
the position under PTDCJ. However, it is questionable whether a patient could 
be judged decisionally competent to consent to treatment or a research 
procedure to alleviate a condition of which she denies existence, as she would 
exhibit a failure of belief and appreciation.
824 372 A.2d 360, 367 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
825 524 N.W.2d 894, 895 (Wis. 1994).
826 Wisconsin is one of a small minority of US states to have a statutory definition of 
competence, although this is usually a standard that has generic application and is not specific 
to medical treatment or research.
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In the more recent Californian case of Thor v Superior Courf27, a similar but 
more clearly elaborated standard of competence was proposed. The court held 
that in order for a patient to be competent, the patient must have “the capacity 
to reason and to make judgments . . .  a clear understanding of the risks and 
benefits of the proposed treatment alternatives” and “a full understanding of the 
nature of the disease and the prognosis”827 28. The first criterion relating to 
reasoning and judgment is a central component of any coherent standard of 
decisional competence. In the context of medical research, however, an 
awareness of the risks and benefits of alternative treatment options cannot 
apply. Instead, a measure of understanding the risks involved in participation is 
appropriate, combined with an appreciation that, in many cases, the benefits of 
the procedure will accrue to individuals other than the patient or volunteer, 
possibly not for some time yet.
We cannot know, given the absence of case law, which standard would actually 
be applied. In the context of medical research, it is open to speculation whether 
a “full understanding of the nature of the disease” refers to the disease that the 
research intends to investigate, irrespective of whether the patient suffers from 
this disease or not, or whether the potential participant satisfactorily 
understands the purpose that the research is designed to fulfil within the context 
of furthering understanding into that disease.
Appreciation of relevant Information is a fundamental component of FPCLC 
determinations in many states of the US. In Lane v Candura829, the court found 
a woman to have legal competence to refuse potentially life-saving treatment to 
amputate her gangrenous leg. Psychiatric assessments showed that the 
respondent satisfactorily appreciated the nature and consequences of her act in 
so far as she understood that her leg was infected and that death would 
probably arise from refusing treatment830. Yet the court in Re Roe831 held that a 
man suffering from schizophrenia was incompetent to consent because of a 
refusal to take his medication and his denial that he was mentally ill. This was a 
consequence of the denial preventing him from “appreciat[ing] the need to
827 855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993).
828 Ibid, at p. 381.
829 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
m  Ibid, at p. 1236.
831 583 N.E.2d 1282,1286 (Mass. 1992).
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control his illness with anti-psychotic medication” and “the risks associated with 
refusing it”832 83. The decision in Lane exemplifies how reasons for refusing 
treatment may be admitted if such refusal affects or potentially affects only the 
patient herself but, as Roe illustrates, are not admitted in circumstances where 
denial of illness or refusal to take medication may have an impact both herself 
and upon other members of society. This represents the problematic boundary 
between individual autonomy and legal paternalism in competence
. f t ' } ' }determinations .
Recourse to legal paternalism is justified under the PGC only if the effect of 
interfering with the generic rights of one agent (e.g. liberty) will prevent the 
probable violation of more important generic rights of other agents (e.g. life). 
This does not commit us to a risk-relative standard of competence, however, as 
the appreciation of the risk of causing harm is subsumed within the criteria for 
competence, not in whether or not we respect the subsequent decision. On this 
basis, we might judge Roe decisionally competent to refuse treatment, but if his 
refusal of treatment were to leave him open to causing harm to himself or others 
we may nonetheless choose to detain him in a psychiatric institution for the 
duration he poses a threat of harm. In order for that to happen, there would 
have to be a clear causal relationship between his failure to take the medication 
and the likelihood of causing unintended harm to himself and/or others. Similar 
issues arise in a research setting, particularly if the effect of a competent refusal 
of experimental surgery was to lead to a continuation of behaviour that poses a 
threat to other agents834.
Interestingly, in certain states, standards of FPCLC are formulated in terms of 
decisional incompetence. The decision in In Re Conroy 835 held that a 
determination of incompetence might be made because of a failure to 
understand information relevant to the decision, or to evaluate respective
832 Ibid at p. 1286.
833 For expositions of legal paternalism in a medical context, see Buchanan (1978); Dworkin 
(1971) and Gert and Culver (1976).
One may object that this fails to address the controversy surrounding whether certain types 
of behaviour are actually illnesses at all. However, the issue relevant to justifying legal 
paternalism under the PGC is not whether a person is suffering from a mental disorder, but 
whether the effects of refusing treatment for her behaviour may potentially violate the rights of 
other agents.
835 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
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options associated with that decision836. This ruling is perfectly reasonable, 
provided that sincere attempts have been made on a number of occasions to 
remedy perceived failures of understanding through education and support. The 
Conroy ruling stands at odds with the more questionable judgment in the 
Californian case of Reise v St. Mary’s Hospita l7, where the understanding and 
appreciation criteria were supplemented by the ability to evaluate the 
information and reach a decision through employing a “rational thought 
process”838. The requirement of a “rational thought process” is heavily value­
laden and discretionary, and may give rise to an outcome test of competence, 
particularly if the rationality of the thought process is defined in terms of the 
competence assessor’s view of what constitutes such a process.
Reflecting on the myriad legal standards attached to competence across the 
US, Grisso and Appelbaum have persuasively argued for a definition of 
incompetence that, while not to be found within law, encapsulates existing legal 
principles within an explicitly decision-relative standard. Incompetence, they 
propose:
“constitutes a status of the individual that is defined by functional 
deficits (due to mental illness, mental retardation or other mental 
conditions) judged to be sufficiently great that the person currently 
cannot meet the demands of a specific decision-making situation, 
weighed in light of its potential consequences."839
The reference to the consequences of the decision-making situation does not 
entail that an individual could be competent to consent to a procedure but not to 
refuse (or vice-versa), as under an asymmetrical standard of competence. 
Instead, we can more accurately interpret it as a requirement for an 
appreciation of the long-term implications of consenting to or refusing a 
particular procedure, which is central to PTDCJ. This demands a holistic 
appreciation of the consequences of consent and refusal that recognises 
competence to make any choice open under the decisional scenario concerned. 
The definition proposed by Grisso and Appelbaum therefore bears a strong 
affinity with PTDCJ. Nonetheless, this definition has no legal force, and in its
838 Ibid, at 1240.
837 243 Cal. Rptr 241 (1987).
838 Ibid, at 254.
839 Grisso and Appelbaum (1998: 27).
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present form is more amenable to influence psychiatric rather than judicial 
opinion.
Overall, competence to consent to treatment and research in the United States 
has developed on an ad hoc basis. It is still in a state of flux. Certainty and 
consistency are impeded through the existence of disparate standards across 
states, although it is encouraging to observe that many of them tend toward 
decision-relativity than risk-relativity. The problem is that while the multitude of 
tests of competence that abound across the country at state level persist, there 
may be an assumption that little needs to be done at federal level, which would 
explain the indifference towards decisional competence in the Common Rule. 
The diversity of standards of competence assessment that exist in the US 
prompted Milton Green to remark over sixty years ago that judicial tests of 
competence were inherently subjective and lacked definition840. It appears that 
in the intervening years, little has changed.
Policy documents on decisional competence
President’s Commission: M aking Health Care Decisions  (1982)
We first considered the report Making Health Care Decisions briefly at the 
beginning of Chapter Six. We return to it here to study more closely the 
discussion of competence it generates. One of the central objectives of the 
1982 report was to consolidate the recommendations of the Belmont Report 
(discussed in Chapter Two) by defining more clearly the nature of decisional 
competence to consent, which they referred to as the non-legal standard of 
mental capacity841. The Commission set out in some detail their views:
“Elements of capacity
In the view of the Commission, any determination of the capacity to 
decide on a course of treatment must relate to the individual abilities 
of a patient, the requirements of the task at hand, and the 
consequences likely to follow from the decision . .  ,842
840 Green (1941: 145-147). Roth (1979) and White (1994) have more recently endorsed this 
view.
841 President’s Commission (1982).
842 President’s Commission (1982: 57).
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Standards for assessing capacity
An assessment of an individual’s capacity must consider the nature 
of the particular decision making process in the light of these 
developments: Does the person possess the ability to understand 
the relevant facts and alternatives? Is the patient weighing the 
decision within a framework of values and goals? Is the person able 
to reason and deliberate about this information? Can the patient 
give reasons for the decision, in the light of the facts, the 
alternatives and the impact of the decision on the patient’s own 
goals and values? . . . Since the assessment must balance 
competing considerations of well-being and self-determination, the 
prudent course is to take into account the potential consequences of 
a patient’s decision [emphasis added]. . . the Commission rejects 
the expressed preference standard for decisions that might 
compromise the patient’s well-being.
The Commission also rejects as the standard of capacity any test 
that looks solely to the content of the patient’s decision. Any 
standard based on ‘objectively correct’ decisions would allow a 
health professional (or other third party) to declare that a patient 
lacks decision-making capacity whenever a decision appears 
‘wrong’, ‘irrational’ or otherwise incompatible with the evaluators 
view of what is best for the patient.”843.
The standards for assessing capacity expounded by the Commission are 
generally synonymous with the criteria for decisional competence suggested by 
Beauchamp and Wicclair in Chapter One. However, the recommendation that 
the consequences of a decision are relevant to the determination of capacity 
indicates possible support for an asymmetrical standard of competence. Aside 
from its logical incoherence, asymmetrical standards are particularly difficult to 
defend in research settings, where ascribing competence to decide one way but 
not the other could be seen either as a licence for exploitation or an instance of 
stringent medical paternalism.
There is a welcome balance inherent in the Commission’s proposals through its 
clear admission that both well-being and patient autonomy are relevant 
considerations in determining competence to consent to research. This meshes 
closely with PTDCJ. However, the idea that the outcome of the research 
procedure and the level of risk the patient is willing to assume should determine 
competence is unconvincing. An inductive theory such as the one proposed 
externalises decisional competence and makes it contingent upon risk, rather 
than premised upon the inherent capabilities of the patient or volunteer. Instead,
843 President’s Commission (1982: 60-61).
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the level of decisional competence which supported decision-making practices 
may be able to elicit from any potentially decisionally competent agent should 
determine the kind of research procedures in which the individual can 
legitimately agree to become involved. We can endorse the expressed 
preference standard such that it allows individuals to participate in only those 
projects to which they are capable of consenting.
The Commission go on to identify the outcome, status and functional tests for 
assessing capacity, endorsing the functional approach. On this basis, the 
Commission turn to the issue of the decisional competence of individuals 
suffering from mental disorder:
“[Pjatients who are presumed to be incapacitated on the basis of their 
status may actually be capable of making particular health care 
decisions . . .[Mjildly or moderately retarded individuals hold 
understandable preferences about healthcare, and the same may be 
true in varying degrees among psychotic persons. . . Similarly, a 
senile person may have been declared incompetent by a court and a 
guardian may have been appointed to manage the person’s financial 
affairs, but the functional standard would not foreclose the need to 
determine whether the senility also negated the individual’s capacity 
to make health care decisions.”844
This refreshing openness to the existence of decision-relative competences 
stands at odds with their earlier insistence upon the consideration of 
consequences in the assessment of competence to consent to research. In this 
paragraph, the Commission appear to endorse a conception of competence that 
is more closely aligned with PTDCJ. However, the approval given to both 
decision-relative and risk-related models of competence raise the question of 
which principle is to be given priority over the other when the two conflict845. It 
highlights the complexity in unpacking the outcome risks from the 
understanding and appreciation needed to understand the research procedure 
in the first place. Nonetheless, the explicit recognition that competence to make 
healthcare decisions may still persist even if competence has diminished in 
other fields of activity and personal affairs is clear evidence of the Commission’s 
support for preserving decisional competence as far possible.
844 President’s Commission (1982:170).
845 An example of this would be where an individual has been found competent to consent to a 
research procedure consisting of several stages, but chooses to consent only to those stages 
that involve a greater level of risk of harmful side effects.
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Further in the report, the Commission consider the position of children:
“Rather than considering children under the age of majority 
incompetent to decide unless they come within one of the exceptions 
created by the statutory and common law, these patients could be 
regarded as competent unless shown to lack decision making 
capacity846
The rebuttable presumption of decisional competence is the antitheses of the 
rebuttable presumption of decisional incompetence formulated in Gillick. In 
proposing this, the Commission have shown willingness to consider innovative 
approaches toward maximising children’s autonomy in healthcare decision­
making contexts. However, on the evidence considered in Chapter Six, this 
presumption of decisional competence is probably only appropriate in treatment 
situations with children above the age of twelve or fourteen and in research 
situations with children above the age of fourteen or fifteen. Below this, it would 
seem advisable that a rebuttable presumption of decisional incompetence 
should apply in both contexts, with higher burden of proof in research contexts.
Expert Panel Report to the National Institutes of Health: Research 
Involving Individuals with Questionable Capacity to Consent (1997)
In December 1997, a panel of leading US psychiatrists and neuroscientists 
were convened by the director of the National Institutes of Health to consider 
the assessment of decisional competence to consent to medical research on 
behalf of individuals whose capacity to do so was in doubt847. Instead of 
approaching the issue from a philosophical perspective848, the panel felt that it 
was more useful to focus on the capacities, impairments, and needs of 
individuals with questionable ability to provide informed consent. Arguing that 
no “gold standard” exists to assess decisional competence, the panel 
concluded:
846 President’s Commission (1982:170).
847 Expert Panel Report to the National Institutes of Health (1997).
848 However, the Panel, mindful of the fundamental ethical principles enshrined in the Belmont 
Report, asserted in the Introduction that: “Research must be conducted with integrity and fidelity 
to the principles of respect for persons, beneficence, and distributive justice. Clinical scientists 
need to enhance their ethics knowledge base and improve the quality of relationships with 
research participants”, (ibid.) This recognition of the moral underpinnings of the issues under 
discussion illustrates their awareness of the ethical context of the debate.
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" . . .  neither “evidencing a choice” nor correctly answering a given 
number of factual questions as a measure of “understanding” a 
protocol are adequate criteria for consent capacity. Instead the 
subject’s appreciation [original emphasis] of how the study applies 
to them and can affect their lives would be preferable criteria . . . .  A 
key factor in potential participants' decision-making is their 
appreciation of how the study applies to them in the context of their 
lives. Measures of appreciation also link to the potential participant’s 
sense of autonomy, and to the possible coercive elements inherent 
in his or her situation.”849
The Panel subsequently comment in the same section:
"While this group focused initially on attempting to identify certain 
diagnostic groups for whom capacity to consent would be 
questionable, they concluded that such an approach was flawed.
Instead, clinical syndromes or symptoms that might impair attention 
or memory, communication or motivation, or lead to distractibility or 
impulsivity were considered more useful to identify’’.850
The report advocates allowing competence or incompetence to be determined 
by internal characteristics demonstrated by the individuals in question, rather 
than by their successfulness in meeting a series of predefined generic criteria of 
understanding or by their belonging to a specific group of individuals whom are 
traditionally presumed to lack decisional competence. By principally construing 
competence in terms of appreciation, the Panel demonstrate their concern to 
ensure that standards of decisional competence are principally comprised of 
higher-level cognitive processes. Their emphasis on appreciation may lead to a 
more clear demarcation between institutionalised individuals whose 
competence to consent to research is undermined by hopes and fears relating 
to the consequences of participation for themselves and those for whom the 
institutional setting apparently has not impacted upon their appreciation of the 
true purpose of the research.
Another beneficial insight provided by the Panel is the concentration on specific 
clinical symptoms or syndromes as being responsible for eroding competence 
rather than recognised medical conditions. It is possible to distinguish between, 
for example, a group of depressed patients who have sufficient motivational
849 Expert Panel Report to the National Institutes of Health (1997).
850 Expert Panel Report to the National Institutes of Health (1997).
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capabilities to offer a competent consent to a research procedure and those 
who have not. PTDCJ endorses this, as the judgment is made upon the direct 
causal relationship between the effect of the symptom and decision-making 
rather than the more vague relationship between the condition and decision­
making. However, a move towards such an approach to understanding 
impairments of decisional competence would require that professionals 
responsible for assessing competence be consistently prepared to see beyond 
generalisations associated with the condition and take the time to undertake a 
meaningful assessment of decisional competence.
National Bioethics Advisory Commission: R esearch Involving Persons  
with M ental D isorders That M ay A ffec t D ecision-M aking C apacity  (1998)
This report, published by the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) 
in 1998851, comprises twenty-one recommendations that the Commission 
believes should govern all research involving persons with mental disorders in 
the United States. Several of these recommendations pertain to competence to 
consent:
“Informed consent to research
Recommendation 6 : No person who has the capacity for consent 
may be enrolled in a study without his or her informed consent. 
When potential subjects are capable of making informed decisions 
about participation, they may accept or decline participation without 
involvement of any third parties.
Assessing potential subjects’ capacity to decide about participating 
in a research protocol
Recommendation 8: For research protocols that present greater 
than minimal risk852, an IRB should require that an independent, 
qualified professional assess the potential subject’s capacity to 
consent. The protocol should describe who will conduct the 
assessment and the nature of the assessment. An IRB should 
permit investigators to use less formal procedures to assess 
potential subject’s capacity if there are good reasons for doing so.
851 National Bioethics Advisory Commission (1998).
852 Defined by US federal legislation as where “the probability and magnitude of harm or 
discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily 
encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical or psychological 
examinations or tests.” 45 CFR 46.102(i).
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Expanding knowledge about capacity assessment and informed 
consent
Recommendation 19: The National Institutes of Health (NIH) should 
sponsor research to expand understanding about decision-making 
capacity, the best means for assessing decision-making capacity, 
and techniques for enhancing the process of informed consent, and 
the possible roles of decision makers in research”853
Two issues arise from the NBAC guidance. The provision for the appointment of 
an external and independent competence assessor prescribed by the research 
protocol in Recommendation 8 represents a desire to eliminate doubt as far as 
possible during the informed consent process, and raises the likelihood of an 
external assessor being better qualified and experienced in making judgments 
of competence. However, there is no reason why this should apply only to those 
procedures that involve greater than a minimal risk, as the vast majority of 
research procedures that occur, particularly of a therapeutic nature, pose a 
minimal risk or less to the participant. We also need to clarify the grounds upon 
which less ’formal’ procedures for establishing consent can operate, so that 
they may be scrutinized properly by IRBs. The exhortation in Recommendation 
7 to respect any refusal or objection is a welcome addition, but there is a risk 
that the investigator could use her entitlement to subsequently approach the 
subject to ascertain whether they have changed their minds to place undue 
influence on the refusing individual. This is more likely when the individual is a 
patient under in the care of the investigator.
The second issue is less encouraging. The absence of any specific criteria with 
which to make assessments of competence or upon which to judge competence 
is disappointing. There is also no reference to criteria for decisional or legal 
competence, or even one propounded by others, in the accompanying 
commentary. The unqualified use of informed consent compounds this 
shortcoming854. However, the clear misgivings the members of the Commission 
have about presuming individuals with mental disorders to be decisionally 
incompetent suggests that functional tests for competence such as that 
supported by the President’s Commission are also supported by NBAC.
853 National Bioethics Advisory Commission (1998).
854 It is likely however that there is an implicit understanding on behalf of NBAC that informed 
consent will be construed in accordance with §46.116, Basic DHHS Policy for the Protection of 
Human Research Subjects, 45 Code of Federal Regulations Part 46 (see section 6.4.1. below).
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The NBAC recommendations capture the spirit of PTDCJ and are welcome as 
evidence of a progressive move, but do not go far enough in terms of making 
clear recommendations for assessing and judging competence. Though the 
Commission has offered some important procedural requirements for securing 
and respecting informed consent, the grounds on which this consent should be 
given and how decision-making can be supported appear to have been passed 
over. The omission of criteria to establish competence undermines our ability to 
draw a correspondence between the NBAC guidance and PTDCJ.
NIH Policy and Guidelines on the Inclusion of Children as Participants in 
Research Involving Human Subjects (1998)
Recommendations contained within a Congressional Directive to the NIH in 
1995 formed the basis of the NIH Policy855. They state that insufficient attention 
had been previously focused on the ethics of paediatric research, particularly 
when the potential benefits to children as a whole were considerable. Three 
years later, this guidance was issued, which makes clear NIH policy in relation 
to medical research with children. The NIH propose that children should take 
part within research on human participants which the NIH funds or stages, 
“unless there are scientific and ethical reasons not to include them". An 
application for a research protocol which excludes children must provide “an 
acceptable justification” for this856.
The NIH policy is motivated by good intentions to catalyse research projects 
that have their aim furthering scientific knowledge to inform paediatric medicine. 
It does however, display a significant omission in so far as there is no concept 
of competence or informed consent contained within these guidelines. It is true 
that the NIH had devised criteria of competence to consent to research, it would 
not have been compatible with the prevailing federal statute, which only 
contains a concept of assent, as we saw above. Still, it is unfortunate that the 
NIH policy appears to has been formulated along similarly restrictive lines, 
rather than spearheading a drive towards new policy.
855 National Institutes of Health (1998).
856 National Institutes of Health (1998).
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Whilst it is clear that research with children is necessary in order to discover the 
aetiology and pathogenesis of disease, this should no be at the expense of 
giving sufficiently able children the opportunity themselves to offer a competent 
consent or refusal to research participation. Assent is appropriate for young 
children, but it is bizarre to apply a blanket policy whereby older adolescents, 
who are essentially adults for developmental purposes, should be subject to the 
same principles. The NIH guidance appears something of a hastily conceived 
reaction to the problem of an insufficient number of child participants in 
research, whilst maintaining a sufficient range of safeguards. There needs to be 
a more thoughtful and nuanced approach towards the participation of children of 
different ages in medical research if these recommendations are to reflect the 
wide range of decisional abilities of children of different ages.
Summary
The regulatory status of decisional competence to consent to medical research 
in the United States remains poorly articulated, in spite of the existence of 
federal legislation on research and the creation of numerous policy documents 
to attempt to improve the position. Standards of FPCLC vary between states 
and are elaborated typically in relation to medical treatment rather than 
research. There is some uncertainty surrounding how competence is to be 
assessed and a palpable tension between standards of decisional competence 
and FPCLC. That the FPPHS does not elaborate a standard of decisional 
competence or FPCLC undermines the prospects for the development of a 
consistent standard that would harmonize practice between individual states. 
There are, however, some encouraging decision-relative tests of decisional 
competence in certain states, and Appelbaum and Grisso’s definition of 
incompetence in particular posits a meaningful way forward.
Policy documents, especially the President’s Commission, suggest that having 
FPCLC and experiencing cognitive vulnerability are not mutually exclusive. 
Moreover, case law indicates that FPCLC can be held in conjunction with the 
existence of a recognised mental disorder in the United States. This is clearly a 
positive development from the perspective of PTDCJ. The recommendations of
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the Expert Panel Report to the National Institutes of Health and the National 
Bioethics Advisory Commission both concur that mental disorder should not 
automatically serve to remove decisional competence in medical contexts, 
including research. The NBAC report obliquely refers to the need for further 
research into supported decision-making, but this appears to be more at the 
level of aspiration rather than offering an argument for why and how it should be 
realised. Aside from that, there is no evidence of regulatory endorsement of 
supported decision-making in the US.
In relation to children, the most encouraging ideas are contained in the 
President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and 
Biomedical and Behavioural Research. This study is however now twenty-five 
years old and further work to identify categories of young people where FPCLC 
should be presumed, ascribed on a case-by-case basis and presumed against 
is long overdue. Current federal legislation regulating research with children is 
diametrically opposed to this, and forecloses legal recognition of the decisional 
competence of many young people by allowing assent only. This position is 
unjustifiably rigid and the requirement for assent is wholly inappropriate with 
adolescents.
The parity that exists between decisional competence and FPCLC in the US 
and PTDCJ is largely due to rulings in individual cases and policy documents, 
rather than because of the FPPHS. Most of the policy documents have explicitly 
upheld a model of decision-making that is essentially decision-relative and one 
hopes that it is only a matter of time until it is absorbed through further 
amendments to the FPPHS into federal law. Overall, however, there are 
currently few similarities between the values of PTDCJ and those embodied in 
US law. Indeed, the regulatory position in the US appears less sympathetic to it 
than that in England and Wales.
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Conclusion
Throughout this thesis, I have sought to provide an answer to Jeffrie Murphy’s 
question “When in doubt, which way should we err -  on the side of safety or the 
side of liberty?”857, in the context of decisional competence to consent to 
biomedical research. The analysis we have undertaken draws out the explicitly 
moral nature of the question and places the moral theory grounding the 
argument at the forefront of this analysis. It has also illustrated the steps that we 
need to take to move from the abstract dimensions of the theory to its practical 
implications in judging decisional competence. Recourse to a moral theory is a 
fundamental precondition of being able to elaborate a clear position in relation 
to making judgments about competence at all.
For the ‘bioethics revolution’858 to be more than mere rhetoric, it needs to be 
capable of constantly reassessing, redefining and reanalysing its core 
assumptions. In the case of decisional competence, conceptual and empirical 
analysis is warranted to understand how it is displayed, how it may be 
enhanced and how it may inform legal discourse. Like most bioethical issues, 
competence cannot and should not be analysed in isolation from the disciplines 
that bear on it. Decisional competence thus represents an area of bioethics 
where philosophy, medicine and law meet859. At its core, competence is a 
normative, value-laden notion whose meaning is formed by the moral theory 
with which we choose to analyse it.
Applying the PGC has given us a non-arbitrary starting point for pitching 
judgments of decisional competence and a dialectically necessary basis for our 
precautionary judgments. The theory of PTDCJ I have derived from it is a 
decision-relative, precautionary theory for making judgments about decisional 
competence. Its reliance upon a foundationalist moral theory and the context of
857 Murphy (1979:174), excerpted in full on p. 3 of this thesis.
858 Bloche (1998: 45).
859 Morreim (1991).
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psychiatric studies of decisional competence unties the strengths of theoretical 
and practical reason in making moral judgments. Precautionary judgments 
about competence represent a synthesis of the judgments we ought to make 
about those who are ostensibly agents and the judgments that we can make 
about their competences, given the available evidence and the likely impact of 
the exercise of those competences on the generic rights of themselves and 
other agents. In proposing the PGC as the basis of my theory, I do not expect 
individuals immediately to abandon any normative theory to which they were 
previously committed, but at least to give the PGC and its implications for 
bioethics serious consideration.
It is true that the precautionary theory I develop is not necessarily related to 
biomedical research and could have been developed in relation to some other 
decision-making context. However, there are good reason for having chosen 
biomedical research as the focus of the thesis. In the early twenty-first century, 
we appear to be at a stage where the demand for the participation of cognitively 
vulnerable individuals in medical research is growing rather than receding due 
to rapid neuroscientific and genetic developments. Understanding when and on 
what grounds they should be judged to be competent to consent or to refuse for 
themselves and how we should help them in coming to decisions is an issue 
which is of concern as much to bioethicists as it is to psychiatrists, other health 
care professionals and medical lawyers.
Studying the agentive, task and decisional competences of the five cognitively 
vulnerable groups under consideration in this thesis has offered a rich picture of 
their mental skills and abilities, which may often surpass intuitive 
understandings. Applying the PGC under precaution has shown us that we 
must treat all members of this groups as agents, even where (as may occur in 
extreme cases) the evidence for this is doubtful. That judgments of competence 
have to be made under the same conditions of uncertainty as ascriptions of 
agency is even more difficult where the evidence for competence is itself 
doubtful, as is the case with cognitively vulnerable participants.
The best evidence for making ascriptions of decisional competence is that 
which we collect from interactions with the person concerned. However, if we
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accept PTDCJ, it is not open to us to be neutral about the possibility of 
competence. Before we can make a morally defensible judgment of 
competence, we must have satisfied ourselves that we have done all we can to 
have elicited the individual’s latent decisional competence, even if we 
subsequently find that the individual is incapable of making decisions for 
herself. Therefore, all those involved in the process of assessing competence 
and those responsible for making competence judgments both in the medical 
and legal arenas have a role in ensuring that the available evidence is as 
thorough as it can be and places the individual’s potential for decision-making 
(however slim it is) in its best possible light.
Judgments of competence under PTDCJ are, then, not mere observations. 
Because the PGC requires that we assist individuals if they are unable by their 
own efforts to secure their rights to well-being, there is an obligation to support 
and enhance the decisional abilities of individuals who otherwise may not be 
able to decide for themselves. This precept informs the account of supported 
decision-making I propose. Supported decision-making is an important step in 
making precautionary judgments about any decisional competence. Although I 
have not sought in this thesis to propose a particular practical model for going 
about this, in general terms we can support decision-making by devising and 
employing methods which are sensitive to the heightened vulnerabilities which 
affect the potential participant and connect with her way of coming to 
understand her social world. Only once these methods have been exhausted 
can we then reach a judgment that this individual is ‘incompetent’ to make the 
decision in question and to consider the role of proxy or surrogate decision­
making.
Given pervasive conditions of uncertainty in our efforts to gather knowledge, no 
concept of competence judgment will be flawless. Buchanan has claimed that 
“[a]ny measurement of capacity is subject to error, and any legal judgment that 
someone is competent to make a decision that is based on a measurement of 
capacity will be similarly susceptible.”860 Buchanan is right that the margin for 
error in judgments of decisional competence will be reflected in the margin of 
error exhibited by FPCLC judgments, particularly if the first becomes the
860 Buchanan (2004:417)
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necessary and sufficient condition of the second. But this should not cause us 
to abandon the insights of PTDCJ. Doing something to improve the basis on 
which competence judgments are ascribed, particularly at the level of first 
principle, is better than allowing the current unclear and fragmented position to 
continue unquestioned. I do, however, agree with Buchanan when he suggests 
later in the same article that “the source and level of doubt attaching to any 
conclusion regarding capacity should form part of any evidence going to legal 
competence since it will contribute to the subsequent adjudication of that 
competence.’’861
As PTDCJ shows, judgments of competence can only be based on the 
evidence in the light of the consequences of believing that evidence for the 
ostensible agent’s generic rights and those of any other agents to be affected. 
Where a legal decision requires a decisive answer we must always err on the 
side of that judgment which is the least restrictive of the generic rights of the 
agents involved, following the criterion of more probable harm. The most 
appropriate - and least confusing -  way to resolve this is to make a decision- 
relative account of decisional competence the necessary and sufficient 
condition of FPCLC. This would remove the possibility of conflation with other 
types of legal competence (and even with mental capacity), as decisional 
competence will become a sufficient and necessary condition of FPCLC.
At the end of his article, ‘Competence, Marginal and Otherwise’, Benjamin 
Freedman states: “An important task for philosophy, particularly in the 
medical/legal interface, is the exposure of muddled and wrong-headed 
concepts, to clear the way for a healthy growth of ideas862.” Decisional 
competence, in particular, has been beset by these confusions. I hope to have 
at least exposed the source of these ‘muddles’ and laid the foundations for 
further study. The importance of Murphy’s original question which inspired this 
thesis has not diminished in the intervening years; indeed, the rate of change in 
biomedical research has rendered it all the more urgent. If the argument of this 
thesis is accepted, then we have arrived at a defensible theoretical framework 
for making judgments of decisional competence. I commend it to competence
861 Buchanan (2004:417-418).
862 Freedman (1981:72).
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assessors and policy makers as a rational and compassionate way to secure 
empowerment and protection for cognitively vulnerable people.
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